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Deus ex Machina? New Religious Movements in African Politics
Elizabeth Sheridan Sperber
The majority of political science research on religion and politics examines how reli-
gious variables influence political outcomes. Either implicitly or explicitly, this literature
posits a one-way causal arrow from religion to politics. This dissertation argues that in
many developing countries, however, religious and political change have been endogenous
(interrelated). This is particularly true in weak states, where established religious groups
mobilized to promote third wave democratization. In such contexts, politicians simultane-
ously faced heightened political competition and established religious groups mobilized to
demand accountable democratic governance after the Cold War. Under these conditions,
I argue that politicians faced incentives to intervene in the religious sphere, and to actively
propagate conversionary religious movements. In doing so, politicians sought to cultivate
both moral authority and new constituencies that would compete with the established
“watch dog” religious groups. I term this strategy “politicized propagation,” and argue that
it is an important mechanism undergirding the endogenous relationship between religious
and political change in the region.
Although the theoretical argument advanced in this dissertation is general, I assess
the argument empirically by focusing on the explosive rise of pentecostal (born again)
Christianity in many, but not all, sub-Saharan African states in recent decades. To what
extent have changes in the religious landscape — i.e., the rapid growth of pentecostal
churches — occurred as a result of dynamic political conditions, and previous ‘church’-
state relations (where the term church refers broadly to established religious institutions)?
I engage these questions using targeted case studies and quantitative analysis. Specifically, I
examine the degree to which a country’s pentecostal population share (in 2010) is predicted
by that country’s (i) level of political competition during the 1990s and 2000s, and (ii)
history of church-led mobilization for third wave democratization. The evidence reveals
a strong and significant positive correlation between these political context variables and
pentecostal population shares in the region. Moreover, through a controlled comparison of
born again movements (i.e., charismatics and pentecostals), I am able to adjudicate between
the appeal of born again doctrine, and the organizational features of pentecostal churches,
such as decentralized network structures, and freedom from transnational oversight and
rigid training requirements for leader, which make pentecostal churches more accessible
and malleable allies than established, hierarchical religious institutions with significant
transnational oversight. My findings refute alternative explanations for cross-national
variation in the rise of pentecostalism, as well as the null hypothesis that political and
religious change were not endogenous in sub-Saharan states.
The latter half of the dissertation examines causal process mechanisms through a
detailed study of church-state relations in Zambia, a predominantly Christian nation, where
I collected quantitative and qualitative data in 2011 and 2013. My analyses of these data
reveal that Zambia’s ruling party systematically targeted local pentecostal churches with
cash grants, media permits, urban land plots, and political appointments between 1991 and
2011. Moreover, I find that the government was significantly more likely to allocate perks,
such as lucrative tax breaks or church business licenses, in the lead up to national elections.
This evidence provides strong suggestive support for the theory of politicized propagation.
Zambians’ subjective perceptions of the relationship between different religious groups and
the state are consistent with the theory of politicized propagation, but also belie the wide-
ranging motivations of pentecostal converts. I conclude with reflections on the impact of
politicized propagation, and the ability of the dissertation’s main argument to illuminate the
politics of born again Christian movements in Latin America, as well as Islamic movements
in sub-Saharan Africa.
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Chapter 1
A Theory of Politicized Propagation
Christian mission organizations are arguably more important
today in Africa than ever. . . but are strangely relegated to the
colonial past in the imagination of much contemporary schol-
arship.
— James Ferguson 2006, p.98
Either explicitly or implicitly, the vast majority of political science research on religion
and politics assumes that religion can influence politics, but that political change has little
influence on religious content or demography. Instead, the literature has focused largely
on identifying the effects of religious variables on political outcomes. At the individual
level, studies examine how religious beliefs, participation, or exposure to religious messages
influences individuals’ political attitudes and behaviors. At the institutional level, studies
consider how religious demography influences state formation, party development, social
movements, and partisan strategy. In all of these studies, religious factors enter the equation
as independent variables, and are used to explain observed political phenomena.
This dissertation — a study of contemporary pentecostal Christian movements in sub-
Saharan Africa — takes a different tack. The main argument is that, in many contemporary
developing countries, changes in the religious and political landscape are endogenous.
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In addition to extant theories about how religion affects political outcomes, therefore,
I argue for greater attention to the conditions under which political actors can and do
intervene in the religious sphere in order to influence religious demography within their
borders. In particular, I focus on the relationship between political elites and relatively
new, conversionary religious movements, such as Born Again Christianity, and ask: (1)
Under what political conditions are new religious movements most likely to thrive, and to
emerge as politically salient identities in developing countries today? (2) To what extent
do contemporary political actors actively seek to facilitate (or constrain) the rise of new
conversionary religious movements, and thereby to influence religious demography within
their borders?
I argue that under certain conditions, political elites face incentives to invest public and
private resources in the propagation of conversionary religious movements. Specifically,
in states where political competition is relatively high, and where established religious
institutions credibly threaten to mobilize opposition, political elites face incentives to
intervene in the religious sphere in an attempt to cultivate new, religiously grounded
constituencies. By targeting state resources to these movements, politicians can easily signal
support to the new groups, which typically have less access to resources than established
religious institutions, and may therefore be considered “less costly” to influence.
How do political elites propagate new religious movements? First and foremost, they
engage in explicit adoption and promotion of the group’s symbolism and rhetoric, and
attend religious events held by the group. This was the case in Benin’s 1996 elections, for
instance, when the country’s former secular Marxist dictator, Mathieu Kérékou, embraced
explicitly Renewalist language, and announced himself as God’s chosen candidate: “In spite
of the past 17 years,” his campaign slogan advertised, “it is Kérékou that God has chosen for
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this people.” 1 Repeatedly, Kérékou and his ministers enlisted imagery of being reborn and of
Christ’s second coming to describe Benin’s destiny. Between 1996 and 2001 — when Kérékou
controversially seized a second term in unfair elections that opposition parties boycotted —
pentecostalism in Benin grew significantly.2
To bolster their promotion of the religious movement’s symbols, elites can target tangible
support to leaders and key institutions associated with the movement. As in more traditional
cases of religious favoritism (e.g., Latin American states’ historic favoritism of the Catholic
Church), ruling parties have a variety of policy tools that they can use to promote the
growth and public prominence of religious movements. These tools include the selective
allocation of development funds or cash, lucrative tax breaks, church business licenses,
media permits (e.g., to run television or radio channels), and government appointments
for co-religionists.3 Additionally, ruling party officials in developing countries can often
use regulation to dictate how simple (or onerous) it is to register new religious institutions,
may also use targeted regulation to constrain or limit evangelization by specific religious
competitors. In Malawi, for instance, the government prohibits Jehovah’s Witnesses from
proselytizing on the grounds that it violates privacy laws (Hackett 2001, 2011).
Conversely, in countries where political competition is relatively low, or where estab-
lished religions either cannot credibly threaten incumbents, politicians face little political
incentive to propagate new religious movements. In fact, in relatively autocratic states,
governments may fear the establishment of any new civil society organization, such as
a religious institution. These elite preferences manifest in legislation that affects the
composition of the religious landscape. In Cameroon, for instance, the only official who
can legally approve the registration of a new church is the President, and no new churches
1Libération, 20 March 1996.
2I discuss this case at greater length in Chapter 2.
3I discuss these tools in detail in Section 1.2, below.
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were permuted to register between 2009-2014 (Caballero 2014). Additionally, in 2013, the
President and his aides branded new pentecostal churches “a threat to national stability,”
and commanded the military to forcibly close over 100 of them (Tanku 2013). State police
also reportedly harass pentecostal leaders in Cameroon, shaking them down for money and
threatening to close their “illegal” churches (Caballero 2014).
Importantly, the Cameroonian governments’ interventions to constrain the growth of
new pentecostal churches contrasts significantly with the regime’s permissive attitude to-
wards charismatic (born again) Catholicism. In 2011, for instance, Cameroon hosted the
second international conference of charismatic Catholicism, welcoming over 400 delegates
from neighboring Nigeria, alone (Ranaghan 2012). In other words, it is not that the regime
opposes or fears born again Christian doctrine, per say, but rather that ruling elites want to
avoid upsetting the extant, identity-based ruling coalition, and therefore prefer to minimize
the introduction of new, autonomous religious organizations.
These two brief examples help to illustrate parts of the dissertation’s broader argu-
ment that political and religious change (or lack thereof) have been interrelated in many
contemporary developing countries. These examples also begin to shed light on the
more specific argument that political elites have played important roles facilitating (or
constraining) religious change, and are themselves often motivated by a combination of
perceived political competition and threat from established religious institutions that have
historically mobilized to promote democratic policy, or to hold the regime to account.
Bridging two discourses
To what degree are these linked arguments surprising? While scholars of early modern
Europe might not be surprised by the argument that political actors intervene in religious
markets to propagate new religious movements, this argument challenges dominant models
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of religion and politics in two distinct literatures in political science, which are typically
considered apart from one another.
The first is the Political Economy of Religion literature, which is informed primarily by the
historic experiences of American and European countries. At the heart of this literature is a
one-dimensional model that posits two types of cases in the world: cases where governments
intervene in the religious sphere to repress religion(s), and cases where governments refrain
from intervening in the religious sphere, thereby promoting healthy religious competition
(i.e., pluralism). The former type of case is typified by authoritarian Marxist regimes (e.g.,
Cuba) or states that forcefully promote one religion (e.g., early modern Spain). An example
of robust pluralism, by contrast, is the United States, where new churches are not required
to register with the state.
Importantly, this literature assumes that increases in religious competition — i.e., the
entrance of new religious movements into the “religious market” — is orthogonal to politics
(so long as governments refrain from religious repression). As I detail in Section 1.2,
however, there are a number of cases that defy this assumption, and do not fit into the
existing binary conceptual framework of existing studies. Not coincidentally, many of these
cases are found in newly independent and weakly-institutionalized states (e.g., many sub-
Saharan African states).4 Specifically, I identify cases of what I term “substitute spirituality,”
which are characterized by simultaneously low levels of government intervention in the
religious sphere and low levels of religious competition, and “politicized propagation,” in
which governments actively intervene in the religious sphere in order to increase religious
competition within their borders, and to establish new religious constituencies.
4On the unique structural conditions of many African countries, see Lonsdale (1986) or Bratton and van de
Walle’s (1997: 38) influential argument that African politics were “excluded” from comparative studies of third
wave political transitions partly on the basis of the region’s unique structural and social conditions, including
the role of personalistic, identity-based rule.
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This dissertation also contributes to comparative politics research on ethnic politics,
which focuses primarily on sub-Saharan African and South Asian cases. This literature
posits religion as one of several distinct types of ethnic identity, and defines ethnicity
as an identity category derived from heritable traits and descent-based characteristics, or
traits perceived as descent-based.5 Conversionary religious movements, however, defy
this definitional assumption in the literature. In contrast to ethnic categories (e.g., tribe),
and even some religious categories (e.g., traditional Catholics), conversionary religious
movements explicitly embrace adult conversion over hereditary group membership. In
the case of born again Christianity, this manifests in the tradition of adult rather than
infant baptism. Accordingly, I argue that religion in general, and new conversionary
movements in particular are special cases of “ethnic” politics, as the centrality of adult
conversion within these movements frequently leads the religious identity to cross-cut other
identities. It is precisely the ability of conversionary religious movements, such as born
again Christianity, to cross-cut and revise earlier conceptions of personal, ethnic and even
national subjectivities which makes them such powerful cultural forces, and which makes
them uniquely useful for politicians struggling to build new political constituencies, and
particularly menacing to politicians striving to protect extant identity-based coalitions. This
insight is especially relevant for studies of African politics, given the undisputed importance
of identity politics in the region.
Application: Empirical context
The argument that I develop in this chapter is general, and can be applied across diverse
religious contexts. For instance, as I discuss in Chapter 5, the theory presented in this
dissertation sheds new light on the growth and political roles of several Islamic movements
5For a discussion of the literature see Varshney, 2007; for recent examples see Chandra 2007, 2012; Posner 2005;
Eiffert, Miguel and Posner 2009; Habyarimana et al., 2009.
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in the region, including the Mouride Brotherhood in West Africa, and Niger’s propagation of
Sufism (and its related regulation of Salafism). In this dissertation, however, I evaluate the
argument in the context of born again Christian movements in sub-Saharan Africa.
There are important substantive and theoretical reasons to focus on the case(s) of born
again Christianity in sub-Saharan Africa. Although Western media tends to focus on Islamic
religious movements in sub-Saharan Africa, the region’s most extreme changes in religious
demography and political engagement have occurred within the gambit of Christianity. As
illustrated in Figure 1.1, for instance, the percentage of Christians in sub-Saharan Africa has
more than doubled over the last five decades (Pew 2011). Pentecostalism, in particular, has
grown most explosively since the advent of third wave democratization in the early 1990s
and survey evidence suggests that these pentecostal converts have come overwhelmingly
from the established churches (Ibid). Today, approximately one in twelve of the region’s 480
million Christians identifies as pentecostal (Ibid; World Christian Database (WCD) 2010).
The rise of pentecostal movements in the region is intriguing not only because of its
timing and the sheer scale of its growth, but also because of its cross-national variation
and prominent position in many states’ political discourse. First, the size of pentecostal
Christian populations varies significantly across African countries. According to Pew (2010),
for example, roughly a quarter of all Christians belong to pentecostal churches in four sub-
Saharan states, but in eight other states, approximately one in ten Christians belong to
pentecostal churches. In still other African countries — including those with substantial
Christian populations — Pentecostals represent a much smaller share of the overall Christian
population (Pew 2011).6 What explains this variation?
6Among sub-Saharan states where at least 25% of the national population identifies as Christian, Pentecostals
and charismatics account for highly variable population shares. In Angola, Congo-Zaire, Ghana, Kenya,
Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Zambia these groups comprise over 20%, nationally, while in
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Sudan and Tanzania they represent less than 10%.
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Notes: The rapid growth of Christianity in sub-Saharan Africa after 1950 contrasts with the stability
of the region’s Muslim population, which has hovered at around 40% since Independence. Data is
from World Christian Database for the years 1900, 1950, 1970, 2000, and 2010. Data is from the World
Christian Database (2015). We do not know the slopes of lines connecting data points, but present
them linearly to ease interpretation of trends.
At the same time, policy reports, newspaper articles, and a growing interdisciplinary
literature emphasize that, in countries with significant pentecostal populations, religion
is increasingly politically salient — political coalitions are increasingly organized around
religious identity, and access to political or economic benefits is increasingly perceived to
depend upon religion (Fearon 2001: 4). A report by the Pew Forum, for instance, has noted
that:
With pentecostalism’s demographic explosion has come the sudden expansion of its ef-
forts to shape politics and public life. While nationalist movements drove African politics
during the era of decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, and mainline church leaders
were deeply involved in the continent’s efforts at democratization in the 1980s and early
1990s (Gifford 1995), Pentecostals have become increasingly important political actors
in the last 15 years. (Pew 2011).
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A case-based, interdisciplinary literature on African pentecostalism also reports that pen-
tecostal leaders have served as vote-brokers for incumbents, legitimized anti-democratic
reform, and, at the extreme, legitimated political violence, as in Côte D’Ivoire in 2002
(Mayrargue 2009; Maxwell 2000; Ranger 2008; Cheyeka 2008; Gifford 1998, 2009). Sociologist
David Maxwell (2012) emphasized the patron-client structure of pentecostal churches by
terming pentecostal leaders “secular chiefs.” Similarly, McCauley (2012) pronounced Pente-
costals the “new Big Men” in African politics based on the finding that Ghanaian Pentecostals
related to their pastors in behavioral games the same way that royal subjects related to their
traditional chiefs, while members of other religious denominations did not behave similarly
with their own religious leaders. Moreover, in Nairobi, Riedl and McClendon (forthcoming)
found that exposure to pentecostal messages increased individuals’ self-efficacy, as well
as their tolerance for social inequity. Grossman (2015) identified a strong correlation
between the size of a country’s born again Christian population and the emergence of anti-
homosexuality sentiment as a valence issue in national politics. That a majority of Christians
in thirteen sub-Saharan states favor the adoption of Biblical law, and that many more report
willingness only to vote for a fellow Christian underscores the importance of new Christian
movements for African politics (Pew 2011).
Studying the rise of pentecostalism in sub-Saharan Africa therefore constitutes a timely
and policy-relevant instance of mass religious change. Yet, we lack well-specified theory
and empirics about the relationship between politics and this religious transformation in
the region. In order to begin clarifying this relationship, I distinguish between factors that
affect the “supply” of pentecostalism across countries from factors that influence individual-
level “demand” (preference) for pentecostal doctrine or worship style, conditional upon its
availability. Existing interdisciplinary research focuses overwhelmingly on the question of
individual demand for pentecostalism. This dissertation compliments this body of research
by focusing on the political context variables that make it more (or less) likely that political
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elites will intervene in the religious sphere in an attempt to influence the “supply” of
conversionary religious movements (namely pentecostal Christianity). Politicians, in other
words, exert influence over these movements by playing gate-keeping roles with respect to
the supply of new religious groups.
Before further clarifying my argument and explaining how I evaluate it, however, I detail
the particular religious movements that I study. This is important, as the methods I use to
evaluate my argument exploit the fact that as pentecostalism has grown in the region, so
too has a “pentecostal option” within the mainline Protestant and Catholic churches. The
latter is referred to as charismatic Christianity. Below I identify the defining features, origins,
and evolutionary trajectories of both the pentecostal and charismatic Christian movements
in the region. I then explain how their dual rise enables me to adjudicate empirically
between demand-side variables (individuals’ preference for pentecostal doctrine, worship
style, media, and so on), and state-level supply-side variables, namely, political competition
and prior church-state relations. In Section 2, I clarify the core argument of the dissertation,
and then provide detailed overview of the dissertation’s research strategy in Section 3.
Section 4 concludes with a discussion of scope conditions and external validity.
1.1 Dual Renewalist Movements
1.1.1 Defining features
I noted above that this dissertation focuses largely on the rise of pentecostal movements
in sub-Saharan Africa in recent decades. Yet, pentecostalism is but one of two major
religious movements that have popularized born again Christianity and lively worship style
throughout the continent. In fact, theologians and religious demographers use the umbrella
term Renewalist Christianity to refer to both pentecostal and charismatic Christianity
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because the doctrine and worship style of these movements are virtually indistinguishable.
Figure 1.2 illustrates this relationship. Pentecostals and charismatics within the Catholic and
traditional Protestant churches, for instance, emphasize the gifts of the Holy Spirit, including
prophesy, exorcism, supernatural or divine healing, and speaking in tongues, among others.
As depicted in Table 1.1, members of these sects also tend to emphasize literal interpretation
of the Bible, narrative theology and witness, community-based evangelism, and, in some
instances, also demonize “ethnoreligion,” e.g. tribal or traditional spirituality and ritual.7
The Pew Forum’s (2011) major report, Global Christianity, therefore described as charismatic
those Christians who “engage in spiritual practices associated with pentecostalism, such
as speaking in tongues and divine healing, but belong to Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant
or other denominations in which a minority of congregations have pervasive pentecostal
practices” (Pew 2011: 95).
Terminologically, it is also important to note that Renewalist (i.e., pentecostal and charis-
matic) movements are often referred to as evangelical. This reflects their shared emphasis
on evangelism — activity intended to stimulate others to embrace Renewalist Christianity.
In many sub-Saharan contexts, the terms evangelical, charismatic and pentecostal are used
interchangeably. It is important, however, to distinguish members of these movements
from members of older Evangelical denominations, such as Baptists and Methodists. When
capitalized, Evangelicalism refers to a variety of movements within Protestantism that
emphasize conversionism (i.e., being born again and experiencing the need for active
change in life); activism (actively expressing and sharing the faith, often through missionary
efforts); biblicism (a unique emphasis on the Bible as a sacred text and identification with
‘the biblical story’); and crucicentrism (a central emphasis on Christ’s sacrifice for the good
7According to the World Christian Database (WCD) — the definitive source on global Christian demographics
— ethnoreligionists are “followers of a non-Christian or pre-Christian religion tied closely to a specific ethnic
group, with membership restricted to that group.” (http://worldchristiandatabase.org/wcd/esweb.
asp?WCI=Results&Query=458).
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of all Christians), but do not embrace the manifestations of the holy spirit that are the
hallmark of pentecostal and charismatic worship (Bebbington 1989; also see Freston 2008,
5 — 8). Evangelical church leaders have also often eschewed open engagement in partisan
politics, and have in some cases sided with Catholic and mainline Protestant churches on
questions of democratic accountability, which I discuss further in Chapter 3.






















1.1.2 Origins and evolution of Christian movements in sub-Saharan
Africa
Pentecostalism
Clarifying the origins of pentecostal and charismatic movements in the region helps explain
their overall similarities, as well as their major differences. Western readers will likely
associate pentecostal doctrine with movements in American Protestantism in the early
twentieth century. Yet, Africanist scholars and religious historians have demonstrated that
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Embrace gifts of the Holy Spirit
Born again conversion Yes Yes
Glossolalia (speaking in tongues) Yes Sometimes
Divine prophecy Yes Yes
Divine exorcism Yes Yes
Divine healing Yes Yes
Other doctrinal elements
Literal interpretation of Bible Yes Yes
Narrative theology and witness Yes Yes
Reconciliatory community Yes Yes
Highly evangelistic Yes Mostly
Prosperity gospel Sometimes Sometimes
Participate in eucharist No Yes
Condemn tribal beliefs Yes Sometimes
Worship Style
Oral liturgy Yes Yes
Includes dreams and visions Yes Yes
Lively music Yes Yes
Emphasize ‘leadership’ Yes Yes
Condemn tribal rituals Yes Sometimes
Notes: For further reading see Gifford 1995; Shorter & Njiru 2001; Anderson et al. 2010, Pew 2011; and
Johnson and Ross 2009.
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around the same time that American religious entrepreneurs were innovating pentecostal
religious doctrine and praxis in southern California, West African religious innovators were
developing new Christian ideas and praxis of their own, manifest in Christian revival
movements (Kalu 2008; Tishken and Heuser 2015; Peel 1986). Hence, one scholar has
summarized, “instead of emerging first in the US and UK and then being taken to Africa,
pentecostalism’s development across the Atlantic was coeval” (Premack 2015: 221). I
adopt the view that contemporary pentecostal movements are the hybrid product of two
simultaneous periods of religious revival and innovation that eventually interacted and
became intertwined. African pentecostalism is not reducible to a cultural “import” from
the US or other Western countries.
In contrast to the evolution of pentecostalism in sub-Saharan Africa, however, scholars
of pentecostalism in Latin America — the other world region where Renewalist movements
are the fastest growing religions — is widely recognized as having been “imported from the
United States” (Chestnut quoted in Masci 2014: 1; also see Chestnut 2003; Masci 2014; Martin
1993). Three contextual factors are important to understanding this different trajectory of
the movement across regions: First, Latin American countries were overwhelmingly majority
Christian (Catholic) when pentecostalism was established in North America (African states
were not). Second, Latin America is closer to the US than sub-Saharan African states, and
relatedly enjoys a robust history of intra-American migration and commercial relations that
contrast with de jure and de facto restrictions on African migration to the US throughout the
20th century. For these and other reasons, prominent scholars of pentecostalism in Latin
America, note that US missionaries were quick to spread pentecostalism in Latin America,
and succeeded “almost immediately,” due in part to missionaries’ encouragement of Latin
Americans to lead, direct, and flavor pentecostal movements in their countries (Ibid).
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Charismatic Christianity
In the US, charismatic Christian movements arose in the 1960s, inspired largely by the rise of
the American pentecostal movement. For Catholics, changes embodied in Vatican II helped
inspire and propel a movement for “Charismatic renewal,” in which thousands of Catholics
called for new, “spirit-filled” Catholicism. Given that the older churches faced increasing
competition from Pentecostals, and given Charismatics’ emphasis on evangelism, leaders
of mainline Protestant and the Catholic Church largely embraced the renewal. In 1975, for
instance, Pope Paul VI announced that, “[t]he church and the world need more than ever
that the miracle of Pentecost should continue in history” (Ranaghan 2012). Similarly, in 1979,
Pope John Paul II stated: “I am convinced that this movement is a sign of the Spirit’s action,”
and in 1992, the Pope went further, emphasizing the significance of the Charismatic Renewal
to the Church’s vitality (Ibid).8 Today there are over 130 million Charismatic Catholics
worldwide, and nearly 40 million of them — roughly 30% of the world’s Charismatic Catholic
population — reside in sub-Saharan Africa (WCD 2015).
Evolution of African Christianity and Renewalist movements
The evolution of pentecostal and charismatic Christianities in sub-Saharan was shaped
by historically contingent events specific to the region — namely, anti-colonial struggle
and post-Independence political turmoil. The major events in the evolution of African
Christianity during the late 19th and 20th centuries are best characterized as waves of
indigenous movements for spiritual renewal, inculturation, and ownership over Christian
8“At this moment in the Church’s history, the Charismatic Renewal can play a significant role in promoting
the much-needed defense of Christian life in societies where secularism and materialism have weakened
many people’s ability to respond to the Spirit and to discern God’s loving call. Your contribution to the re-
evangelization of society will be made in the first place by personal witness to the indwelling Spirit and by
showing forth His presence through works of holiness and solidarity.” Address of Pope John Paul II to the ICCRO
Council: March 12, 1992, accessed 12/08/2011 at http://ccc.garg.com/ccc/articles/John_Paul/John_
Paul_001.html
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praxis (c.f., Ranger 1986: 4; Claffey 2007: 11). Terrence Ranger, a prominent scholar of
African Christianity noted of early African religious movements, that “even if they were not
unequivocally anti-colonial, they constituted a form of politics” (Ranger 1986: 6).
Of most relevance to this dissertation are the multiple movements for religious renewal
that coalesced around anti-colonial struggles, and burgeoned during the decade following
Independence.9 As African states transitioned to Independence after WWII, unprecedented
numbers of African Christians broke away from established churches, and formed African
Independent Churches, sometimes referred to as African Indigenous Churches, or AICs.
Some of these churches, such as Alice Lenshina’s Lumpa Church in Zambia, and the
African Independent pentecostal Church of Africa in Kenya, were affiliated with anti-
colonial movements in the 1950s, and drew strength from embracing the African nationalist
zeitgeist.10 In general, AICs emphasized a need to preserve at least some African cultural and
spiritual traditions, such as belief in ancestor spirits and, in some cases, polygamy, which the
established churches shunned. And, unlike most colonial-era mission churches — especially
the Catholic Church — in which Africans rarely held powerful positions as clergy, Africans
ran AICs by and for their communities (Ter Har and Ellis 2004).
Therefore, during the middle decades of the 20th century, as pentecostalism became
more mainstream in the US, and charismatic movements emerged within mission churches,
African societies were simultaneously undergoing unique and major sociopolitical transfor-
mations. This did not go unnoticed by clergy affiliated with the established churches in the
region. As anti-colonial movements ascended to lead newly independent states, church
9For a classic account of revival movements that occurred during the early 20th century, see Peel 1986.
10In the 1950s, for instance, the African Independent pentecostal Church in Kenya supported the Mau Mau
uprising, and urged its members to join this anti-colonial resistance movement. British colonialists imposed a
state of emergency, and shuttered all churches affiliated with the African Independent pentecostal Church of
Africa. Not until Independence in 1963 were these churches reopened (Karanja 2008; Pew 2011).
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officials recognized a clear challenge: Either they would adapt to changing social, cultural
and political conditions, or they would bleed members.
In response to this challenge, a number of missionary scholars undertook unprecedented
research efforts in the region with the goal of better understanding the changing environs in
which their churches sought to operate.11 They also sought to understand why people were
leaving the mission churches for AICs. These researchers soon recognized that Africans were
attracted to AICs precisely because AICs prioritized what many mission churches did not:
inculturation (e.g., embrace of African cultural praxis), recognition of the people’s political
aspirations, and indigenous, nationalist pride, as well as a popular desire for a feeling of
freedom and ownership.
As a result, the established churches began a decades-long process of promoting black
African clergy and attempting to “inculturate” their doctrine and worship styles (c.f., Eg-
bulefu 1992: 104-5; also see Banzikiza 1985; Osei-Bonsu, 2005; IMBISA 1992). Today, most
Catholic Churches in the region acknowledge parishioners’ beliefs in spirit possession by
ancestor spirits and permit modified forms of exorcism Ibid).12 Similarly, it is common
practice throughout much of the region that the older churches (e.g., the Catholic Church),
to permit polygamists to attend church with their first wife — a compromise in which the
church tolerates polygamy, even if it does not fully embrace it (Shorter and Njuru 2001).
11In the early 1960s, for example, Rev. Dr. David Barrett established a research division for the Church of
England in East Africa, which he lead from 1965-1985. This research division formed the basis of the World
Christian Database (WCD, cited above), which is the preeminent source of data on Christian movements
worldwide. It is no coincidence that this data collection began in postcolonial Africa.
12Author interview with anthropologist and Catholic Priest, Fr. Bernard Udelhoven, of Zambia’s Faith and
Encounter Center in Bauleni, Lusaka (Zambia), July 9, 2011.
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1.1.3 Political crises, mobilization and religious change
The 1970s and 80s also brought major political and economic crises throughout the region
that influenced the region’s religious demography. During this heightened period of Cold
War politics, many African states transitioned from multiparty political systems established
at independence to military dictatorships or authoritarian regimes during this period. As
governments tightened their grip on power, they significantly constrained space for political
opposition, free media, and freedom of expression or assembly (c.f., Ibid, Jackson and
Rosberg 1984: 423; Bratton 1989: 420-426; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Baylies and Szeftel
1994: 83). This included major attacks on civil society organizations, including AICs. The
only AICs that survived this era did so by turning inward, and “insulating themselves” rather
than ”challenging the status quo” (Phiri 1999: 325). Notably, these smaller churches lacked
resources, such as well-trained leadership, infrastructure, material support, and network
connections that might have enabled them to stand up to brutal governments. The older
mission churches, by contrast, had unique capacity to mobilize against repression by calling
on these resources.
The political turmoil of the 1970s and 80s therefore provided the older mission churches
with an opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to liberation and African self-rule
by promoting democratic transition and human rights (Gifford 1995). In numerous African
countries, the older mission churches — especially the Catholic Church — stepped into the
breach of civil society created by repressive regimes. In many (though not all) countries,
these churches emerged as bastions of relative freedom, and provided some of the only space
where pro-democratic thinking and organizing could occur (Gifford 1995; Gyimah-Boadi
1996; Phiri 1999). Moreover, post-Vatican II, the Catholic as well as the mainline Protestant
churches were able to provide mobilizing frames and psychosocial resources that built on
themes akin to Latin American liberation theology (Ibid).
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The charismatic movement also permeated the region’s mission churches during this
period, and boosted the churches’ ongoing effort to “inculturate.” Through charismatic
subgroups, Africans discovered that they could engage in the ecstatic worship style that
AICs provided in the 1960s and 70s, but now from within the secure, transnational, and
relatively well-resourced mission churches. By the 1990s, when the (now largely African)
leadership of the Catholic and mainline Protestant churches helped facilitate third wave
democratic transitions in at least twenty-four sub-Saharan states, their populations had
grown dramatically (Toft, Philpot and Shah 2011; also see Philpott 2004).13
From the standpoint of religious demography, then, the historical record suggests that
the major churches experienced challenges to their membership during the 1960s and, to a
lesser extent, the 1970s, but by the 1980s and 90s, the churches had reasserted themselves
as more fully inculturated, socially prominent and politically relevant and pro-democratic
institutions in African civil society. Unfortunately, reliable, comprehensive data on religious
demography in the region is unavailable for the 1950s and 60s. However, Figure 1.3 uses data
from the Catholic Church (compiled by the Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate
(CARA), 2015) to compare the growth rate of the Catholic Church with average population
growth rates in the region by decade, from 1970-2009. In contrast to population growth,
which hovered steadily at just above forty percent across this period, the Catholic Church’s
growth rate increased from 32% in the 1970s to 51.5% in the 1980s, continued to outpace
natural population growth in the 1990s, and then fell to 33% between 2000-2009. The
trajectory of growth depicted in this data affirms the trends described above, based on
historical research on African Christianity. Moreover, as Figure 1.4 illustrates, the growth
of Catholic Church in Africa during and after the 1980s far surpasses its growth in any other
world region.
13The African states in which established churches played this role include: Benin, Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville,
Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Zambia (Ibid).
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Catholic Growth Rate in SSA Population Growth Rate in SSA
Notes: This figure illustrates that during the 1980s and 1990s, Catholicism grew faster than overall
population growth; during the 1970s and 2000s, Catholic Church membership was significantly lower
than overall population growth rates in sub-Saharan countries.
Data on the size of the Catholic population in the region for 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010 was
transcribed from the Vatican’s Annuarium Statisticum Ecclesiae (ASE), by researchers at the Center
for Applied Research in the Apostolate (CARA) at Georgetown University, and published in their 2015
report Global Catholicism, Trends and Forecasts. Data for Catholic population size in 1970 is from the
World Christian Database. Population growth figures are supplemented by the World Development
Indicators.
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Figure 1.4: Catholic Growth Across Regions, 1980-2012
Notes: Graph reprinted from the report Global Catholicism, Trends and Forecasts published by the
Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate (CARA, 2015). CARA affiliates transcribed data on
the size of the Catholic populations across regions in 1980 and 2012 from the Vatican’s Annuarium
Statisticum Ecclesiae.
Timing of pentecostal growth
To return here to the question of pentecostal growth, we know that so-called pentecostal
churches were established in many African countries as early as the 1940s, 50s, and 60s.
However, the explosive growth of African pentecostalism that we know today did not
begin until African states undertook third wave political transitions (Pew 2006; 2010; also
see Gifford 1998). The religious content, cultural mores, and worship styles of so-called
pentecostal Churches in earlier decades were also virtually unrecognizable in relation to
today’s pentecostalism. As Ruth Marshall noted in her unparalleled analysis of Nigerian
pentecostalism’s historic evolution, the small pentecostal communities that emerged prior
to the 1980s were characterized by intensely conservative social values, a rejection of
material wealth and status, and an overarching commitment to austere living guided by their
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devotion to Christianity. Today’s pentecostal movement is the product of several decades of
socioeconomic transformation, and the wholesale reorientation of “pentecostal” doctrine
away from traditional spirituality or social conservatism and austerity, to fashionable,
wealth- and status-seeking in the name of Christianity (e.g., the health and wealth gospel).14
Marhsall also demonstrated that it was not until the 1980s and the 1990s that Nigeria’s
“new” pentecostal movement emerged and began to grow rapidly. In addition to Pente-
costals’ emphasis on God’s desire to reward loyal followers with material success, Marshall
characterizes the contemporary movement as “resolutely trans-ethnic and egalitarian,” and
emphasizes that pentecostal leaders now focused on exhorting converts to break with “old
hierarchies and differentiations, such as kin, generation, ethnicity, and even gender, upon
which dominant relations of power... and strategies for upward mobility had rested” (2009:
113). Anthropologist of African pentecostalism, Birgit Meyer, similarly observed of Ghanaian
pentecostalism that,
“[T]hough much research is still needed on the consequences of becoming Born
Again for people’s personal and social identities, . . . it is clear that for many [in
sub-Saharan Africa] the turn to pentecostalism implies a dissociation — or at
least an attempt to do so — from earlier social and cultural affiliations” (2010:
121).
In other words, as Meyer influentially summarized, pentecostal conversion experiences in
the region can be seen as an attempt to “make a complete break with the past” (1998: 182).15
14Matthew Ojo (1988), argued that Nigeria’s pentecostal and charismatic Christian movements originated in
January, 1970 at the University of Ibadan in Nigeria, when members of the country’s elite university claimed that
they had been baptized in the Holy Spirit and began speaking in tongues (1988: 4; also see Cheyeka 2007: 149).
While these students drew influence from transnational models, Ojo argues that the Born Again “movement”
that originated in Nigeria during the 1970s became first and foremost a mechanism through which indigenous
spirituality was developed and expressed, including the strong emphasis on healing, wealth and power that
have been central in many forms of traditional spirituality on the continent.
15Similarly, Robbins (2004: 127) emphasizes the “images of rupture and discontinuity” that pervade pentecostal
discourse. For discussion, see Deininger 2014: 57-60.
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Unlike earlier African religious movements, which sought to recognize and incorporate
elements of African spirituality into seemingly Renewalist praxis, the African pentecostalism
that emerged in the 1980s and spread like wildfire in a number of African states during
the 1990s is distinguished by its recognition and rejection of tribal custom and missionary
churches’ embrace of inculturation. As Deininger (2014: 59) summarized: “Pentecostals
never claim that the spiritual worlds of the folk religions they encounter are illusory.
Rather they demonize indigenous spirits by making them representatives of the devil” (also
see Robbins 2004: 128).16 It is contemporary pentecostalism’s powerful capacity to help
individuals’ revise their narrative relation to the “past” that Marshall views as most resonant
with youth and entrepreneurs struggling to survive in sprawling urban settings, which grew
at unprecedented rates in the 1990s and 2000s.
Additional evidence of the extraordinary burst of growth experienced by pentecostal
churches in many African countries during the 1990s and 2000s can be found in the United
States Government’s annual International Religious Freedom Reports, the first of which was
released in 1999. Under the section heading “demographics,” the report reads as follows:
Approximately 85 percent of the population are Christian; 5 percent are Muslim;
5 percent adhere to other faiths, including Hinduism and Baha’ism; and 5
percent are atheist. The Christian faith was introduced by foreign missionary
groups in the 1890’s. The majority of indigenous persons are either Roman
Catholics or Protestants and are spread throughout the country. Currently, there
16Accordingly, Kenyan Catholic priest-scholars, Shorter and Njuru condemn the pentecostal churches for
“notoriously turn[ing] their backs on African culture” while the Catholic Church engages in “cultural education
and cultural retrieval” (Shorter and Njuru 2001: 65).
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is an upsurge of new pentecostal churches, commonly known as the "born
again" churches, which have attracted many young persons into their ranks.17
But how does this apparent explosion of pentecostal churches in the 1990s and 2000s
relate to the previous triumph of the service-providing, transnational, pro-democratic and
relatively resource-rich older mission churches in the 1980s and 1990s? How did the
missionary churches fall out of favor, despite their provision of charismatic alternatives,
engagement with African cultural tradition, and — in many countries — a strong stance
against political repression and corruption during the 1980s and 90s?
As noted above, I argue that in the states where established churches were able to
mobilize for democratization at the end of the Cold War, political elites strategically invested
in the propagation of (a variety of) pentecostalism that promotes extreme wealth and, with
it, tolerance of inequality, and portrays political elite as God’s chosen leaders, rather than
leaders in need of oversight by the “watch-dog” pro-democracy major churches. In the
following section, I explicate the logic of this argument and situate it within the context
of existing research on church-state relations. I then return to the specific context of rival
Christian movements in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa, provide preliminary empirical
evidence that helps to illustrate the argument, and explain the research strategy that I
employ in this dissertation to evaluate the plausibility of this argument.
17This line was repeated in all International Religious Freedom Reports for Zambia until 2004, when
authors of the document shifted focus towards the oppositional organizing of mainline churches through
the Oasis Forum, noting “continued to be reports that members of the Government criticized the Oasis
Forum [comprised of the Law Association of Zambia, NGO Coordinating Committee, Zambia Episcopal
Conference, Christian Council of Zambia, and Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia] over the latter’s stance on
the constitutional review process and the mode of adoption of a new Constitution. In spite of rebukes from
government officials against church leaders for taking a stand on political issues, the churches continued to
freely and vocally criticize the Government, organize activities, and mobilize public opinion.” For more details,
see http://www.cesnur.org/testi/irf/irf_zambia99.html
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1.2 Theoretical Frameworks, Revisited
In response to the perceived threat of opposition from established churches, what kind of
political behavior does the literature on religion and politics predict? More broadly, what
do existing studies imply about the relation between political and religious change? As
noted in the introduction, existing studies conceptualize a binary opposition to describe
church-state politics in terms of (either) religious liberty or repression. Drawing on liberal
theories of economic markets, this literature likens state intervention in the religious sphere
to state intervention in the economy, and suggests that either states intervene and reduce
(religious) competition, or they refrain from intervening, which leads to spontaneous and
"healthy" competition. In other words, the literature suggests that when governments
refrain from regulating religion, new religious movements spontaneously arise to meet
individuals’ naturally heterogeneous spiritual needs, leading to greater religious competition
and pluralism (Stark and Bainbridge 1985, 508; also see Iannaccone 1996; Stark and Finke
2000; Smith 2004, 2008).
1.2.1 Conceptual intervention
Yet, the underlying logic of this argument actually implies a broader set of possible re-
lationships between state intervention in the religious sphere and religious competition.
Specifically, Figure 1.5 illustrates that in addition to the conceptualization of intervention in
the religious sphere as repression (quadrant 1) and the absence of intervention as equivalent
to religious pluralism (quadrant 4), there are two other general types of cases that have gone
under theorized in the existing literature. These include instances of high regulation and
high competition (quadrant 2) and low regulation and low competition (quadrant 3). The
ways in which government regulation (or lack thereof) relates to religious competition is not
necessarily as clear-cut as the two-dimensional market model predicts.
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Figure 1.5: Relating Regulation of Religion and Religious Competition
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Case examples clarify the meaning of each of terms in Figure 1.5. For instance, examples
of repressive regulation (quadrant 1) include Cuba, where religion is broadly condemned in
favor of an atheistic, communist loyalty to the state, and Cameroon, where older established
churches receive de facto favoritism as a result of the regime’s fear of new ethnically cross-
cutting pentecostal Christian church networks. In Cameroon, this has led the ruling party to
create regulatory legislation that makes it extremely difficult to establish a new church legally
in the state. In turn, this regulation enables the government to “crack down” on “illegal”
churches if it feels that they threaten the ruling party. Hence, in 2013, Cameroon’s president
used the military to forcibly shut over one hundred pentecostal churches in several major
cities on the grounds that they threatened national stability (Tanku 2013).
By contrast, examples of robust religious pluralism (quadrant 4) include the US and
South Africa. In these cases, governments promote religious freedom by law and individuals
face few practical or legal restrictions on their ability to worship in unregistered groups. In
both countries, there is also a high level of religious competition, which plausibly reflects
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the fact that individuals can easily establish new religious groups. It is no coincidence that
existing models rely heavily on US history for examples of pluralist policy.
Existing literature also implies that many Latin American countries fall along the di-
agonal between the two extremes in quadrants one and four. Gill (2008), for instance,
characterizes Mexico during the 1980s as experiencing a de facto deregulation of the religious
market that occurred largely as a result of economic liberalization. As religious competition
increased slowly over time in many Latin American states, Gill argues that the states became
more likely to deregulate religion and promote greater electoral competition associated with
steps towards democratization. Trejo (2009) makes a complimentary argument, suggesting
that the arrival of North American missionaries in Mexico spurred the monopolist Catholic
Church into progressive political action to retain its marginalized members. As in Gill’s
assessment, the original increase in religious competition is depicted as an unintended
consequence of unrelated policy, and can therefore be used to explain a simultaneous
movement towards more democratic politics and, simultaneously, increasing religious
competition in these cases. The implication, in other words, is that as religious competition
increases, it can push cases along the diagonal from from quadrant one (repression) to
quadrant four (pluralism).
We have far less insight, however, into the dynamics at play in cases that fall into quadrant
2 or 3. Below I review the few scholarly insights that we have with respect to quadrant
three, and then turn to the question of “politicized propagation,” which is the focus of this
dissertation.
1.2.2 Substitute spirituality
Cases in quadrant 3 are characterized by low government intervention in religion and
low religious competition. In cases of “supplementary spirituality,” spiritual or religious
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identities effectively fuse with ethnic or national identity. In Ireland and Poland, for instance,
Grzymala-Busse (2012, 437 — 8) suggests that because the state previously opposed both
Catholic and national identities, these two identities became intertwined during nationalist
struggles (also see Breuilly 1993, Ramet 1998, Martin 2005). This alignment of religious and
national identity, in turn, helps to sustain high levels of religiosity,18 enabling the Catholic
Church to retain a monopoly in the religious market without state intervention because of
the reinforcing effect of national and religious identity.
Botswana is another example of supplementary spirituality. In the relatively peaceful,
prosperous, and liberal country of Botswana, scholars of political culture argue that the
ruling party has been able to maintain power largely by constructing a narrative of the state
as “traditional” institution, i.e., “a sacrosanct outside entity, which nurtures and protects
... and which is essentially in continuity with the colonial and pre-colonial past” (Van
Binsbergen 1995, 24 — 5). To explain how Botswana’s ruling party has peacefully won the
country’s regular, multiparty elections since independence in 1966, political economists and
anthropologists alike have emphasized the persistent influence of precolonial institutions
(Ibid; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2002).19 Yet, it is not that the persistence of actual
institutions underpins the national identity promoted by the ruling party, but rather the
party’s claim to derive its legitimacy from these traditions and the spiritual powers that
underpin them. One way in which the party maintains this semblance of spiritual authority
is by emphasizing the “national tradition” of the kgotla or traditional village assembly.
Historically, the kgotla was a site where village elders and chiefs mediated political relations
among villagers, as well as relations between villagers, Gods, and ancestor spirits (van
Binsbergen 1995, 24 — 5; also see Ellis and Ter Haar 2004, 12 — 16). In his ethnography of
18A mix of religious belief and participation. On the distinction between participation and belief, see Huber and
Stanig, 2011).
19Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson argue that Botswana’s considerable political stability and economic
“success” are largely attributable to the survival of “relatively inclusive pre-colonial institutions” (2002, 1).
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political culture in Botswana, van Binsbergen (1995) documents the centrality of the kgotla
model, noting that,
Emphatic public reference to, and artificial emulation of, the kgotla model can
produce, in the mind of common Batswana,20 a sense of historic continuity and
legitimation where in fact there is discontinuity and transformation... Today,
proceedings at village dikgotla and especially at Urban Customary Courts are
claimed to be in accordance with the time-honoured kgotla model, which — as
the elite never tires of reminding the population — is at the heart of the Botswana
tradition; but in fact uniformed police officials and clerks have appropriated the
judicial process even at the village level (1995, 24).
In this view, the ruling party has engaged in “symbolic engineering” to construct a national
identity that draws its power from an imagined relation to traditional spirituality, leading
the national identity to double as a spiritual identity for some Batswana. Under these
conditions, the government does not intervene in the formal religious sphere yet new
religious movements have less appeal in Botswana where an alternate national-spiritual
identity remains prominent (Ibid).
1.2.3 Politicized propagation
Government intervention in the religious sphere may not only coexist with high levels of
religious competition, but can be used to help generate greater religious competition when
governments strategically support the growth of new religious movements. I term cases
in this quadrant “politicized propagation” to emphasize that when governments monitor
and/or target public resources to help establish and grow some religions but not others, the
effect is often to induce quid pro quo relationships in which the new religious group relies
on the ruling party for support.
How exactly do politicians seek to propagate new religious movements? States can
promote certain identity categories as well as types. For instance, in an effort to secure
20The term for individuals living in Botswana.
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support from Pentecostals and charismatic Protestants, Chilean President Michelle Bachelet
created a new Executive Office of Religious Affairs in 2005. The purpose of the council was
to promote equality among different religions, which meant to further deinstitutionalize
the privilege of the Catholic Church. Zambian evangelical President, Frederick Chiluba
created a similar office during the 1990s in Zambia and used it to appoint religious leaders
to more visible positions in government, and to target state patronage to religious groups.
Governments can use a variety of policy tools to promote specific identity groups, including:
• Tax breaks
• Distribution of funds
• Allocation of real estate (e.g., land plots)
• Allocation of media licenses or provision of access to state-run media stations (e.g.,
columns in state-run newspapers; shows on state-run television channels)
• Privileged access to external development funds or funding groups orchestrated by the
state
• Public visibility of leaders at state functions
• Use of an identity-specific site for public ceremonies (e.g., a Catholic Cathedral)
• Public recognition of church leaders or martyrs in public ceremonies or documents
(e.g., legislation)
• Creation of national holidays or days of recognition
• Creation of religious councils or offices in government
• Privileging one religion as a sole chaplain in the military or prison system
• Facilitate creation of interdenominational or collaborative umbrella institutions
specifically oriented towards certain sub-groups (e.g. Renewalists)
• Provide easy access to foreign missionaries of a certain religious persuasion (e.g.
permits for crusades, inexpensive and expedient visas for missionaries, etc.)
The state may also decrease incentives for individuals to found new churches, and, in some
cases, for individuals to join or participate in specific religions. Some examples of tactics that
disincentivize specific groups include:
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• De jure regulations that raise the cost of establishing a new religious institution, such
as limiting the registry of new churches to citizens rather than foreigners, imposing a
high fee for church registration and high penalties for failure to register, requiring a
large number of followers before a group qualifies to register.
• De facto constraints on the establishment of new religious institutions, such as the
denial of necessary permits, media licenses, or real estate to certain faith-based appli-
cants, or sanctioning extrajudicial infringement on individuals’ rights to evangelize or
assemble.
• De jure or de facto favoritism of other religious institutions (i.e., adopting other
religions as official state religions, or simply informally targeting these religions with
selective benefits).
• Elimination of prior benefits for some religions (e.g., nationalizing education or health
care systems formerly run by established religious groups).
The theory of politicized propagation therefore suggests that governments will use some
of these tools to favor new religious movements. They are most likely to do so when they lack
capacity for meaningful programatic party development, and face relatively high political
competition and strong identity-based networks (e.g., established religious institutions) that
credibly threaten to mobilize opposition to elites and their favored policy. With respect to the
recent growth of pentecostalism in sub-Saharan African states (discussed above), I therefore
derive the following hypotheses, which I illustrate in Figure 1.6.
Hypothesis 1A: Parties are most likely to engage in politicized propagation in contexts
characterized by high levels of political competition and recent histories of pro-democracy
mobilization by incumbent religious groups.
Hypothesis 1B: Conversely, parties are least likely to engage in politicized propagation in
states with low or no electoral competition, and where religious institutions did not succeed
in mobilizing for third wave democratization.
A background condition of this argument is that, in weakly institutionalized states, and
states transitioning to independent statehood or democratic politics, governments are more
likely to perceive oppositional established religious groups as a meaningful challenge. This is
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because major religious institutions often boast significant ties to followers in far reaches of
the state and simultaneously enjoy the protection afforded through their close transnational
contacts and resources. At the local level, religious groups’ moral authority and ability to
facilitate information exchange gives them the capacity to mobilize collective action. To
the extent that ruling parties in weak states view existing religious groups as (potentially)
oppositional, politicians are threatened by them.
1.2.4 Preliminary evidence
Is there descriptive data to justify this argument? Figure 1.7 plots the raw correlation between
average levels of electoral contestation (1996 — 2010) in sub-Saharan states with significant
Christian populations against the of each state’s Christian population that identified as
pentecostal in 2010 (logged). States where established churches mobilized for democratic
transition are colored red, and the best fit line for this subset of states appears as an upward
slanting, dashed red line. By contrast, African states where churches did not mobilize for
democratic transition are represented in gray, and their best fit line appears as a single
downward sloping gray line.
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Considering only this raw correlation, it is clear that there is a significant deviation in the
relationship between electoral competition and pentecostal population share across these
subsets of African states. This evidence suggests a strong relationship between political
context variables (i.e., political competition and prior church-state relations), and the size
of pentecostal populations across African states. Chapter 2 expounds on this relationship,
and presents regression analyses to examine the robustness of this relationship.
These same data can also be used to investigate the degree to which correlates of
pentecostal population size in sub-Saharan African states differ from Latin American cases.
While case-based research suggests this,21 I am not aware of quantitative demonstrations of
this variation. A comparison of Figures 1.7a and 1.7b reveals a clear difference across regions:
whereas histories of religious mobilization for democracy in sub-Saharan Africa appear
to significantly affect a positive correlation between political competition on pentecostal
population share, a weak inverse relationship is observed across Latin American countries.
Overall, this descriptive evidence suggests a strong foundation for the theory of politicized
pentecostalism, and is consistent with the claim that the relationship between politics and
religious demography varies across both states and regions.
1.3 Research Strategy
Although I am not arguing for monocausal account, my job is to persuade the reader
that religious and political change have been endogenous in sub-Saharan Africa in recent
decades, and that this relationship has been driven, in part, by politicians’ “politicized
propagation” of pentecostalism in some (but not all) African states. In other words, I must
21See for instance, Freston 2004; Ranger 2003; and Corten and Marshall-Fratani 2001
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No Major Religious Mobilization Linear Fit
Notes: The lefthand side graph demonstrates a strong positive correlation between religious mobilization for
democratic politics (measured by Toft, Philpott and Shah 2011) and electoral competition, which is measured
using Polyarchy’s Index of Democratization (2000, 2013). Pentecostal population share applies to 2010 (WCD,
2010). The measure of religious mobilization applies to the years 1985 — 1995 for countries included here. I
average the Polyarchy index scores over the years 1996-2010, inclusive. This is because third wave transitions
in sub-Saharan countries were largely complete by the mid-1990s and I am interested in the period that has
followed. (Data limitations force me to end with the year 2010.) Countries are included in the sample if they
are at least 20% Christian. The relationship is equally strong when a threshold of 35% is applied, and the
negative relationship among other countries in the sample becomes more exaggerated.
By contrast, the righthand side graph demonstrates that Latin American countries do not exhibit the strikingly
bifurcated trajectory between political context variables and pentecostal population size that sub-Saharan
states do. Rather, the opposite trend is apparent among Latin American states, though less dramatic. For
details on measures used to construct this figure, see notes on the previous figure.
34
persuade the reader that variation in the size of pentecostal populations across African
countries has not occurred independently of politics.
A major challenge in making this argument is disentangling my argument about the
importance of political context variables (i.e., competition and prior church-state relations)
from existing arguments that focus on the doctrinal features of pentecostalism that have
made it so appealing to converts. Below I explain how I address this issue through a
controlled comparison of the size of pentecostal and charismatic populations across African
countries over time.
1.3.1 Cross-national evidence
In Chapter 2, I evaluate the plausibility of my argument at the cross-national level. I do this
by presenting a cross-country quantitative analysis, supplemented with brief case studies,
in which I assess whether clues are present to either validate or invalidate my argument. If
data constraints were not an issue, I would want to establish a quantitative index concerning
governments’ willingness to privilege Pentecostals each year, and I would then regress this
measure on an interaction term including a measure of electoral contestation and a measure
of political mobilization by religious groups. I expect that the interaction between electoral
contestation and religious mobilization would predict the degree of politicized propagation
governments engaged in the following year. If this relationship held, I could then test to see if
politicized propagation actually correlates with larger pentecostal population shares in later
years.
This analysis is impossible, however, due to constraints on data concerning pentecostal
population size and politicized propagation. Instead, Chapter 2 presents the closest approx-
imations of these analyses using available data. Specifically, I investigate the correlation
between a country’s pentecostal population share in 2010 (most recent, reliable year for
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which data is available), and an interaction term between measures of electoral contestation
and measures of religious mobilization for third wave democratic transitions.
I find robust evidence of a positive and statistically significant correlation between this
interaction term and states’ pentecostal population size, as a share of the national popula-
tion. Moreover, when I run the same models on an alternate dependent variablemeasure
of the country’s charismatic Christian population sharefind no such relationship. These
relationships are resilient to the inclusion of plausibly confounding variables.
From this analysis I infer a clear indication that variation in political context variables
correlates with variation pentecostal population share, as I expected. That political context
has no similar relationship with the size of charismatic populations lends further support to
my argument that we must separate questions about the supply of pentecostal churches
from questions about demand for Renewalist doctrine and worship styles, which Pente-
costals and charismatics share. Results of the analyses presented in Chapter 2 reject the
null hypothesis that political context variables are unrelated to pentecostal population share
across contemporary sub-Saharan countries.
These analyses cannot, however, illuminate the causal process mechanisms that lead
from political context to larger pentecostal population shares. Beyond arguing that religious
change and politics are endogenous in many contemporary sub-Saharan states, the final
parts of Chapter 2 and subsequent chapters examine the degree to which causal process
mechanisms associated with politicized propagation actually help to explain the endoge-
nous relationship that we observe in cross-country regression analyses. To this end, Chapter
2 concludes by addressing three concerns — and seeking three types of “clues” (Humphreys
and Jacobs 2015) — that help to further establish the plausibility of my argument.
First, I address the concern that politicians engaged in strategic favoritism of pentecostal
churches may be motivated by sincere faith and evangelistic zeal, rather than self-interest
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in political survival. If this were the case, I expect that we would observe the same type
of religious motivation and zeal to manifest in pro-pentecostal politicians leadership, more
broadly. By contrast, I would not expect these politicians to engage in grossly immoral and
“unChristian” behaviornaked fiscal corruption to disregard for human life among opposition
supporters. A brief review of the misdeeds committed by several of the most prominent pro-
pentecostal leaders in the region clearly reveals that many of their political decision-making
was motivated by anything but Christian morals. To this end, I conclude that it is fair to
conclude that self-interest in political survival played at least partially inspired their efforts
to propagate pentecostal church networks.
The second two concernscluesI address at the conclusion of Chapter 2 concern colonial
heritage, and the role of politicians’ personal religious histories. Some might assume
that former colonizers would help drive variation in pentecostal population size, either
because former British colonies are more likely to appeal to English-speaking pentecostal
missionaries from the US. Alternatively, others might conjecture that because former British
colonies tend, on average, to have more significant Protestant populations, they may provide
easier contexts for pentecostal missionaries to establish churches and acquire converts.
A targeted paired case study of Benin and Cameroon — two former French coloniesthat
the dynamics of politicized propagation are by no means restricted to formerly British-
colonial territories, as Benin has experienced politicized propagation under President.
Additionally, comparing these countries’ most prominent leaders, Mathieu Kérékou and
Paul Biya, demonstrates the relative unimportance of several personal and political factors
might otherwise be assumed to influence the likelihood of certain politicians to engage
in politicized propagation than others. Both leaders were born Catholic and emerged as
powerful secular dictators during the Cold War era, and each won Presidential office in early
multiparty elections and subsequently stalled democratization. Yet, only Kérékou engaged
in politicized propagation. I argue that variation in political context explains why these
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similar leaders adopted such different political strategies vis-a-vis religion an politics in the
1990s and 2000s.
1.3.2 Subnational evidence
Having demonstrated the plausibility of the argument at the cross-national level, Chapters
3 and 4 provide more rigorous evaluations of causal process mechanisms by investigating
observable implications of my argument at the subnational level. As I discuss in detail at
the outset of Chapter 3, I focus this investigation on Zambia, an overwhelmingly Christian
southern African state that has held multiparty elections consistently since 1991.
Specifically, Chapter 3 draws on an original database constructed from the adminis-
trative records of over 12 government ministries and several church umbrella bodies to
investigate the degree to which Zambia’s long ruling party, the Movement for a Multiparty
Democracy (MMD):
• Targeted a disproportionate amount of selective benefits to Pentecostals
• Allocated more of these benefits in months preceding elections
• Withheld similar benefits from the Catholic or other established churches
Additionally, thanks to an unforeseen transfer of power after the 2011 elections, I am
able to examine how the new ruling party, the Patriotic Front, or PF, responded to Zambia’s
religio-political landscape. Evidence indicates that the PF attempted to penalize many
politically engaged Pentecostals, and attempted to woo the Catholic Church into supporting
its populist yet relatively authoritarian rule. (The Catholic Church rejected these overtures.)
No single piece of evidence in this chapter provides a smoking gun for the theory of
politicized propagation. However, the overwhelming impact of these analyses is to debunk
the notion that religious change occurs independently of politics, and to provide even
stronger evidence in line with a theory of politicized propagation.
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Building on this foundation, Chapter 4 presents results of systematic qualitative re-
search conducted in Zambia both before and after the historic 2011 elections. My goal
in this chapter is to identify clues that, if present, would provide compelling support for
or against the theory of politicized propagation. Additionally, by presenting reflections
on the relationship between religion and politics by every-day Zambians, I am able to
document further variation in the attitudes of Pentecostals and members of other religious
groups, and to document the perceived rationale for leaving one religious group to join
another. The chapter is also informed by more than 120 semi-structured elite interviews
conducted in Zambia during this period. Elite participants included church founders, other
religious leaders, activists, politicians and party strategists, as well as bureaucrats in relevant
government offices.
Overall, evidence examined in Chapter 4 is largely consistent with this dissertation’s
broadest argument — that religious and political change are endogenous in developing
states like Zambia — as well as the more targeted claim that politicized propagation played
an important role in shaping the country’s current religious and political landscapes. Ad-
ditionally, these qualitative accounts emphasize the degree to which individual motivation
for joining a pentecostal church can diverge significantly from the motivations of politicians
and church leaders engaged in quid pro quo relationships.
1.4 Scope Conditions and External Validity
As I discuss in Chapter 5, my argument concerning politicized propagation is intended
specifically to explain the rise of pentecostalism in many sub-Saharan African countries after
the Cold War. How far does this theory travel? What are its scope conditions? And how do
the findings presented in this dissertation advance broader understanding about religion
and politics?
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I address these questions in Chapter 5 by comparing the spread of pentecostal Christian-
ity in sub-Saharan Africa to its growth in Latin America — the two world regions in which
pentecostalism is the fastest growing religious group. Two important scope conditions help
explain differences in the growth trajectories and public roles of pentecostalism in these
regions, including the relative strength of state and party institutions and the historic role of
established religions (e.g., the Catholic Church). These scope conditions also help to clarify
the ways in which the theory of politicized propagation can be used to further insight into
the rise of conversionary Islamic movements in national and world politics.
Within sub-Saharan Africa, the dissertation’s conclusions also have surprising policy
implications. Most notably, if donors or local pro-democratic activists focus on supporting
established, pro-democratic religious institutions, they may inadvertently create incentives
for politicians to engage in the politicization of other religious institutions with less transna-
tional oversight and less hierarchical network structures. This increasing politicization of
religion may, over time, undercut the moral authority of the older churches.
By contrast, findings presented in this dissertation also underscore how established
religious groups continue to constitute preeminent guardians of pro-democracy activism,
even in states where democratization has stalled or reversed. I suggest several directions
for future research that can enhance understanding about how faith-based institutions can
be best incorporated into broader struggles to promote democratic government on the
continent, and what lessons we can take from the legacy of the Catholic and Protestant
churches in African politics.
Lastly, I highlight the dissertation’s implications for the broader study of identity and
politics. In the gambit of comparative ethnic politics, concepts advanced in this dissertation
highlight two important omissions in dominant models of comparative ethnic politics. This
includes the question of how institutional and network structures shape their relative appeal
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to politicians seeking to cultivate new constituencies or engage in clientelistic exchange. The




Endogeneity In Religion and Politics: Cross-National
Evidence
While it would be an error to reduce religious movements to the
purely political, it is true to say that their existence is in itself a
political statement.
— Rev. Dr. Patrick Claffey, 2007
In the previous chapter, I argued that changes in religious demography and political
institutions are endogenous in many developing countries. It is impossible to explain one
without reference to the other. Specifically, focusing on the explosive growth of pentecostal
Christianity in some sub-Saharan states since the late 1980s, I argued that political context
variables — i.e., the combination of relatively high political competition and pro-democratic
mobilization by established churches — incentivized politicians to strategically promote
pentecostal church growth within their borders after third wave transitions. I termed this
form of promotion politicized propagation.
In the language of political economy, I am interested in the factors that affect variation
in the supply of pentecostal churches, and not on individual-level correlates of demand
for pentecostal church membership (assuming availability). This matters because existing
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explanations for the rise of pentecostalism in the region have focused almost exclusively
on factors that affect individual-level demand for pentecostal doctrine or worship, given its
supply within a given country. This case-based, interdisciplinary literature offers a variety of
insights into the potential roles that urbanization, globalization, economic inequality, and
(to a lesser extent) international influences play with respect to the growth of pentecostal
church membership. This first goal of this chapter is to briefly review and relate this body of
research to the goal of this dissertation: evaluating drivers of cross-national variation in the
size of pentecostal populations in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa.
In Section 2.2, I present what I believe is the first quantitative analyses of the correlates
of pentecostal population size across sub-Saharan countries. Drawing on diverse sources
of cross-national data, I use regression analysis to demonstrate the robust and consistently
strong correlation between certain political context variables and pentecostal population
share. Specifically, I find that the interaction of electoral competition and prior political
mobilization by the older, established churches significantly predicts larger pentecostal
population shares across countries.
Moreover, these same variables do not predict variation in the size of charismatic
populations, which suggests that the specific doctrine and worship style associated with
Renewalist movements are not driving my findings about pentecostal population share.
This evidence strongly supports the argument that politics and religious change have
related endogenously in many contemporary African states. It is also consistent with my
more specific argument about politicized propagation. Overall, the quantitative analyses
presented in this chapter shed new light on the correlates of cross-national variation in
pentecostal population shares in the region.
There are two more hypothetical counter-arguments that could confound the theory of
politicized propagation, however. The first centers on the possibility that politicians might
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promote pentecostalism out of sincere religious motivation rather than political expediency.
The second concerns the role politicians’ personal characteristics (e.g., the religion into
which they were born) might play in determining whether they promote pentecostalism or
not. In Section 2.3, I address these concerns conceptually and examine qualitative evidence
from Kenya, Ghana, Benin and Cameroon to demonstrate that the historical record largely
supports a theory of politicized propagation in these cases (with Cameroon as a negative
case).
Below, I review existing explanations for the rise of pentecostalism in the region, and
relate the core tenets of existing studies to the dissertation’s main argument.
2.1 Factors Affecting pentecostal Growth in sub-Saharan
Africa
2.1.1 Doctrine
As discussed in the previous chapter, most studies of global pentecostalism emphasize the
appeal of pentecostal doctrine. This includes a personal relationship with God, as well as
belief in one’s own ability to receive the Holy Spirit. This reception of the Spirit in one’s
own body and life are believed to manifest through the “gifts” of the Holy Spirit, including
prophesy, exorcism, supernatural or divine healing, and speaking in tongues. As Table 1.1
illustrated, Pentecostals may also feel empowered by their doctrine’s emphasis on literal
interpretation of the bible, which enables lay individuals to derive direct meaning from
Bible, as they read it. Both descriptive and experimental studies of pentecostal messaging
in Kenya also indicate that Pentecostals’ doctrinal emphasis on principles of self-reliance
and possibility engenders greater self-efficacy in recipients of the pentecostal message (Riedl
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and McClendon (2015; forthcoming). At the same time, these studies find that exposure to
pentecostal doctrine causes individuals to become more tolerant of socioeconomic inequity,
which may serve its own protective psychological function for individuals in societies that
are rife with inequity. For these and other reasons, pentecostal doctrine is often cited as
causing the rapid rise of pentecostalism in many countries in the region.1
2.1.2 Social context
Poverty and health
It is intuitive that poverty and lack of access health services in the wake of economic
collapse and structural adjustment predispose individuals to favor a doctrine claiming to
offer not only a renewed connection to God, but also God-given “health and wealth” (i.e., the
prosperity gospel) to devoted believers. In this sense, poverty or poor health only enhance
the doctrinal appeal of pentecostalism. The pentecostal belief in faith healing and miracles
is particularly meaningful in this regard (McCauely 2015).
Additionally, poverty-impacted individuals who are unable to find employment are
presumably more likely to have the time (lower opportunity costs) to participate in a
religious group that requires significant commitment. “Working” for the church as an
evangelist, and possibly contributing to worship services, can also increase individuals’
self-esteem and facilitate the construction of more positive identities. It may also enable
the individual to access material support in a manner that is more consistent with the
individuals’ values and self-image (as in, one sees themselves as “working” for the church,
even though their work is informal and they are compensated through charity). In other
cases, new social networks offered by the church can facilitate access to new employment
1This is true in Latin America, as well (Martin 2002; Smilde 2008).
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opportunities. For all of these reasons, exposure to poverty or disease are individual-level
factors associated with pentecostal conversion or participation.
Urbanization
Urbanization is also often cited as a factor that has contributed to the rapid growth of
pentecostalism in sub-Saharan Africa for at least two reasons. At the individual level, rural-
urban migrants often struggle with “cultural dislocation” and the loss of extended family and
cultural networks (Meyer 2004). Urban individuals lacking access to other sources of cultural
identity or social support networks may be more likely to prefer (“demand”) the intense,
relatively tight-knit religious communities associated with pentecostal churches. Indeed,
political scientist John McCauley recently declared pentecostal pastors to be Africa’s “new big
men” after documenting that, in Ghana, pentecostal Pastors enjoy similar types of authority
over their parishioners as traditional chiefs wield over tribal subjects (McCauley 2015).
A second set of factors that may make pentecostalism particularly likely to grow in more
urban settings is logistical: It is easier to evangelize to large numbers in dense, urban settings,
and therefore potentially easier to recruit converts. These urban converts are also more likely
to earn wages as opposed to surviving on the basis of subsistence agriculture, as is common
in rural areas. Because new churches rely heavily on congregants for funds, urban settings
are often viewed as more practical contexts in which to found a new church.
2.1.3 Globalization and mass media
In addition to emphasizing the effects of urbanization, scholars who associate the growth
of pentecostalism in Africa with globalization or “modernization” typically emphasize two
other factors: African Pentecostals’ savvy use of media (including but by no means limited
to music and the internet), and increased exposure to western missionaries and media
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(Marshall 1998; Meyer 2004). Yet, these accounts make far-reaching assumptions about the
ability of Pentecostals to access television and radio licenses, as well as media and music
production studios. As I detail in Chapter Three, for instance Zambia’s pro-pentecostal
government inexplicably denied the Catholic Church a permit for a television station for
over ten years. During the same period, the government not only permitted a twenty-four
hour TV channel run by Pentecostals, but also invited Pentecostals to produce media content
using the state’s own production studios. In addition to all of this, the government regularly
amplified the voices of Pentecostals on state-run TV, while minimizing or denying media
representation to more critical religious leaders.
Similarly, in Kenya, Ghana, Cote D’Ivoire, Burundi and Benin, political leaders have also
enhanced the prestige and public visibility of Pentecostals using state-run media, while,
in some cases stifling media production or distribution by critical religious figures. For
instance, when Jerry Rawlings faced heightened pressure to respect human rights and mul-
tiparty politics, he banned the Catholic Standard for three years (Gifford 2007: 203). Again,
existing scholarship has largely overlooked the critical role that African governments have
played as gatekeepers, even when it comes to media access, production and distribution.
2.1.4 Foreign evangelism
The degree to which international missionaries have “caused” growth of pentecostalism in
sub-Saharan states is a more contentious topic. Paul Gifford, for example, has emphasized
the role of American bible schools, missionaries, and media in his case-based accounts,
and has characterized the emergence of pentecostalism in Africa as a product of American
cultural imperialism. Other respected scholars in the field have aggressively refuted this
characterization as one-sided (c.f. Marshal 1998, 2008; Meyer 2004; Maxwell 2002). As I
discussed in the previous chapter, the experience of African states contrasts with that of
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Latin America cases, where the “arrival” of evangelical Protestantism and pentecostalism
was sparked by foreign missionaries seeking converts in formerly monopolized Catholic
territory (Gill 1998; 2008; Trejo 2009, 2011). Instead, in sub-Saharan Africa the rapid
growth of pentecostalism in African states occurred many decades after the first pentecostal
missionaries arrived on the continent, and has been buoyed by the rapid proliferation of
relatively small African-led pentecostal churches (Cheyeka 2008; Ranger et al., 2008; Phiri
2008; Anderson et al., 2011).
The relative impact of local (as opposed to foreign) evangelization efforts is difficult to
pin down empirically. The World Christian Database measures “foreign evangelism” and
“indigenous evangelism.” The former is defined as the share of the national population
that has been evangelized (“exposed to the word of God") as a result of foreign persons
or agencies, rather than members of their own national community. As illustrated in the
left hand panel of Figure 2.1, the data do not reveal a strong correlation between the
foreign missionary impact and relative pentecostal population size in sub-Saharan states
(WCD 2010). This may reflects the fact that foreign missionaries are often associated with
non-pentecostal religious denominations (e.g., Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh Day
Adventists, and other denominations typically classified as “marginal”), as well as the fact
that western pentecostal missionaries often claim to prioritize evangelizing majority-Islamic
or other non-Christian countries, where they perceive the greatest “need” for evangelization.
By contrast, internal or “indigenous" evangelism refers to the percent of the national
population that was “evangelized as a result of persons or agencies of their own people
or [national] population" (WCD 2010, emphasis added). Indigenous evangelism is highly
prevalent (note that the graph’s axes do not begin at zero), and is strongly positively corre-
lated with overall rates of evangelism within a given country. This evidence underscores the
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Figure 2.1: Re-Examining the Role of Foreign and Domestic Evangelism
Notes: There is no observed correlation (positive or negative) in the left hand panel, which plots each country’s
pentecostal share of the total population and the percent of the population evangelized by foreign missionaries
(WCD 2010). The right hand panel demonstrates that in sub-Saharan Africa, countries that are more highly
evangelized, also tend to have extremely high levels of the population evangelized by domestic (“indigenous”)
evangelizers (WCD 2010). This strong positive correlation suggests that domestic evangelization has constantly
made substantial impact throughout the region.
important role that citizens of developing countries play in their own religious economies,
especially with respect to evangelism.2
While scholars of African Christianity do not deny the importance of transnational ties,
most do not view these ties as single determinants of religious change on the continent,
nor do they view transnational ties as one-way interactions between western missionaries
and Africans (c.f. Udelhoven 2009; Hinfelaar and Giacomo 2008). It is also important to
note that the established churches continue to exert monopolies in access to international
volunteers and fundraising, writ large. The social services and charity that these institutions
provide vastly outstrips services provided by newer pentecostal churches (Freston 2004;
author interviews), and this is born out in recently collected Pew Survey data (described in
Chapter 5).
2It is impossible to tell from the data what denominations that evangelizing, or if indigenous evangelists receive
any external support. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize the role of local evangelism, as it is often
contradicted by western media representations of Christianity in the region.
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Finally, to the extent that international influences do matter, there is little reason to
believe that internationals would have greater success promoting pentecostalism in some
states (e.g., Burundi but not neighboring Cameroon), and at specific times (e.g., only when
Burundi’s most famous politician was desperate to cultivate new constituencies in order to
beat powerful opposition at the polls). It is this type of variation that the theory of politicized
propagation is intended to address.
2.2 Evaluating Explanations for Variation in pentecostal
Population Share Across African Countries
Recall, I argue that in post-Cold War SSA states, political competition has significantly
influenced religious change, i.e., the increased prevalence of pentecostalism in some states
states. Specifically, in more competitive states where incumbent religious groups could
credibly threaten to mobilize opposition to ruling parties’ preferred policy (anti-democratic
reform), politicians were incentivized to strategically propagate pentecostal churches. In
Chapter One, I hypothesized that political parties were most likely to engage in politicized
propagation in contexts characterized by high levels of political competition and recent
histories of pro-democracy mobilization by incumbent religious groups. Conversely, I expect
that parties have been less likely to engage in politicized propagation in states with low or no
electoral competition, or where religious institutions cannot credibly threaten to mobilize
opposition.
The following sections explain the data and methods that I use to examine these
hypotheses in a cross-national regression framework.
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2.2.1 Data and methods
Dependent variable
The main dependent variable in this chapter is the percentage of the population belonging
to pentecostal churches. The dependent variable in main regressions is the share of the
national population that identifies as a member of a pentecostal church.3 The World Chris-
tian Database (2015) provides the most widely trusted measure of pentecostal population
share. The most recent estimate for countries in my sample is from 2010. Academic studies
of changes in global Christianity rely heavily on this data, which offers comprehensive
estimates of the size of religious populations across countries. The most reliable data covers
the period since 1990.4 A recent assessment of the WCD’s reliability compared the WCD’s
estimates of religious populations to data collected by the World Values Survey, Pew Global
Assessment Project, CIA World Factbook, and the US Department of State reports, each of
which covers a small subset of country years covered by the WCD (Hsu et al., 2008). The
WCD’s population estimates are highly correlated with other sources, increasing confidence
in the data.
Alternate dependent variable
As discussed above, I adjudicate between the importance of doctrine and worship style,
on the one hand, and political context variables, on the other by enlisting a controlled
3As noted above, this includes groups that the World Christian Database’s terms “neocharismatic.” I include
these smaller, newer churches in the measure of pentecostal churches used in Models presented here. Results
do not change significantly whether or not they are included.
4Having originated from the efforts of a British missionary social scientist who sought to understand schisms
in African Protestantism at independence, it draws its data from a wide range of sources, such as religious
officials, censuses, reports, and surveys, and observational trips and fieldwork. More information is available
at http://www.worldchristiandatabase.org.
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comparison between the share of Pentecostals and charismatic Christians within a given
country. Data on national charismatic population share comes from the WCD (2010).
Explanatory variables
The primary explanatory variable in this analysis is an interaction between degrees of elec-
toral contestation and the degree to which established religious institutions have mobilized
to promote third wave democratization. To measure electoral contestation, I rely primarily
on the Polyarchy dataset’s Index of Democratization (DI), which indexes parties’ vote share
and turnout. Also known as the Vanhanen Index, DI is the unweighted average of two mea-
sures derived from election data, including: Competitionshare of seats won by opposition
parties in parliamentary elections; and Participationpercentage of the population that voted
in elections. Higher DI scores indicate greater competition and turnout. A major benefit of
this measure is that it captures the effects of electoral boycotts, which reduce voter turnout
and inflate apparent support for incumbents. I average the Polyarchy index scores over the
years 1996-2010, inclusive because third wave transitions in sub-Saharan countries were
largely complete by the mid-1990s, and I am interested in the subsequent decades.
As a secondary measure of electoral contestation, I enlist Beck and Keefer’s measure of
Electoral Contestation (EIEC), which is drawn from Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer and Walsh’s
(2001) work on comparative political institutions in the Database of Political Institutions
(DPI) dataset. This measure evaluates electoral contestation as a function of vote share for
the executive in national elections. It is a less desirable measure than DI, however, because it
is characterized by a relatively small range and is unable to account for turnout and, hence,
opposition boycotts. Without accounting for turnout, this measure risks undercounting
competition in scenarios where incumbents face significant well-organized opposition
parties on the ground, but where opposition opts to boycott unfair elections under corrupt
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Figure 2.2: Electoral Contestation and pentecostal Population Share Across Regions
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Notes: Panels above plot the correlation between two different measures of electoral contestation (DI and
EIEC, scores averaged for the period 1996-2010), and states’ 2010 pentecostal population size (logged; WCD
2015). Magenta circular markers indicate countries where religious actors mobilized to promote third wave
democracy according to Toft, Philpott, and Shah (2011). Dashed trend lines depict linear fit lines among these
cases.
Panels 1a and 1b depict a positive correlation between electoral contestation and pentecostal population
size across sub-Saharan states with recent histories of religious mobilization. This holds using the Index of
Democracy or EIEC measures of electoral contestation. As expected, however, such relationship is found
among either sub-Saharan states where religious actors did not mobilize for democratization, or Latin
American states, toute de suite (Panels 2a and 2b). In sub-Saharan states, we also observe that electoral
contestation tends to be lower than in Latin American states.
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incumbent parties. Such boycotts have been a prominent feature in sub-Saharan African
polities during the period under consideration. Figure 2.2 juxtaposes illustration of the
Polyarchy DI data and EIEC data in both sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. The lack of
variation on the EIEC measure (particularly in Latin America) speaks to its relative weakness
as a measure.
To measure pro-democracy mobilization by religious institutions, I use a categorical
measure constructed by Toft, Philpott and Shah (2011) which covers the years 1985-1995
(inclusive) for the countries sampled here. The measure ranges from zero to two, where
zero indicates that religious institutions did not play significant roles in promoting third
wave democratization in a given country between 1972-2009; a score of one indicates
that religious institutions played a “supporting role” in such struggles; and a score of two
indicates that religious institutions played “leading roles.”5
Control variables
I control for several factors that are believed to influence the growth of pentecostalism in
the region. This includes the urban share of national population, which I measure using
the World Bank Development Indicators for 2010 (results are unaffected by weighting or
averaging of this measure over the period under consideration; for simplicity, I present
results using the 2010 measure of urbanization in each country.
Additionally, I control for the overall Christian share of the national population in 2010,
and the share of population that identified as Renewalist (including either pentecostal or
charismatic) Christians in 1970 (World Christian Database). I include the latter variable
5Although the data considers religious mobilizations between 1972 and 2009, all countries included in the
following analysis that experienced democratic transitions did so prior to the mid-1990s. The original measure
also considers mobilization by non-Christian religious actors (e.g., Muslims in Mali), though all religious actors
in the states sampled below were Catholic or Protestant. This measure has been used recently in academic
publications, such as Dowd’s (2014) study of religion and democratic politics in the region.
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because the number of Pentecostals and charismatics (together referred to as Renewalists)
in the country prior to democratic transitions may have impacted the growth of these
groups in later years. Specifically, renewalists in my sample include pentecostal Christians
worshiping in either older Evangelical churches (e.g., Baptist) or newer pentecostal ones
(e.g., Assemblies of God); charismatic Catholics; and members of charismatic African
Initiated Churches (AICs). Unfortunately, no reliable data exists for years between 1970 and
the 1990s, due in part to tense political contexts in many African countries during this period.
Summary statistics for all variables are provided in Table 2.1.
The WCD also collects data on the overall number of foreign missionaries operating
in a given country, but does not distinguish between pentecostal, Catholic, or mainline
Protestant missionaries. Moreover, this variable correlates significantly with the share of
the state that is Christian. Therefore, given the difficulty in interpreting coefficients on this
very general term, and given concerns about multicollinearity in regression models, I do not
control for this factor explicitly.
Models
All models are OLS regressions with robust standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity.
To ease interpretation of coefficients, I present beta standardized coefficients. All models
include a constant term and include only countries in sub-Saharan Africa where at least
20% of the national population identified as Christian in 2010. I use this cut-off because I
am interested in the way that electoral and political contexts incentivize actors to promote
certain forms of Christianity for electoral gain. This is less likely to be relevant in countries
where there are only minor Christian populations.6 Moreover, available evidence indicates
that movements within Christianity draw members primarily from other Christian churches
6Results are generally robust to a higher threshold of 30 or 35%, but given the small sample size, I present
models using the lower threshold of 20% here.
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(Anderson 2010; Pew 2011; Meyer 2004; Gifford 1998). Sampled countries include: Angola,
Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, Equato-
rial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique,
Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda,
Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Key Variables, SSA
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Pent. Share 4.28 3.33 0.43 14.9
Rel Mobilization 0.38 0.49 0 1
Contestation (DI) 7.71 4.03 0 17.31
DI x Rel Mob 3.77 5.5 0 17.31
EIEC 5.67 1.6 2 7
EIEC x Rel Mob 2.22 3.06 0 7
% Renewalist in 1970 3.78 2.66 0 10
% Urban 0.39 0.16 0.12 0.87
N = 29
Notes: Summary statistics are reported for all countries included in analyses. Inclusion criteria is a national
population that was 20% Christian in 2010. Eritrea is excluded due to limitations on data availability. The small
island states of Mauritius, Cape Verde and the Seychelles are also excluded given their small populations and
unique geographic, cultural, and religious heritages. Mauritius, for example, is the only country in the region
with a Hindu plurality.
2.2.2 Results
As expected, findings indicate that, in sub-Saharan Africa, there is a strong positive corre-
lation between pentecostal population share and the interaction between electoral com-
petition and pro-democracy political mobilization by established religious institutions (i.e.,
churches). Figure 2.2 illustrates this raw correlation using the preferred measure of electoral
contestation (DI). Table 2.2 presents results from main OLS models.
Specifically, Model A includes the preferred measure of electoral competitionIndex of
Democracy (DI) scores, 1996-2010the sole IV. Models B-C include an interaction between
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Table 2.2: Electoral Competition and Rel. Mobilization and pentecostalism, SSA
DV: Pentecostals as % of Christians
A B C D E F G
Electoral Contestation 0.455∗∗ -0.478+ -0.525+ -0.951 -0.348 -0.384
(0.038) (0.116) (0.116) (0.245) (0.223) (0.227)
Religious Mobilization 1.220∗∗ -2.193∗ -2.305∗ -3.401 -2.887∗∗ -2.977∗∗
(0.015) (0.069) (0.085) (0.214) (0.030) (0.042)
EC x Rel. Mob. 0.359∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 0.760∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.090) (0.003) (0.005)
% Urban -1.126 -0.201 -0.808
(0.825) (0.972) (0.872)
% Renewalist 1970 -0.00797 -0.00882 0.0352
(0.980) (0.981) (0.912)
Literacy -3.375 0.677 -2.495
(0.655) (0.934) (0.731)
% Christian -8.226∗∗ -6.639 -10.19+ -7.553∗∗ -6.423
(0.027) (0.235) (0.135) (0.032) (0.239)
Observations 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
Adj. R2 0.119 0.171 0.399 0.325 0.161 0.433 0.358
+ p < 0.15, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, p-values in parentheses.
Source: WCD (2010); Polyarchy (2013); and DPI (2001, 2013).
Notes: All models are OLS regressions and include a constant term. The dependent variable in all models is
the number of pentecostal Church members in 2010, as a share of the total Christian population.
this measure and each states’ religious mobilization score; Model C also includes controls for
factors believed to influence pentecostal population size (Share urban; share identifying as
Renewalist (e.g., pentecostal, charismatic or Neocharismatic) in 1970; share of literate adults
(rough proxy for human development); and Christian share of state’s population. As noted
elsewhere, the only available measure of foreign evangelists’ presence in-country correlates
at nearly a 1:1 level with percent Christian, and is therefore excluded from these models.
Results do not change if it is substituted for Christian share of the population, however.
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To assess robustness, Model D uses an alternative measure of electoral contestation:
mean EIEC score, from 1996-2010, inclusive (Data from DPI). Results are generally consis-
tent, though some are less statistically significant. (This measure’s emphasis on procedural
elements of political competition makes it a less ideal measure than DI.) Models E-F use
mean DI score as a measure of electoral contestation, but now restrict the measure to 2001-
2010 (inclusive). Strong results indicate that anomalous factors associated with the end of
the Cold War or early period of privatization around 1990 do not drive main findings.
Catholic activism
To what extent are these findings driven by the Catholic Church mobilizing for democracy,
as opposed to other religious institutions? Table 2.3 evaluates this question by restricting
the measure of religious mobilization to Catholic Churches, as opposed to Protestant or
(in a very few cases) Islamic institutions. Specifically, Models A-B examine the interaction
effect of electoral competition (mean DI 1996-2010) and Catholic religious mobilization on
pentecostal population share, and Models B-C, supplant the alternate measure of electoral
contestation (EIEC) for DI. Results are robust to the inclusion of different controls and other
cutoffs for the EC measures (not shown).
Models A-B indicate that Catholic activism, in particular, has a strong positive correlation
with pentecostal population size in the region: The coefficients on the interaction term
of interest (Cath Mob x DI) are highly significant and substantively large. Using the less
preferred measure of electoral contestation, however, this effect is no longer detectable.
What explains this difference?
As noted above, EIEC is a less desirable measure because it does not take voter turnout
into account. It therefore tends to underestimates the degree of competition that ruling
parties face in contexts where electoral intimidation and/or electoral boycotts are very sig-
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nificant. With this in mind, it may be the case that in countries where electoral intimidation
and boycotts are significant, the Catholic Church has played an especially powerful role. This
would help explain why the significant effect of Catholic agitation evidenced in Models A-B
disappears in Models C-D, when our measure of electoral contestation stops taking turnout
into consideration. Defending this inference requires research beyond the scope of this
dissertation, however. I infer only that the models are broadly consistent with the idea
that hierarchical churches, e.g., the Catholic Church, can play particularly powerful roles
in mobilizing pro-democracy constituencies.
This interpretation would be confounded if Catholic activism correlated with Catholic
population share. If the Catholic Church played a strong role in democratization only in
the countries where it had a relatively large membership, then results may be driven by
the size of the Church’s membership in those countries. The lefthand panel of Figure 2.3
uses simulated data to illustrate what we would expect to observe, were this the case. The
righthand panel portrays the relationship observed in the data.
2.2.3 Robustness
To assess the robustness of results presented here, I assess the degree to which results
presented above are driven by possible outliers. Table 2.4 illustrates that results are robust to
the exclusion of relatively extreme cases, including Angola (Models A-B) and Ghana (Models
C-D). The substantive size of coefficients and degrees of significance remain remarkably
similar to the main results (above). This builds confidence that extreme cases are not driving
the findings presented here.
Additionally, I run the main models with a substitute dependent variable: the best
available estimate of pentecostal growth rates during the period under consideration.
Ideally, I would estimate growth rates from roughly 1994–present. However, available data is
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Table 2.3: Assessing Catholic Activism Separately, SSA
DV: Pentecostals as % of Christians
A B C D
Electoral Contestation -0.449∗ -0.472
(0.140) (0.155)




Cath Mob x EIEC 1.027 0.980
(0.151) (0.205)
Catholic Mobilization -3.533∗ -3.540 -3.744 -3.307
(0.132) (0.195) (0.399) (0.503)
Controls - Y - Y
Observations 29 29 29 29
Adj. R2 0.386 0.305 0.239 0.141
∗ p < 0.15, ∗∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗∗ p < 0.05, p-values in parentheses
Source: WCD (2010); Polyarchy (2013); and DPI (2001, 2013).
Notes: All models are OLS regressions that include a constant and use the same DV as in previous models
(Pentecostals as share of Christian population). All models control for Christians as a share of the national
population; additional controls include measures of urbanization, literacy, and percent of Renewalists in 1970.
Models A-B examine the interaction effect of electoral competition (mean DI 1996-2010) and Catholic religious
mobilization only, i.e., a measure of religious mobilization that excludes Protestant and Islamic actors. Models
B-C, supplant the alternate measure of electoral contestation (EIEC) for DI, still averaged across the period
1996-2010. Results are robust to the inclusion of different controls and other cut-offs for the EC measures (not
shown).
based on very rough estimates of the pentecostal population size in 1970 and the population
in 2010. Researchers at the World Christian Database advise caution when using measures
of pentecostal population size in 1970, as they are less confident in the measurement of this
variable than in their estimate of Renewalists as a block. That said, Table 2.5 suggests that
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Notes: If nations with larger Catholic populations were significantly more likely to observe Catholic
mobilization for democracy in the late 1980s — early 1990s, we would expect data that looked like the simulated
data in the left hand panel, with an upward sloping fit line. In actuality, we observe only a slight negative
relation between population size and activism (depicted in the right hand panel). It does not appear that
church membership — either as a share of national Christian populations or of the national population —
significantly influenced political engagement by the Catholic Church during this period. The distribution
of data does not change significantly if a measure of Catholic share of national population is substituted for
Catholic share of Christian population.
the same general pattern of results holds: The interaction between religious mobilization
and electoral contestation positively predict pentecostal growth rates between 1970–2010.
The size of these coefficients is smaller than coefficients in the main models, and the degree
of statistical significance is lower. These models also predict a lower portion of the variance
in growth rates than main models, which is to be expected given the larger-than-desirable
span of time over which we are forced to consider growth rates.
With all of these caveats in mind, however, Table 2.5 demonstrates that pentecostal
growth rates over the period of interest are positively predicted by the political context
variables that a theory of politicized propagation emphasizes. These results are inconsistent
with the null hypothesis that pentecostal growth rates have been unaffected by electoral
contestation and church mobilization. These results should therefore reinforce confidence
in the main findings presented above.
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Table 2.4: Favored Models Excluding Possible Outliers, Angola and Ghana
DV: Pentecostals as % of Christians
Dropping Angola Dropping Ghana
Electoral Contestation -0.337 -0.358 -0.428∗ -0.515∗∗
(0.281) (0.310) (0.112) (0.073)
Rel Mob x EC 0.321∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗ 0.215∗∗
(0.011) (0.025) (0.075) (0.086)
Religious Mobilization -1.849∗ -1.828 -0.960 -0.948
(0.124) (0.180) (0.394) (0.428)
Controls - Y - Y
Observations 28 28 28 28
Adj. R2 0.429 0.351 0.218 0.183
∗ p < 0.15, ∗∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗∗ p < 0.05, p-values in parentheses
Source: WCD (2010); Polyarchy (2013); and DPI (2001, 2013).
Notes: Model specifications are identical to Models B-C in Table 2.2, but drop Angola from the sample
(Columns 1 and 2), and Ghana (Columns 3-4). Results remain positive and significant for the main explanatory
variable (Rel Mob x EC). This confirms that results are not driven by the arguably extreme cases of Angola or
Ghana.
Comparison with charismatics
Recall, in order to distinguish between the role of doctrinal appeal and political context
variables, I run the same models with a charismatic (rather than pentecostal) population
share as the dependent variable. If doctrine or worship style drove the rise of these groups
across countries, then I would expect that the same variables that predicted the rise of one
Renewalist group (e.g., Pentecostals), would predict the other (i.e., charismatics). This is
because these groups share similar doctrine and worship practice.
Yet, if my argument is correct, then I expect political context variables to significantly
predict the size of pentecostal populations, but not charismatics. This is because pentecostal
churches’ political histories and network dynamics are extremely different from churches
with which most charismatics are affiliated. While Pentecostals practice within relatively
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Table 2.5: Rel. Mobilization, Electoral Contestation and pentecostal Growth
DV: Logged Pent. Growth Rate, 1970-2010
A B C
Electoral Contestation -0.0473 -0.0554 -0.0793
(0.645) (0.600) (0.742)
Rel Mob x EC 0.0536+ 0.0640∗ 0.215∗
(0.190) (0.131) (0.101)
Religious Mobilization -0.604∗ -0.607+ -1.294∗
(0.142) (0.155) (0.110)
Controls No Yes Yes
Observations 28 28 28
Adj. R2 -0.0454 -0.0480 0.00502
∗ p < 0.15, ∗∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗∗ p < 0.05, p-values in parentheses.
Source: WCD (2010); Polyarchy (2013); and DPI (2001, 2013).
Notes: The DV in all models is the logged growth rate of pentecostalism as a percent of national population
between 1970 — 2010. To measure electoral contestation, Models A-B use mean DI score from 1996-2010,
and Model C uses the EIEC measure for the same period. Results are broadly consistent with the argument
advanced in this dissertation, but must be interpreted with caution due to data constraints. Ideally, these
models would focus on the period from (roughly) 1990 — 2010, but WCD data is unavailable for the 1980s
and 1990s.
new, decentralized, and competitive pentecostal churches, charismatics generally worship
in subgroups in traditional Catholic or mainline Protestant churches.
Running the same models with charismatic population share as the dependent variable
reveals results that are consistent with my emphasis on political context variables as drivers
of pentecostal growth. There is no apparent correlation between religious mobilization and
electoral contestation on the size of charismatic populations across countries in my sample.
Accordingly, coefficients are insignificant and the percent of variation accounted for by these
models is negligible — a stark contrast from the main findings presented above.
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Table 2.6: Rel. Mobilization, Electoral Contestation and Charismatic Population Size
DV: charismatics as % of Christians
A B C D
Electoral Contestation 0.471 0.462 1.106 0.282
(0.168) (0.215) (0.188) (0.418)
Rel Mob x EC -0.191 -0.200 -0.362 -0.117
(0.157) (0.173) (0.415) (0.429)
Religious Mobilization 2.180∗ 2.357∗ 2.793 1.724
(0.108) (0.116) (0.315) (0.297)
Controls - Y Y Y
Observations 29 29 29 29
Adj. R2 0.0188 -0.0997 -0.116 -0.168
∗ p < 0.15, ∗∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗∗ p < 0.05, p-values in parentheses
Source: WCD (2010); Polyarchy (2013); and DPI (2001, 2013).
Notes: This graph demonstrates that the correlates of pentecostal population are not strong correlates of
charismatic population size. This is consistent with the view that while pentecostal doctrine and worship style
are popular across most countries, the supply of pentecostal churches is distinctly influenced by the interaction
of political competition and recent religious mobilization. As in previous tables, all models are OLS regressions
and include a constant term, but the dependent variable in these models is the share of Christian population
that identifies as charismatic, not pentecostal. Models A-B are identical to models B-C in Table 2.3, and use
mean DI (1996-2010) as a measure of EC. Model C substitutes EIEC (averaged across the same period). Model
D substitutes the constrained mean DI measure, covering only the years 2001-2010. Results are consistent
across models.
2.3 Confounding Characteristics? The Role of Leaders’ Per-
sonal Identities
2.3.1 Sincere pentecostal believers?
Evidence presented in the preceding sections indicates support for the basic tenets of
a theory of politicized propagation. However, it is possible that politicized propagation
unfairly characterizes the motives of political actors. For instance, even if some political
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leaders target resources strategically to enhance the size of pentecostal populations within
their borders, how do we know that they are motivated by self-interest in political survival
rather than sinecure religious belief and evangelical zeal?
It is impossible to fully assess politicians’ perceived motivations. Moreover, it is likely
that individuals’ perceived motivations vary across contexts and over time. Yet, there are
two main reasons why I reject the hypothetical argument that politicized propagation is
motivated fundamentally by religious zeal. First, if pentecostal politicians’ sincere religious
beliefs fully motivated their actions, then I would expect these leaders to behave morally,
in accordance with their motivating religious beliefs in other realms of their political
and private lives. Overwhelmingly, however, the evidence indicates that pro-pentecostal
politicians violate religious moral codes in important other areas of life. Consider three
illustrative examples.
Morally motivated leadership in Kenya?
As Kenya’s former President, Daniel Arap Moi, faced increasing pressure to return the
country to multiparty rule, Moi enlisted leaders of the Evangelical Fellowship of Kenya —
most notably Arthur Kitonga, of the pentecostal Redeemed Gospel Church of Kenya — to
legitimize his consolidation of power and wide-ranging corruption. There is little ques-
tion that Moi’s rule was fundamentally inconsistent with Christian values, including most
fundamentally, respect for human life. As Sabar-Friedman summarizes, the climate under
Moi was “characterized by extensive official violence and systemic torture, surveillance and
censorship, abductions and detentions without trial, and the deadly use of police and armed
forces,” as well as an unprecedented clamp down on civil society (1997: 27; also see Akoko
2007: 192; Freston 2001: 148-9; and Gifford 2009: 201-222). In 1992, the Justice and Peace
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Commission of the Anglican Church of Kenya described Moi’s increasing authoritarian rule
during the 1980s in a letter read to all their congregations:
Fear was the order of the day and before very long that fear became a new culture
in the national life — the culture of fear. Other institutions which were critical
of the government were also intimidated and some succumbed to silence. In the
final analysis it appeared as if only the Church . . . had the courage to speak on
behalf of the people.7
Over the course of his personalistic, autocratic reign over Kenya, Moi issued or approved
innumerable beatings, killings, abductions, and other forms of intimidation intended to
protect his rule from political challenge. He also used his position of power to accumulate
personal wealth, and wealth for his family and key political allies.8 In response to this
behavior, the leaders of the older, established Christian Churches opposed Moi’s human
rights violations as un-Christian, and they did so at grave personal risk. Anglican Bishop
David Gitari, for instance, publicly condemned Moi and demanded justice for government
officials who committed politically motivated murders (Akoko 2007: 192-3).9 Many in Kenya
believe that Moi’s personalistic regime was responsible for Gitari’s subsequent death in an
automobile accident.
Yet, Moi’s image as a God-fearing Christian remained pivotal to his claims to legitimate
rule during this time. For instance, every Sunday during the early 1990s, the first item of
weekly, state-run news programming was simply footage of Moi attending church. State
7Archive of the Church of the Province of Kenya CPK/ARCH/CPK. Justice and Peace Commission, A Pastoral
Letter to all CPK Congregations, 1992: 16. Quoted by Sabar-Friedman 1997: 25.
8In 2011, Forbes confirmed that former President Moi was a billionaire, but removed him from their list of
the wealthiest Africans because he did not earn his money through business, but through political corruption.
Risk consultancy company, Kroll Associates, has been cited reporting that Moi diverted roughly one billion
dollars from government coffers into his personal accounts (see http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-2063548/Forbes-releases-African-rich-list---dont-expect-dictators-there.html.
9For a description of specific human rights issues (including politically motivated killings) that Gitari raised in
public hearings before his death, see Fr. Joachim Omolo Ouko’s article, “Questions: Gitari Wanted Answers, but
Died before he could be Answered” (10/2/2013) accessed June, 2014 at http://blog.jaluo.com/?p=36136.
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media and Moi’s public events also prominently featured pentecostal Bishop Arthur Kitonga,
who repeatedly preached that “President Moi has been appointed by God to lead the country
and Kenyans should be grateful for the peace prevailing. . . . We have freedom of worship, we
can pray and sing in any way we want. What else do we need? That is all we need” (cited
in Gifford 2009: 202). Like Moi, Kitonga loudly denounced Kenya’s “radical” pro-democratic
clergy as frauds. But Kitonga was not alone. The Evangelical Fellowship of Kenya (Kenya’s
union of pentecostal and some Evangelical churches) publicly supported Moi’s rule in the
1990s, which earned them considerable “government favor” (Pew 2007; also see Freston
2001: 146). Indeed, co-optation of pentecostal and evangelical leaders, Gifford concludes
“became the order of the day” (Gifford 2009: 204).
Morally motivated leadership in Ghana?
Although many other cases are less notoriously violent than the Kenyan case, similar
patterns of polarization and co-optation characterize many other African countries where
Pentecostals have emerged as powerful religious and political figures. In Ghana, for instance,
Jerry Rawlings became the first popularly elected President in the 1990s, following his rule
over Ghana after a coup in the 1980s. During his reign, “clientelism, personalism [around
Rawlings], and corruption . . . returned with a vengeance” Sandbrook and Oelbaum 1997: 44).
Simultaneously, his courting of Pentecostals and other born again leaders in Ghana became
a mainstay of his political identity. For instance, Rawlings was “bathed with the glow of sacral
kingship in the discourse of pentecostal preachers” who viewed all of his acts as a political
leader as open to “the blessing of God” (Kay 2009: 142). Ghana’s single largest Christian
block, however, remains the Roman Catholic Church, which “gained credibility over many
years for its bold denunciations of the abuse of political and police power” (Ibid: 141).
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Was Rawlings’s vocal promotion of and support for pentecostal churches throughout the
country a result of his fervent Christian belief? Should we view his support for Pentecostals
as strategic, but for religious rather than political purposes? If this was the case, we would not
expect to learn that Rawlings is alleged to have committed adultery with a younger woman
from Texas during his reign (Gifford 2007), nor would we expect his regime to repeatedly
engage in presumably immoral and politically expedient acts of corruption and repression,
such as banning the Catholic Standard for three years “for its human rights stance” (Gifford
2007: 203). Especially in light of the fact that nearly half of Ghana’s population is not
Christian, it is particularly surprising that a fervent Christian would engage in such public,
internecine struggle with the country’s largest Christian church if his main objective was to
promote Christian beliefs. Instead of refusing to appear on the same platform as Catholic
Bishop Peter Sarpong, then Chair of the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, we might
expect that such a leader would engage rather than repress fellow Christian leaders.
Other cases
In nearly every African country where political leaders have actively promoted the spread
of pentecostal churches in recent decades, there is at least anecdotal evidence that they
have also engaged in anti-democratic politics (and, at the extreme, violence), and public
corruption. In 2002 in Cote D’Ivoire, for example, then President Laurent Gbagbo relied
heavily on pentecostal pastors to rally citizens against his political opposition, and amplified
pastors’ demonization of northerners, Muslims, and foreigners (Mayrargue 2008: 14). The
regime is also rumored to have run guns and hired fighters through pentecostal churches on
the border of Liberia, which is particularly troubling given that Gbagbo arguably extended
the conflict when he inexplicably failed to commit to peace negotiations in October, 2002. Is
this the behavior that fervent Christian belief would dictate?
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And, in the severely HIV- and poverty-impacted country of Zambia, the “sincerity” of
pentecostal President Frederick Chiluba’s faith is called into questions by a variety of actions,
including his two divorces and conviction of extraordinary fiscal corruption.10 Though it
is impossible to ascertain Chiluba’s motivation for each policy he implemented or set of
funds he allocated, evidence suggests that at least several of Chiluba’s major decisions were
guided by self-interest and pursuit of wealth, power and pleasure, rather than an abiding
commitment to Christian values — despite his public pronouncements.
Therefore, I do embrace the possibility that some leaders, some of the time, may have
taken actions associated with politicized propagation, but without political motives in
mind. In the absence of evidence to support the view that pro-pentecostal leaders’ political
actions were frequently motivated by religious belief, however, I reject the argument that
the same leaders’ strategic allocation of goods and political opportunities to Pentecostals
was motivated primarily and overwhelmingly by faith. The degree to which many of these
leaders’ actions in fact offend the same leaders’ professed morality belies an insincerity when
it comes to leaders’ adherence to their professed faith. This is especially true when evidence
reveals politicians promoting pentecostal church growth on an electoral business cycle, as I
discuss in Chapter Three.
2.3.2 Other individual-level factors of leaders
Moving beyond the question of leaders’ perceived or driving motivations, there are other
individual-level characteristics that might influence leaders’ willingness to engage in pen-
tecostal propagation. Taking a step back and considering the political landscapes of sub-
Saharan countries, for instance, one might be concerned that politicized propagation is
10In 2007, Chiluba was found to have plundered at least $50 million USD in public funds during his presidency
(1992-2001), which he spent on European properties and designer shoes and clothes. https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2009/aug/17/zambia-chiluba-cleared-corruption
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more likely to appeal to leaders of former British colonies than their peers in states formerly
governed by France. This could be a result of the fact that we expect French colonial subjects
to have been more likely to be raised Catholic than former British colonial subjects. It could
also be tied to languages spoken in these countries: If pentecostal evangelists are more likely
to speak English than French, and are therefore more likely to have made inroads in former
British colonies, enhancing the likelihood that the countries’ leaders have been exposed to
pentecostalism (Mayrargue 2001: 278).
I respond to these concerns by examining the trajectories of political and religious
change (or stability) in two former French colonies during the post-Cold War period.
Specifically, I evaluate subnational historical evidence from Benin and Cameroon, in search
of clues that the leader of either of these countries had personal experiences that prevented
them from engaging in Politicized pentecostalism.
Case selection
I opt to compare these countries — and their most prominent post-Cold War leaders —
because the countries (and leaders) are similar along many important dimensions, but differ
with respect to the main independent variables that I argue predict the use of politicized
propagation. Specifically, both of these West African countries were formerly ruled by
France, have diverse religious populations, including Muslims and traditional religionists
in addition to significant Christian populations, and made relatively peaceful transitions to
multiparty “democracy” in the early 1990s. Moreover, in both of these countries, former
dictators — both of whom were born and raised as Catholics — were elected President in
the 1990s, and both leaders faced accusations of corruption and anti-democratic actions in
office (e.g., election fraud).
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Yet, as noted above, Benin and Cameroon differ with respect to the (i) degrees of political
competition observed in the post-Cold War period; and (ii) the role of established churches
in agitating for democratic transition. Whereas Benin’s Catholic and older Protestant
churches played a major role in facilitating democratic transition (and continue to play a
“watch dog” role promoting political accountability in Benin), the established churches in
Cameroon were unable to mobilize a unified pro-democracy movement in Cameroon. In
turn, this has limited the ability of the mainline churches — especially Cameroon’s sizable
Catholic Church — to credibly threaten oppositional political mobilization.
Cameroon
Leaders within the Catholic Church and the Presbyterian Church in Cameroon (the country’s
preeminent mainline Protestant denomination) have spoken out against corruption and
anti-democratic actions by the government for decades. Salient regional, tribal, and linguis-
tic divisions in the country, however, have long constrained the ability of these churches to
mobilize significant opposition to government policy (Konings 2003: 51-3; Akoko 2007: 206-
8). Moreover, although some religious leaders publicly agitate for democracy, Bishops of
President Paul Biya’s Beti ethnic group have effectively counteracted these messages during
important political moments in the country. These Beti Bishops are also alleged to have
received patronage in exchange for their support (Akoko 2007: 2006).
This was the case in 2004, for instance, when Benin’s Cardinal Tumi denounced recent
elections as unfree and unfair on a local, private radio station, and the Archibshop of Yaonde
(Cameroon’s capital), Victor Tonye Bakot, went on the national radio station to contradict
Tumi, and legitimize the election results (Akoko 2007: 2006-7). Interestingly, the Archbishop
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of Yaonde, Bakot, a Beti, who defended President Biya was then President of the Cameroon
Episcopal Conference — the umbrella association of Catholic organizations in Cameroon.11
At the same time, President Biya’s government has made it extremely difficult to acquire
legal licenses to found new churches. The government can and does use the “illegality”
of many new churches as justification to abolish them, occasionally using force. For
example, in 2012, Cameroon’s military “permanently closed” all but a select few Born Again
pentecostal churches in the nation’s capital city, Yaounde, among other heavily Christian
areas of the country. These churches, Biya stated, had “outstretched their liberty” by
exploiting the poor, and thus posed a “threat to national security.”12
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Cameroon’s level of political competition lags behind that of
Benin and many other African countries. Biya has ruled the country since 1982, narrowly
winning with 40% of the vote in the country’s first multiparty elections in 1992. In sub-
sequent elections (1997, 2004, and 2011), Biya “won” re-election with large margins, but
opposition politicians and Western governments accuse Biya of relying on electoral fraud.
Hence, a recent report on political liberalization in the region classified Cameroon as a
country in-between the best and worst performers, noting that although the country has
routinely held elections, “the opposition has no realistic chance of dislodging the incumbent
party from power, and civil liberties . . . have either stagnated or regressed” (Burchard 2014).
Meanwhile Biya’s approach to Pentecostals has been anything other than friendly. First,
his government used legislation to make it extremely difficult to legally establish a new
church in the country. The government used the “illegality” of many churches as justification
to abolish them, sometimes using force. For instance, in 2012, Biya ordered Cameroon’s
military to “permanently close” all but a select few Born Again pentecostal churches in the
11Also see Jean F. Channon, “Affaire Tonye Bakot: Comment l’archevêque de Yaoundé a été broyé” in Cameroon
Voice, Aug. 8, 2013. http://www.cameroonvoice.com/news/article-news-11990.html
12http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/14/world/africa/cameroon-churches/
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nation’s capital city, Yaounde, among other heavily Christian areas of the country. These
churches, Biya stated, had “outstretched their liberty” by exploiting the poor, and thus posed
a threat to “national security.”13
Benin
Roughly 400 miles to the West of Cameroon, in the predominantly Christian state of Benin,
another Catholic-born, former dictator turned controversially-elected-President, Paul Biya,
took a different tack. Baptized in the Roman Catholic Church, Kérékou had officially
embraced secular Marxism during his dictatorship from 1971-1990, allegedly flirted with
conversion to Islam for geopolitical reasons in the 1980s, and proceeded to rule Benin from
1996 — 2006 as a fervent Born Again pentecostal Christian (Grätz 2014: 58). His conversion
to pentecostalism preceded his run for President in 1996, in which he squeaked to victory
amidst disputed vote counts. During his campaign in 1996 and again in 2001, he likened his
return to governing the country as a “second coming,” emphasized themes of Born Again
forgiveness, and used a campaign slogan that suggested he was God’s chosen leader: “In
spite of the past 17 years,” his campaign advertised, “it is Kérékou that God has chosen for
this people.” 14
During his first term, Kérékou repeatedly linked the concept of Born Again conversion
to the effort to achieve peace and prosperity in Benin, resulting in the rapid growth of
Born Again churches and their membership (Claffey 2007). However, Kérékou’s newfound
religiosity did not prevent him from controversially seizing a second term in 2001 in elections
that observers characterized as "unfair,” and which Kérékou’s major opposition parties
boycotted (Fomunyoh 2001: 38). Kérékou is also widely believed to have accepted more
13http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/14/world/africa/cameroon-churches/
14Libération, 20 March 1996.
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than 2 million USD in international corporate bribes during this period. As in other
African countries, such as Zambia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Ghana, the historical record belies
the popular notion that leaders’ Born Again conversion leads to good governance and
democratic consolidation.
It is notable here that in Benin, the Catholic Church played a leading role as an agitator
for democratic transition and consolidation (c.f., Gifford 1995; Strandsbjerg 2000; Mayrargue
2001; Claffey 2007). Catholic Church leaders literally presided over the country’s transition
from single party politics to multipartyism in the early 1990s. Perhaps because of the
Catholic Church’s strong claim to moral authority in Benin, Kérékou had actually initially
sought to dramatize his pursuit of religious forgiveness and rebirth through public apology
to the Catholic Church at Benin’s 1992 National Convention, over which the Catholic Church
presided. However, the Church’s reception of Kérékou was lukewarm. Ever the “chameleon”
(a nickname that Kérékou embraced, with reference to his adaptability to new contexts),
it was only a matter of years before Kérékou was back on the scene, this time with a
new approach to dramatizing his political reconciliation and rebirth: now as a born again
pentecostal (Strandsbjerg 2000).15
In 2006, Kérékou considered but ultimately did not seek constitutional amendments so
that he could serve a third term. Instead, his successor Thomas Boni Yayi ran and won
in Benin’s 2006 and 2011 elections. Like Kérékou, Yayi is widely portrayed as a “fervent”
pentecostal. Simultaneously, his presidency was marked by a number of major economic
15The degree to which Kérékou framed his political “resurrection” in religious terms was extreme. It was also
not lost on Beninese observers. As one reader noted in an op-ed in following Kérékou’s 1996 electoral victory,
“a political Easter in Benin . . . the story we have of Jesus, Palm Sunday is very illustrative of the coming to power
of the General [Kérékou], of his departure, of the arrival of Soglo,16 of his departure and of the return of the
General who, by coincidence appears as a converted man . . . five years ago, we crucified Soglo as we did the
General five years earlier. By crucifying Soglo, we resurrected the General Chameleon.” Le Matin 4 April 1996,
p.2, quoted in Strandsbjerg 2000: 407.
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scandals, significantly escalating corruption,17 and, according to Freedom House (2013), a
crackdown on media freedom. Reelected in 2011, Boni Yayi won re-election after postponing
the election twice to register more voters. Increasingly, he “surrounded himself with family
members and members of the pentecostal church” including three of his relatives in his
administration, and three pentecostal church members as the Ministers of Justice, of Labor
and of the Environment (Moestrup 2014).
Contrasting cases
Clearly, the size of Born Again Christian populations and their political roles have evolved
very differently in Cameroon and Benin, despite the similar religious origins of both coun-
try’s preeminent leaders, similar timing of the reintroduction of multiparty politics, and
comparable religious demography in these formerly French-ruled West African states. What
explains this variation?
Clearly, the role of capability of the established churches to effectively mobilize and
advocate for democratization differs across countries, despite similarly pro-democratic
political ideals held by many (though not all) Catholic clergy. The three major clues that
indicate the presence of politicized Propagation in Benin, but not in Cameroon are as
follows: (i) Beninese political leaders (Kérékou and Yayi) publicly touting their commitment
to pentecostal Christianity since the mid-1990s; (ii) promotion of pentecostal values, beliefs,
and church leaders through public ceremonies, commentary, national media, and political
appointments; and (iii) rapid proliferation of pentecostal church propagation following the
17In 2013, the US declared Benin ineligible for aid allocated by the Millennium Challenge Account due to
increasing corruption in the country (Moestrup 2014). For details, see http://presidential-power.com/
?p=1127.
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election of (newly) pentecostal Kérékou.18 Additionally, the alignment of politicians’ public
proselytizing of pentecostalism with anti-democratic behavior (e.g., Kérékou’s questionable
claim to have won the 2001 elections, and alleged acceptance of international bribes,
and Yayi’s successive scandals and media repression) is consistent with the argument
that politicians’ religious and political motivations as interdependent, and, in Benin, this
interaction led Kérékou to engage in pentecostal Propagation. By contrast, Cameroon’s lower
levels of electoral competition and religious mobilization coexist with a regime intent on
using both legislation and security forces to minimize the growth of pentecostal churches
that it deems “threats.”
2.4 Conclusion
Both quantitative and qualitative case evidence presented in this chapter is consistent with
the argument that political context (e.g., electoral competition and religious mobilization
for democracy) and African pentecostalism have related endogenously in recent years. It is
extremely difficult to explain variation in the size of pentecostal populations across countries
without reference to variation in these political context variables. More specifically, I
find evidence consistent with the theory of politicized propagation: Where ruling parties
faced relatively high electoral competition and established religions with a history of pro-
democratic mobilization, politicians appear to have acted in ways that promoted the growth
of pentecostal church membership.
18Mayrargue (2001) describes the relatively late arrival of pentecostalism to Benin, as well as his assessment —
based on data obtained from the Beninese Ministry of the Interior, Security and Territorial Administration —
that roughly 100 — 200 new religious structures were established following Benin’s transition to multipartyism,
and the majority of these are new Christian churches that emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s (2001:
275–8).
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Moreover, the structured comparison between the size of pentecostal and charismatic
Christian populations across countries revealed that while political context variables are
significant predictors for the size of pentecostal populations in the region, the same variables
do not correlate with the size of charismatic Christian populations. If the growth of born
again movements was driven primarily by doctrine and worship style associated with
Renewalism, we would expect pentecostal and charismatic church membership to be driven
by similar variables across countries. Yet, as expected, regression analysis indicates that this
is not the case.
Additionally, this chapter has discussed alternative and complementary accounts that
seek to explain why and how pentecostalism has emerged as such a powerful force in
some sub-Saharan countries in recent decades. Explanations that emphasize the role of
urbanization, socioeconomic inequality, political disfunction, and intergenerational conflict
are all potentially powerful complements to the argument that I advance, as they focus on
explaining the conditions under which specific individuals are more likely to join pentecostal
churches, assuming their supply. By contrast, the theory and evidence presented in this
dissertation aim to advance understanding about how political context influences cross-
national variation in the supply of these churches. This chapter has also marshaled
qualitative evidence that undermines two hypothetical, competing explanations for the
appearance of politicized propagation, including explanations that would emphasize the
idiosyncratic lived experiences of politicians, or politicians’ potentially sincere religious
motivations.
Taken collectively, the discussion and analyses presented in this chapter support a
theory of politicized propagation, and refute the null hypothesis — idea that the rise of
pentecostalism has occurred independently from political context variables. The following
chapters continue to hone in on causal process mechanisms undergirding apparent rela-
tionships between political and religious change. Specifically, Chapter Three introduces an
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in-depth investigation of the relationship between religion and politics over time within the
single case of Zambia. Only by combining broader contextual and cross-country analyses
presented in this chapter with case-specific insights and original data presented in Chapters
3 and 4 can we gain a more clear understanding of the relationship between political and
religious change in many sub-Saharan countries.
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Chapter 3
Church-State Relations in Zambia’s State Records
On behalf of the nation, I have now entered into a covenant
with the living God. . . . I submit the Government and the
entire nation of Zambia to the Lordship of Jesus Christ. I further
declare that Zambia is a Christian Nation that will seek to be
governed by the righteous principles of the Word of God.
— Then President Frederick Chiluba
Quoted in The Times of Zambia, 2201994
In previous chapters, I have argued that in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa, the
relationship between religious change and politics is endogenous. Moreover, I argued that
political actors have played critical yet understudied roles in promoting (constraining) the
growth of pentecostalism within their borders since the late 1980s. I expected that politicians
would be most likely to engage in what I termed politicized propagation of pentecostal
churches when facing a combination of: (i) established religious groups (e.g., the Catholic
Church) that credibly threatened to mobilize opposition to the ruling party’s favored policy
or political survival; and (ii) relatively high electoral contestation.
Evidence considered in Chapter 2 suggested support for this argument at the cross-
national level. First, raw data illustrates divergent trends in the size of national pentecostal
populations in countries where established churches played important roles in democ-
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ratization struggles. Second, empirical analysis demonstrated that an interaction term
constructed from a measure of electoral contestation and a measure of established churches
mobilizing for democracy has a strong, positive, and statistically significant correlation with
the share of a state’s population that belonged to pentecostal churches in 2010. Revealingly,
no such correlation exists with respect to the size of Charismatic Christian populations.
This indicates that the major alternative explanations for the rise of Renewalist Christianity
— including both Charismatic and pentecostal groups — cannot explain cross-national
variation in the size of pentecostal populations.
One limitation of cross-national evidence presented in Chapter 2, however, is that it
cannot shed light on causal process mechanisms. In other words, I have not yet pro-
vided evidence to demonstrate that political actors have in fact disproportionately targeted
pentecostal churches with selective benefits in countries with relatively large pentecostal
populations, nor a temporal or publicly recognized relationship between the allocation of
selective benefits and electoral politics.
This chapter presents analysis of original data from a single case over time to begin
evaluating causal processes mechanisms. I focus on the case of Zambia — a southern
African country that has held multiparty elections since 1992. As I discuss in detail below,
Zambia is an appropriate case to study because its mainline Protestant, Catholic, and some
older Evangelical churches helped to lead the struggle for democracy in the late 1980s,
mediated the transition from a single to a multiparty state in 1991-2, and have remained
at the forefront of Zambia’s struggle to democratize. Additionally, Zambia has experienced
relatively high levels of electoral contestation since 1992, culminating in the 1990s in anti-
democratic reforms that benefited the ruling party, and, later, a transfer of power in 2011.
Like a majority of sub-Saharan states, Zambia is majority-Christian, with roughly 80% of
Zambians professing Christianity. For all of these reasons, Zambia is an ideal test case to
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evaluate my argument that political and religious change have been endogenous, and have
been heavily impacted by instances of politicized propagation.
In what follows, I provide a deeper discussion of case selection, as well as necessary
background information about the recent history of religion and politics in Zambia. I then
draw on data that I compiled from more than thirteen government agencies and religious
umbrella bodies in Zambia, with which I can evaluate when, how, and to what degree
ruling parties have targeted selective benefits to Pentecostals (or other religious groups),
and the degree to which the same partisan actors withheld similar benefits from other
religious actors. This data also enables me to assess whether selective benefits were allocated
disproportionately in the lead up to elections.
Indeed, the evidence strongly indicates that between 1992-2013, Zambia’s ruling party —
the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) — disproportionately targeted benefits to
Pentecostals, and, where possible, denied similar benefits to the Catholic Church. The MMD
also allocated these benefits far more frequently in the lead up to elections, which I consider
evidence of an endogenous relationship between religion and politics.
No single analysis presented in this chapter constitutes a “smoking gun” for the theory
of politicized propagation. However, the collective impact of these findings is powerfully
suggestive evidence that is consistent with the theory. Moreover, findings presented in this
chapter do not support competing explanations for the rise of pentecostalism that focus
on doctrine, foreign influence, or the power of new media and globalization. Chapter 4
complements results presented in this chapter by probing the results of qualitative research




Zambia (illustrated in the figure below) is an appropriate case with which to evaluate my
argument for substantive, analytic, and logistical reasons. Substantively, it meets several
criteria required in order to test the argument I make. These include:
• Political liberalization. Zambia peacefully transitioned from single party rule to
multiparty electoral politics in 1991 and has consistently held elections since. Research
in African politics has therefore consistently viewed Zambia a representative example
of post-Cold War “democratization” (c.f., Posner 2005; Baldwin 2010, 2013; Riedl 2014).
• Rapid pentecostal growth post-democratization. The World Christian Database
(WCD) and numerous qualitative accounts have indicated that pentecostal churches
grew rapidly following liberalization in 1991 (c.f., Gifford 1998; Cheyeka 2007; Udel-
hoven 2010; Hinfelaar et al., 2014).
• Established religious institutions mobilize for democracy. There is consensus among
historians that the churches played pivotal roles in Zambia’s transition to multiparty-
ism, and continue to serve as “watch dogs” in Zambian political life, often speaking
out against undemocratic practice through the churches’ own media outlets, as well as
other sources (c.f., Gifford 1995, 5; 1998, 190-197; Cheyeka 2007, 144-163; Phiri 2008,
95-129; also see Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011, 100).
• Significant Christian population. A significant percentage of Zambians are Christian
(nearly 80% at the time of democratic transition, according to Zambia’s Central
Statistical Office).
Zambia therefore meets the broad criteria as a case where I would expect to observe
pentecostal propagation.
Zambia is also an important case to study from a policy perspective. As one of the
first African countries to transition to multiparty electoral politics after the Cold War,
Zambia was frequently held up by international donors and the U.N. as an example of
Africa’s own “third wave democratization.” Yet, in recent years policy makers and scholars
have been increasingly willing to recognize that — as in many of the region’s “successful”
cases of post-Cold War political liberalization — Zambia’s democratic transition has been
significantly stalled by corrupt political elites, and has arguably experienced reversal of
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Figure 3.1: Maps of Zambia
important democratic gains (discussed further below). Understanding why and how this
once-exemplary case has failed to democratize, as expected, is important for policy makers,
citizens and activists interested in democracy promotion across the region.
Analytically, the Zambian case also affords scholars a uniquely long period of multiparty
political evolution, given the country’s relatively early transition to mulitpartyism, as well as
its consistent conduct of multiparty elections in the decades since transition (even if many
of those elections were deemed unfair by observers and opposition parties) (Posner 2005).
Moreover, given that Zambia experienced a peaceful transition of power from the long-
ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) party to the Patriotic Front (PF) party in
2011, the case afforded me the opportunity to observe how relations between political and
religious actors changed in the wake of an unpredictable, narrowly won election in 2011.
Focusing on the Zambian case has the added benefit of enabling me to dialogue with
influential recent research on identity and politics in the region, which also focused on
Zambia, but has largely excluded considerations of the relationship between religion and
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politics in the country (c.f. Posner 2005; also see Baldwin 2010, 2013, and Riedl 2014).
Bringing religion into focus in the Zambian case therefore enables me to contribute to
ongoing debates in the discipline from a new perspective, and to provide new evidence and
analyses with which to evaluate influential arguments in the field.
Additionally, as we observed from descriptive statistics presented in the Chapter 1, a ma-
jority of states in sub-Saharan Africa are majority Christian, and many are overwhelmingly
so. Existing interdisciplinary literature on religion and politics in the region, however, has
tended to focus on a small number of high profile countries, such as Nigeria, Ghana, and
Kenya. In each of these cases, larger Muslim populations have led analysts to emphasize
the role of Christian-Muslim tensions. Like a majority of sub-Saharan states, however,
Zambia has a relatively small Muslim population.1 and yet the politicization of religion (e.g.,
denominations) has nevertheless increased dramatically over time. Given limited research
on such dynamic contexts, studying the Zambian case has the benefit of expanding insight
into the processes through which religion becomes a politically salient social cleavage over
time in the absence of local Christian-Muslim tensions.
Finally, two pragmatic research considerations influenced my selection of the Zambian
case. First, Zambia held national elections during my period of dissertation research (2011-
2013). Secondly, and more importantly, Zambia’s relative political stability means that it
boasts significant repositories of state administrative data on things like church registration,
tax breaks, business licenses, media permits, land allocation and (to a lesser extent) access
to development funds and local government appointments to church leaders. After much
lobbying, I was able to gain access to most of these data. This was not only imperative
to my research design, but also enables me to contribute to literature on identity politics
1Muslims accounted for approximately 10% of the national population in 2000, according to the Zambian
Central Statistical Office, 2006.
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using historical information on the allocation of benefits, which is typically difficult if not
impossible to do in poverty-impacted countries with weak state institutions.
Related to this, I was able to use the government’s lists of registered churches as a basis
for a sampling frame in my qualitative research across church congregations, which I discuss
in Chapter 4. This sampling approach improves my ability to draw meaningful inferences
from my qualitative research as I can be sure that I’m not only considering the dynamics
within churches that would be most accessible to a foreign observer. For all of these reasons,
Zambia constituted a policy-relevant, analytically advantageous, and pragmatic case for
researching the relation between religion and politics over time.2
3.2 The Political Context
Zambia is a large southern African country, formerly known as Northern Rhodesia. Like
many African countries, Zambia suffered dramatic economic crisis during the 1980s, and
transitioned from a single party to a multiparty electoral regime at the end of the Cold War.
As in many of its African counterparts, churches, unions, and student movements
played leading roles in the struggle for democratization during the late 1980s and early
1990s. Specifically, the Catholic and mainline Protestant churches — allied with unions,
student movements, and Baptist Evangelicals — were at the helm of Zambia’s Movement for
Multiparty Democracy (MMD). Much like the churches that Bayart describes in his seminal
study of Cameroonian politics during the 1970s, Zambian churches in this period also came
to “replace the manifestly political institutions in certain of their functions,” becoming one
of the few outlets for civic life and basic social services amidst repression and poverty (1973,
5). After intense struggles, including riots over food shortages, the churches — which could
2Appendix B describes all original data collected in Zambia.
85
marshal external resources as well as domestic legitimacy — played “an absolutely pivotal
role” as “the midwife of multipartiism,” as an avowedly secular leader of the progressive Law
Association of Zambia explained to me in 2011 (Amos Chanda, interview 7/21/11). Together,
these church leaders worked alongside evangelical trade unionist, Frederick Chiluba, to
usher in the first peaceful transition to multipartiism among a former British colony in 1991.
As several other active intellectuals put it, the Catholic Church, in particular, “was in the
driver’s seat” during democratization and “drove the process home,” persuading Kaunda to
concede to a referendum on multipartiism and then mediating the transition with UNIP and
the incoming leaders of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD).
In 1991, after two decades of single-party rule, Zambia therefore returned to multiparty
electoral politics. The coalition known as the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD)
had transformed itself into a political party and swept the nation’s first multiparty elections
in over two decades. Frederick Chiluba, a born again Protestant trade union leader, won
the presidency on the MMD ticket. Yet, the heady days of mass mobilization by civil
society actors soon gave way to a puzzling state of affairs in which religion took on new,
unanticipated, and increasingly important roles in national politics.
Following his inauguration, President Chiluba surprised the major churches by person-
ally declaring Zambia an officially Christian Nation (epigraph). The declaration caused
considerable controversy despite the fact that Zambia, like a majority of states in sub-
Saharan Africa, is majority Christian.3 Testament to their commitment to protect religious
freedom and promote democratic consolidation, the powerful Catholic and mainline Protes-
tant churches condemned the declaration as undemocratic.
3According to the 2010 census, approximately 87% of Zambians are Christian, 1% are Muslim or Hindu,
and 12% adhere to indigenous religions. Others estimate that closer to 80% of Zambians are Christian,
approximately 5% are Muslim, 5% belong to other faiths (e.g., Hindu or Baha’i), and the remainder are non-
religious (African Religious Health Assets Programme, 2006).
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A rapidly growing group of pentecostal church founders, however, lauded the declara-
tion, and began to flood the State House with visits, where many allegedly received material
support for their churches (Cheyeka 2008). By all accounts, the number of pentecostal
churches in Zambia grew exponentially during these years, boosted by the status and
material assistance that the new government offered them (Gifford 1998; Phiri 2008; Cheyeka
2008; Ndlovu 2012). For instance, Rev. Sempa Brendt, then General Secretary of the umbrella
body of mainline Protestant churches in Zambia, emphasized that, although there were
some older evangelical, Baptist and even a few international pentecostal churches that
operated in Zambia before the transition to multipartiism, it was only after Chiluba was
sworn in as first President in 1991 and declared the nation to be “officially Christian” that
the “pentecostal churches spread like fire” (Author interview, Lusaka 2011).
Yet, the 1990s were difficult years for most Zambians, as economic liberalization and
austerity associated with Structural Adjustment led to massive unemployment and a simul-
taneously reduction in state services. In this context, the MMD’s popularity was in jeopardy.
During the lead up to national elections in 1996, however, Chiluba’s MMD party forced
three constitutional amendments through parliament in an effort to ensure victory. Two of
these amendments targeted Chiluba’s main political rivals, including UNIP’s founding father,
Kenneth Kaunda, and UNIP’s candidate for Vice President, Senior Chief (traditional leader)
Inyambo Yeta. The first amendment disqualified Kaunda from running for office because his
parents were born in Nyasaland, which was not a part of contemporary Zambia. The other
amendment officially prohibited traditional chiefs from participating in partisan politics,
which prohibited Yeta from leading UNIP in Kaunda’s absence, and forced numerous UNIP
MPs to decide whether they would give up their seats to maintain chieftaincies. Chiluba’s
third constitutional amendment sought not to exclude his rivals from the political process,
but to increase his popularity by formally declaring Zambia a Christian Nation.
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The Catholic and mainline Protestant churches condemned all three amendments as
undemocratic. They issued pastoral letters and waged criticisms from pulpits and in the
press urging citizens to reject such anti-democratic reform. “We said, if Chiluba wants to lead
a Christian nation," one mainline Protestant activist recounted to me, "he should show this
in deeds, by leading a free and tolerant nation with religious liberty. A nation that eliminates
competition and then claims to be Christ-like is not a true Christian nation." (Interview,
Lusaka 2011). But the swelling ranks of pentecostal churches largely rejoiced on behalf of
the Christian Nation amendment, and ignored Chiluba’s blatant disqualification of his rivals
from participating in politics. Pentecostals were happy to look the other way if it helped to
guarantee the political survival of, as one Evangelical pastor put it to me, their new “patron
saint” (Interview, Pastor Emanuel Kambwambwe 8/13/2011; also see Cheyeka 2008; Gifford
1998; Ndlovu 2012).
As I detail below and in the following chapter, it was also during the 1990s that Chiluba
established a number of programs and unofficial policies to propagate the growth of new
pentecostal churches. This included a policy to redistribute valuable urban land plots
to churches as well as the creation of a Ministry of Christian Affairs (later renamed the
Religious Affairs Desk) and a corresponding budget line, which Zambians routinely refer to
as “Chiluba’s slush fund.”
For their part, the Catholics launched major voter sensitization drives and sent teams of
well-trained Zambian Catholic NGO workers across the country to train election observers.
They also established a program to launch dozens of Catholic Commissions for Justice and
Peace (CCJP), tasked with leading locally-grounded, pro-poor, pro-democracy activism in
various regions of the country. CCJP campaigns also strived to include interfaith constituen-
cies, including counterparts from the mainline Protestant United Church of Zambia.
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The continued work of the Catholic and other older churches as pro-demcracy “watch
dogs" threatened Chiluba and his inner circle. Evidence of this perceived threat is found
in repeated assaults on the Catholic Church in state-owned newspapers, which harshly
described Catholic-led activism or objections from the churches to government policy as
un-Christian, worldly, self-interested, unpatriotic, and even directed by Rome. These same
accounts admonished Christians to pray for their leaders and focus on living good Christian
lives. God would ultimately select the country’s “rightful” leader.
With the help of MMD’s heavy hand, all three amendments passed.4 With the major
opposition parties boycotting the elections — this included Kaunda’s UNIP party and five
other allied opposition parties — Chiluba was reelected with 73% of the vote, and the
MMD won 131 of 150 seats in Parliament. International observers, such as the Carter
Center condemned the elections as “free but unfair,” and bemoaned the fact that the MMD
appeared to be imperiling democratization in Zambia.
The prominence of pentecostal identity in the 1996 elections was underscored by the
transition of numerous pentecostal leaders into partisan candidates. This included Zambian
pentecostal Televangelist, Pastor Nevers Mumba, who would later serve as Vice President
(2003-2004) and President of the MMD party (2012-present).
The years that followed were difficult ones, with more Zambians slipping into poverty
and more authoritarian responses on the part of the government, which was later convicted
of embezzling massive amounts of public money. Nevertheless, as Zambia’s next national
elections approached in 2001, Chiluba again floated a constitutional amendment designed
to prolong political survival. This time, he wanted to amend the constitution to permit a third
term as President. Notably, the Catholic and traditional Protestant churches led civil society
4The constitution maintained basic guarantees of religious freedom for individuals, though critics note that
the government requires Christian instruction in public schools (for details, see United States Department of
State, 2012).
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groups in opposing the amendment as dangerously undemocratic. Scores of prominent
pentecostal leaders, however, came out in favor of the amendment. As I discuss below,
shifting political circumstances ultimately led to a divide within the broader Evangelical and
pentecostal community, in which leaders of older Evangelical churches rejected the third
term amendment, while prominent leaders of newer pentecostal churches supported it.
In the years since Chiluba’s reign, the MMD continued to walk a fine line between
anti-democratic reform and governance, on the one hand, and actions consistent with
democratization, i.e., regular, relatively free (if unfair) elections. The role of religion in
politics would ultimately come to a head in 2011, when the MMD was narrowly defeated
in Presidential elections by the nominally Catholic and broadly populist former MMD-
member, Michael Sata.
It is with this broad historical context in mind that I now turn to a more rigorous analysis
of quantitative data that can help refine our understanding of the degree to which the MMD
has favored Pentecostals in Zambia, and the degree to which these actions should be viewed
as currying a constituency that was more willing to tolerate anti-democratic reform than
members of the older churches.
3.3 Analysis of Government Records from Zambia
This section triangulates different types of fine-grained administrative data to evaluate
observable implications of my argument in the case of Zambia. Specifically, I examine the
timing and targeting of state benefits to various identity-based networks during Zambia’s
post-Cold War period of democratization (the Zambian Third Republic). During this
period, the Movement for Multiparty Rule (MMD) government held office from 1991 —
2011; The Patriotic Front (PF) party has ruled since 2011. Evidence presented below
demonstrates that the MMD government allocated business licenses, tax breaks, local
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government appointments, and media licenses (i) disproportionately to Pentecostals and
(ii) more frequently in election years. Additionally, I find evidence that the MMD refused
to permit the Catholic Church to register for a television station, while simultaneously
subsidizing the production and distribution of local pentecostal media in government-
owned media facilities. Similarly, the MMD (particularly during its first decade of rule)
strategically demoted the political authority of chiefs while propagating pentecostal church
networks.
Finally, given the unanticipated election of the PF government in 2011, I am able to
compare the behavior of the MMD and PF governments with respect to several of the
indicators I consider in this chapter. Indeed, I find that whereas the MMD privileged
Pentecostals with appointments to local government positions and business licenses, the PF
government denied the same benefits to Pentecostals. Instead, the PF (led by Catholic “pop-
ulist” Michael Sata) sought to make a strategic alliance with the Catholic Church, appointing
a disproportionate number of Catholic clergy to local government development committees
throughout the country. Evidence is also clear, however, that the Catholic Church did not
engage in clientelistic relations with this party in a manner akin to pentecostal pastors under
the MMD. I consider the implications of this evidence at the chapter’s conclusion.
Notably, although data constraints limit my ability to assess causal relationships, the
triangulation of multiple types of theoretically comparable benefits over time and across
parties enables me to systematically refute the null hypotheses that the establishment of
new pentecostal churches was unrelated to partisan politics. Instead, evidence consistently
suggests strong support for the specific hypothesis that the MMD engaged in politicized
propagation of pentecostal churches, as well as the broader theoretical framework that
suggests parties engage different identity-based networks in clientelist relations both in an
attempt to cultivate constituencies through loyal and capable clientelistic networks, and
also, simultaneously, to undermine potentially oppositional identity-based networks.
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Below I consider the allocation of business licenses, tax breaks, local government
appointments, and media permits and production subsidies. I then discuss the implications
of changes that occurred after the transition from MMD to PF rule in 2011. The evidence
presented in this chapter contributes primarily by shedding light on the causal process
mechanisms that undergird these processes.
3.4 Business Licenses
In this section I assess the hypotheses that churches are more likely to register, in general,
and to obtain business licenses in the lead up to national elections as compared to other
years. The reason they might do so is because church leaders and possibly congregants
anticipate (or are informed) that they will receive benefits from political parties who choose
to campaign at or simply seek to induce the support of the church. Moreover, the registration
as a business can itself be considered as a serious perk allocated by the state to an applicant
organization. Below I explain how church registration works in Zambia and what the benefits
of different types of registration entail.
Registration
To register as any kind of non-profit organization in Zambia, including a church, groups
must follow a complicated system of registry with the Zambian state. First, all churches
(and non-profit entities) must register with the Registrar of Societies. Failure to do so
can result in being fined and shut down by the state and imprisonment of up to 7 years
(United States Department of State, 2011). While punishment is not often severe in practice,
registration serves a legitimating function and is a prerequisite for receiving any kind of perks
or organizational privileges from the state (discussed further below). Hence, it is widely
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believed that most churches do register within a period of one to two years of formation.
Additionally, accusations of sorcery and witchcraft are not uncommon in Zambia; registering
an organization as a church is sometimes perceived as a sort of social safeguard against being
called a witch. As one church founder told me: With a license, church organizers can “at least
prove that you are not some wicked impostor” (Author interview with Anonymous Subject,
8/4/2011). Registering with the Registrar of Societies is therefore a generally accepted step
in the process of forming any sizable church that seeks to grow its membership.5
Yet this preliminary form of registration does not entitle a church or non-profit to
function as a corporate legal entity in the eyes of the state. Instead, if a church or secular
NGO wants to take out a loan, lease, buy or sell real estate or vehicles in the organization’s
name, or operate a not-for-profit media station or recording studio, that church must register
with the Patents and Companies Registration Agency (PACRA). The principal function of
PACRA, as a semi-autonomous executive agency of the Zambian Ministry of Commerce,
Trade and Industry, is to register commercial and industrial property with the Zambian state.
The organization was associated with Pentecostals under MMD rule, as Pentecostals are also
widely associated with entrepreneurial ventures and Christian business associations.6
At PACRA, I was able to obtain data on all faith based organizations registered in Lusaka
province from 2007 — 2013. While I am able to contrast the registration of different types
of faith-based organizations, I am not able to contrast this with registration rates for non-
5To be eligible for registration, a group must have a unique name; possess a constitution consistent with the
country’s laws; and display general compatibility with the peace, welfare, and good order of the country.
6Notably, two years after the MMD government was voted out of power, PACRA officials used social media to
emphasize that, “like other companies incorporated under the Companies Act, churches are subject to other
relevant laws regulating their conduct. To this end, the agency collaborates with law enforcement agencies
to ensure that they are not established for criminal intents and purposes.” Many locals would interpret these
claims as a reflection of two facts: (i) PACRA was associated with Pentecostals under MMD rule; and (ii) By
2013, Sata’s PF government was tightening state control over all civil society organizations including religious
organizations registered under PACRA.
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faith based or corporate entities.7 With this limitation in mind, this data offers one of many
descriptive indicators that I probe to evaluate my argument against the null hypothesis: that
there is no correlation between election timing and pentecostal church registration; or that
similar peaks in registration around election time occur for a wider variety of faith based
groups, not just Pentecostals.8
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Dashed vertical line represents an election year.
As Figure 3.2 illustrates, a clear correlation emerges from this data that is consistent with
my argument and contradicts the null hypotheses described above. Specifically, Figure 3.2
depicts PACRA registrations for to pentecostal churches in Lusaka Province, 2007-2013. In
particular, this data reveals that pentecostal churches received PACRA registrations in the
year preceding the 2011 election at a significantly higher rate than in any of the other six
7Unfortunately, I was denied access to this data despite repeated requests.
8Due to the highly decentralized nature of the agency, each provincial office houses its own records. Although
administrators did not believe this would be the case, 80% of the records provided to me by PACRA’s main
headquarters pertained to the province of Lusaka, alone. Therefore, I limit my analyses here to the district of
Lusaka here, though the pattern of results is unaffected if I include the other 20% of records to which I have
access.
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years covered in the data. Moreover, allocations declined rapidly after the PF party came to
power in December of 2011.
What can we infer from the fact that churches register as companies more often in elec-
tion years? This evidence might reasonably be interpreted as indicating any combination of
the following:
1. pentecostal identities are more salient around election time, leading more individuals
to apply for an advanced registration status at PACRA because their interest in church-
related business is on their mind more than in non-election years.
2. Religious entrepreneurs anticipate greater access to state benefits in the period prior
to elections, and thus seek to register not only for the business license (which is itself
a privileged status), but possibly other state benefits and rent-seeking opportunities,
such as tax breaks, which require a PACRA license.
3. Party leaders “plant” or assist others in planting new churches and church-based
organizations, presumably to mobilize support and constrain opposition.
My interviews with PACRA staff lead me to believe that a mix of all three explanations are at
play. For instance, the Director of Research and Inspections at PACRA, introduced himself
to me as Apostle David Moola, a self-published pentecostal evangelist. Moola generously
gave me copies of several of his Christian books, which detail how he used his job as a civil
servant working for PACRA as a means to move around the country, and to obtain access
to housing, land, and permits easily as he sought to plant branches of his own church. In
Moola’s view, it is worth mentioning privileges associated with his employment and how
these privileges facilitated his attempts to “plant” churches around the country. This is
because Moola perceives the privileges associated with his high-status government job as
a blessing from God. Although they are allocated to him via the MMD government, whose
commitment to the Christian nation is also duly noted in the book, which ruled during the
time of the book’s publication. The use of civil service positions to spread the Word, however,
was a recurring theme in many of my discussions with high-level bureaucrats and successful
church founders. Many of these individuals emphasized that it can be quite difficult to
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obtain “proper papers” for many “average” Zambians; having access to the social network
and skills required to access things like PACRA registration speak to the same kind of ability
that might make someone both a good church founder and a loyal party activist, who has a
stake in ensuring the perpetuation of the status quo.
Another point worth highlighting about the data obtained from PACRA is that it focuses
on the recent past. This suggests that partisan ties between the MMD and its favored
religious networks lasted long after evangelical President Chiluba’s reign as well as the years
during which Zambia’s own pentecostal Televangelist, Nevers Mumba, served as a high
ranking official, including Vice President (2003 — 2004). Below, I examine another type of
evidence, which, if consistent with patterns observed in this data, would raise confidence
that my interpretation of the PACRA data is correct.
3.5 Tax Breaks
After registering with PACRA, churches are eligible to receive several other types of resources
from the state, including tax breaks. To receive tax exemption, churches must apply for
Public Benefit Organization (PBO) status at the Zambian Revenue Authority (ZRA). Organi-
zations that are eligible for PBO status include churches, charitable organizations, business
associations, farmers’ collectives, and sports, youth, women’s, and cultural associations,
among others. All organizations in these categories must register with the Registrar of
Societies or face threats of fines and jail time; but in order to obtain perks such as tax breaks,
organizations must additionally apply — and be approved — by PACRA and then the ZRA.
This process represents a high level of state involvement in qualifying and rewarding
some types of religious organizations with public benefits while retaining authority for the
state to deny similar benefits to other religious organizations. Hence, tax benefits are a good
example of how blurry the line between regulation and favoritism can be.
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Unfortunately, I was unable to access data on applications that were not approved.
Interviews with staff at the ZRA suggest that there is some ambiguity in terms of who receives
these benefits and it is likely that there are selection effects, whereby organizations do not
file applications if they expect their request to be rejected for any number of reasons. This
might be the case, for instance, if the ZRA was perceived to be motivated by partisan ideals
or interests.
3.5.1 The real value of PBO status
Interviews with more than fifteen pentecostal church founders and numerous bureaucrats
made it clear to me PBO status should not be taken lightly, as this status creates significant
financial opportunity for the PBO leaders (i.e., pastors). Since PBOs pay neither domestic
VAT nor import tariffs, leaders of organizations with PBO status can legally acquire land or
import electronics, cars, industrial machinery, construction materials or other heavily-taxed
items and sell these items informally within Zambia for a massive mark-up. In a land-locked
state, where the mining sector has generated economic growth in recent decades but limited
industrial production facilities makes many of these goods difficult to come by, PBO status
promises financial opportunity and, with it, status. For instance, it is commonly asserted
that church founders use this loophole to enrich themselves and/or their congregations
by raising money to import a car for the pastor duty free, and then selling this car on the
informal market to make a significant profit. One bureaucrat termed this a “church business
model,” emphasizing the prevalence of this practice. Another bureaucrat at the Ministry of
Lands put it this way:
The church business is booming here in Zambia. Everyone wants to sign up
to become a pastor so that they can make money. You get your followers to
chip in with tithes and then you can import your cars and fancy things, get the
government to subsidize you and your church materials, and then they [church
leaders] just turn around and sell those cars for profit. Now, whether that profit
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goes back into the church, I don’t know. But I know the business is booming. We
see it all the time. And the parishioners may not even mind.9
With this in mind, examining the allocation of PBO status enables us to assess how the MMD
and (subsequently) the PF governments have allocated access to state-subsidized resources
to different religious groups over time. Figure 3.3 displays data that I obtained from the
Zambian Revenue Authority in 2013.10 The year leading up to a tripartite national election is
shaded in red and the years following such elections are shaded light gray. First, comparing
data from the Registrar of Societies and Zambian Revenue Authority, I find that the allocation
of PBO status in election years to EPOs is disproportionate to the number of EPOs that
register in these years. Second, Figure 3.3 strongly suggests that allocation of PBO status
to EPOs spiked prior to tripartite national elections, particularly in 1996 and 2006.
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Data obtained with permission from the Zambian Revenue Authority, 2013.
Dashed vertical lines indicate tripartite election years.
9Interview with P. Cachimba, attorney at the Ministry of Lands, 81313.
10Data collection is described at length in appendix B.
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Importantly, the 2001 election deviates from this pattern. As indicated above, 2001 is
the exception that proves the rule, in this case. In contrast to elections in 1996 and 2006,
the 2001 election followed on the heels of the Chiluba’s failed bid for a third term, which, as
noted above, many pentecostal leaders supported (Gifford 1998; Phiri 2009), but the leaders
of the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia rejected publicly. Additionally, Chiluba and his party
were embroiled in a series of major corruption scandals at the time, with some international
donors going so far as to withhold aid (Raker 2007). This may help explain why the party
appears not to have promoted pentecostal organizations in the 2001 elections. However,
President Chiluba’s hand-picked successor, Levy Mwanawasa, was quick to appoint MMD-
defector and pentecostal televangelist, Nevers Mumba, as Vice President in 2001, continuing
to appeal to the Pentecostals who constituted a key piece of the MMD’s ruling coalition. By
the next major election years (2006 and 2011), we again observe a pentecostal PBO status
spike.
3.5.2 Benefits for other religious institutions
One concern would be that this pattern extends to all types of new religious groups and
other civic organizations. As Figure 3.4 suggests, this is not the case. Seventh Day Adventist,
Independent African Churches, and other Catholic and mainline Protestant organizations,
for instance, are not significantly more likely to be established in election years. Other NGOs,
like women’s and youth groups, are also not significantly more likely to be established in the
lead up to elections. Pentecostal churches therefore stand out in this regard. Moreover, 1999
represents the only year when non-EPOs outstripped the registration of EPOs; anecdotally,
many of these organizations are linked to mobilization around new networks for opposition,
some of which are linked to the Catholic Church.
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Data obtained with permission from the Zambian Revenue Authority, 2013.
Dashed vertical lines indicate tripartite election years.
3.6 Local Government Appointments
In Zambia, MPs appoint local leaders to sit on local development councils for four year
terms. The positions are not salaried but come with significant perks and prestige, including
a car and driver, per diem stipends for certain kinds of work, and other travel costs associated
with the job, including train rides or flights to the capital city or regional conferences in
some instances. Perhaps most importantly, individuals appointed to local development
councils technically exercise discretion over the allocation of Constituency Development
Funds (CDFs). Although MPs have the final say over CDF expenditure, local government
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appointments are unanimously viewed as coveted positions for community leaders, which
empower appointees with influence in the community.11
Access to data from the MLGH was significantly constrained in terms of the years of
coverage. The data I was able to obtain is a random sample that covers approximately half
of Zambia’s eighty-nine districts and spans the period immediately preceding and following
Zambia’s 2011 elections. The 2011 national elections were declared relatively free and fair
by international observers and, as noted above, saw the long ruling, pentecostal-friendly
MMD party narrowly ousted by the Patriotic Front (PF). Recall, the PF is sometimes popularly
associated with the Catholic Church, due to the fact that the party leader — President
Michael Sata — a Catholic, and because the PF and Catholic Church each criticized the
corruption of incumbents and warned against their attempts to manipulate voter rolls and
electoral procedures prior to the election.12
I find that with the ousting of Zambia’s incumbent party, the Movement for Multiparty
Democracy (MMD), which was long associated with pentecostal Christianity, the percent
of government appointments to Pentecostals dropped by more than half. Specifically, in
Figure 3.5a I use bars to represent the percentage of individuals appointed by MPs to
local government positions who self-identify as one of the following on their nomination
form: (1) Evangelicals or pentecostal; (2) Traditional Protestant; (3) Catholic. Strikingly,
this figure reveals that the percent of evangelicals and Pentecostals appointed to local
government positions under the MMD government in 2010 decreased by more than half in
11The debate within the MLGH and National Assembly over the degree to which chiefs’ should have privileged
authority on such councils bespeaks their perceived importance: Chiefs and their representatives have urged
for greater power over development funds by giving chiefs a special position on the development council; the
MMD party refused to empower chiefs with this degree of control for years. (Documents obtained from the
archives at National Parliament and the Zambian House of Chiefs; interviews with Dr. Patrick F. Manda, former
Head Researcher at the House of Chiefs, 2007-2011 as well as interviews with a city planner working for the
MLGH and another MLGH employee who prefer to remain anonymous.
12Sata also served as a high ranking official in the Chiluba administrations and after Chiluba actually joined
Sata’s (at the time) new PF party after he lost his bid for a third term. Therefore, Sata can hardly be seen as been
disassociated with Pentecostals in government, although he himself is obviously not one.
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2012, falling from 22% in 2010 to 9% in 2012. Meanwhile, the percent of Catholics more
than doubled, jumping from 7% to 16%. Given that evangelicals and Pentecostals represent
less than 15% of the national population and Catholics more than 30%, the figures for 2010
alone underscore the salience of religion for politics in Zambia’s competitive democracy.
Additionally, the fact that neither party appointed more traditional Protestants suggests
that dynamics between the Catholic Church and pentecostal leaders may be particularly
politicized.13 This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that Sata has increased access
to media licenses for Catholics and actively sought to disband one of the pentecostal and
independent church coalitions established under the MMD.
Since this data reflects voluntaristic self-reporting, one concern might be that the raw
number of pentecostal and Catholic appointees are roughly even over time but that their
respective willingness to self-report their religious identity changed as a result of the change
in government. Qualitative interviews and preliminary analysis of some CDF expenditures
strongly suggest that this is not the case. If someone is qualified for the position because of
their ties to a church, it would be pointless to submit a resume that made no mention of this
fact. Additionally, the status of nuns, priests, reverends, and (sometimes self-proclaimed)
bishops and apostles are also typically reflected in an individual’s formal title (i.e., Sister
Mary). Yet, even if what I am able to measure here is the willingness to voluntarily self-
report religious identity, the indication is that individuals perceive religious identity to affect
their likelihood of being approved as a local government councilor and associate different
religions with different political parties. Such a finding comports with the main argument of
this dissertation.
13I consider this possibility in greater depth in the larger project of which this is a part.
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To compare this variation to other types of identities, I also coded resumes for a variety of
other identities. These include resumes that mentioned whether or not the nominee had
any involvement with labor unions (past or present); women’s group; or if the nominee
was a traditional leader (typically a Headman or Head woman). Figure 3.5b reveals no
strong relationship between any one of these placebo identities that is comparable to the
relationship between religious groups depicted above. The percentages of individuals who
mentioned these three other identities remain relatively constant across periods. This lends
support to the argument that there is something special and partisan related to religious
identities in this case.
3.7 Media Licenses
An additional policy tool that has played a significant role in the government’s attempt
to favor and constrain different denominations concerns the allocation of media licenses.
Though the Zambian government was uncooperative in providing records of applications
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for media stations accepted or denied, there is ample anecdotal and journalistic evidence
of consistent government favoritism and repression in this realm. Consider, for instance,
the US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices of 2002,14 which
described the status of radio and television broadcasting:
In addition to the government-controlled radio station, there were several
church-related radio stations, two private commercial radio stations, and three
community radio stations in the country. Radio Phoenix re-broadcast Voice
of America (VOA), British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and South African
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) items. A Catholic radio network, Radio
Yatsani, continued broadcast operations; however, the Government has not
approved an application to add an associated television station. The radio
license limited Radio Yatsani to three newscasts of 3 minutes each per day.
Yatsani officially had permission to re-broadcast VOA and BBC transmissions;
however, it first must have excerpts approved by the Ministry of Information, a
censorship process that effectively eliminated timely re-broadcasts. . .
The Government-owned ZNBC was the sole local-content television station.
Multichoice, a telecommunications company based in South Africa, provided
satellite and analog wireless subscribers with television services. These
services included broadcasts of Cable News Network (CNN), BBC World,
Sky Television, and the SABC’s Africa News. They also provided three BBC,
one Radio France International, and VOA radio news broadcasts. None of the
services included local news coverage. There was a second wireless television
service, CASAT. Trinity Broadcasting Network, a foreign-based, church-related
television network, broadcast a 24-hour transmission of prerecorded religious
programming from a rented studio at the former ZNBC complex . . .
Opposition political parties complained that government control of the ZNBC
and two major newspapers limited their access to the chief means of mass
communication in the country. Opposition politicians and the Government
submitted bills to Parliament that would revise media legislation. At year’s
end, negotiations were underway to resolve differences between the competing
bills . . . In 2001 [an election year] there were also reports of direct government
intervention in private broadcast operations.
14Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3e918c2fc.html.
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Beyond simply allocating a television permit to Pentecostals, the MMD government pro-
vided Pentecostals with 24 hour access to evangelize (and promote their businesses) on
television and further subsidized the local production of those programs at government-run
media studios.
In stark contrast, the Catholic Church first applied for a license for its own television
station in 2002. For an astonishing nine years, the government sat on this request, supplying
no explanation for the delay despite repeated inquiries from ZEC. The situation was similar
with ZEC’s request to establish several new community radio stations, and to make their
existing station, Radio Maria, nationally accessible. It was not until Zambia’s transition away
from the MMD as the ruling party that these requests were entertained by the government.
Only after the 2011 election of President Michael Sata — a lifelong albeit occasionally lapsed
Catholic — did the government entertain Catholic applications for media licenses.
Following receipt of their TV station permit, ZEC released the following press release,
which notably relates the lisence to prospects for Catholic evangelization in the country:
The Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) of Zambia through its chair-
person, Mr Emmanuel Mwamba formally announced on 18 October 2013 the
granting of the television construction permit and it is therefore anticipated that
the new Catholic television station will in fact belong to both Catholics and non-
Catholics, meaning all Zambians. This will be in keeping with the approach of
the Catholic Church towards its public institutions such as hospitals, schools and
other similar institutions. These institutions are readily accessible to the public
regardless of their religious persuasion . . .
The Zambia Episcopal Conference remains equally committed to three other
radio projects that are still in the offing and which will be spearheaded by
different dioceses. These include the establishment of a diocesan community
radio station in Kasama, Radio Lutanda as well as Sesheke FM to be established
in Sesheke. Similarly, Chipata Diocese hopes that now that the Independent
Broadcasting Authority is in the process of clearing a backlog of radio ap-
plications for frequencies, the pending request (lodged with the Ministry of
Information and Broadcasting Services in 2008) to turn Radio Maria into a
national radio station will be favourably considered. Unlike other Catholic radio
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stations in Zambia, Radio Maria is predominantly a faith radio that promotes
prayer in Christian homes . . .
Fr. Lungu is very optimistic that with the issuance of the license, they will be able
to promote the work of evangelization through media broadcast, which indeed
has a lot of impact on the people.15
The historical record clearly indicates that successive MMD governments systematically
denied Catholics access to the permits that they required in order to make use of their state of
the art radio and television studios. By contrast, the government heavily subsidized media
production on behalf of Pentecostals and maximized Pentecostals’ access to the airwaves.
Notably, this selective allocation of benefits occurred long after Chiluba’s tenure in office.
Therefore, we observe a similar pattern in the allocation of media licenses that we
have observed in other areas of governance: The MMD systematically favored Pentecostals,
granting them both a larger number of networks and responding to their applications
much more quickly; subsidizing their programming with public funds; and incorporating
numerous pentecostal leaders on national programming and at national events (Gifford
1998; Cheyeka 2007). As Father Samasumo, a spokesperson for the Catholic Church noted
in the same press release quoted above, “[e]stablishing a television station is a mammoth
and expensive undertaking” — in rural areas of Zambia, establishing community radio is
also a costly and challenging enterprise. In the face of unyielding government obstruction,
and systematic privileging of competing religious institutions contributed to Pentecostals’
enhanced ability to evangelize throughout the country, while constraining the ability of the
Catholic Church.
15Association of Member Episcopal Conferences in Eastern Africa (AMECEA) Social Communications. “Zambia:
Zambian Episcopal Conference gets a Catholic TV Permit.” Posted on 10/25/2013. Available at: http:
//amecea.blogspot.com/2013/10/zambia-zec-gets-catholic-tv-permit.html
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3.8 Exceptions that Prove the Rule: Zambia’s Third Term
Debate
The interpretation of evidence from the Zambian case is buttressed by two exceptions that
prove the rule: The first concerns what we might loosely term punishment of Pentecostals in
the 2001 elections. As briefly noted above, the MMD was surprised when older Evangelical
churches, which had effectively built the “mother body” that newer pentecostal churches
were united under, was ultimately persuaded by other churches and international figures
to withdraw their support for then President Chiluba’s controversial third term bid. It
is important to underscore that prominent Zambian televangelists and (no coincidence),
Evangelical government appointees, and clients continued to vocally endorse the bid. Joe
Imakondo, for instance, suggested repeatedly on televised programming that term limits get
in the way of allowing God to decide who should lead.
In light of this, I find evidence that the ruling party altered its tactics in the lead up to
the 2001 election, allocating tax breaks to significantly fewer new pentecostal organizations
despite high rates of church registration with other branches of the government (e.g., the
Registrar of Societies). Additionally, as discussed in Chapter 3, President Chiluba used
money from his “slush” fund to subsidize the creation of a new mother body for the newer
pentecostal Churches, ICOZ. He hired a local party activist and lay preacher, David Masupa,
to travel the country giving radio and television reports about how “the people” supported
the third term. In Masupa’s words, the third term debate literally “made ICOZ,” and hence
his career. Moreover, Masupa described the synergy between traveling the (vast) Zambian
countryside and amassing churches that would constitute his new mother body. This
enabled him to amass the semblance of influence necessary to rival more conservative, older
Evangelical churches that had sided with the traditional Protestants and Catholics (also see
Ndlovu 2013). In turn, the churches that joined ICOZ had access to (sometimes limited)
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clientelistic benefits through Masupa’s political connections and media access in the nation’s
capital city. In 2013, there were 249 individual churches associated with ICOZ, many of which
have multiple branches.
My research team reviewed and coded all of the member churches’ constitutions to
assess the degree to which member churches should be categorized as African Independent
as opposed to pentecostal churches; with very, very limited exceptions, these churches
reported espousing classic pentecostal beliefs (adult baptism, divine healing, prophesy,
speaking in tongues) and endorsed classic pentecostal prohibitions (divorce and witchcraft).
Additionally, we found that a very small percent of pastors had received international
training of funding, emphasizing the home grown nature of this Zambian pentecostal
clientelistic network. This research contributes to our understanding of these new religious
movements more broadly, as well as to our understanding of elite politics in Zambia after its
third wave transition.
By 2006, however, with the rise of a new party leader and new electoral context, state
support for Pentecostals again surged prior to national elections. Pentecostal leaders, in-
cluding former Vice President and pentecostal megachurch leader, Nevers Mumba, featured
prominently in the press criticizing opposition and endorsing the view that God selected the
country’s leaders (Phiri 2008; Cheyeka 2009; Riedl 2013).
Second exception: change of government
The second “exception” that proves the rule regards the unanticipated change in ruling
parties in 2011. When Michael Sata’s Patriotic Front party narrowly won the presidency
in 2011, I found a marked decrease in the number of local government appointees who
identify themselves as pentecostal or evangelical and a surge in those identifying as Catholic.
Extensive interviews with local city planners and preliminary analysis of the allocation of
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Constituency Development Funds during this period lends support to the interpretation
that the party sought to court the Catholic Church by involving priests in local government
in place of the disproportionate allocation of government offices to Pentecostals under the
MMD. The attempt to prevent the Catholic Church from speaking out against the PF has
not succeeded, but it speaks to the ways in which parties attempt to court religious voters
in order to build ruling coalitions. Additionally, in October, 2002, the Chief Registrar of
Societies under Sata announced that he would revoke the registration of all religious groups
and communities taking an active role in politics and subsequently sought to revoke the
registration of the Independent Church of Zambia (ICOZ) for non-payment of fees — an
allegation that ICOZ successfully contested.
Moreover, if clientelistic strategy responds, as I argued, to the landscape of loyalty and
opposition bequeathed to a new ruling party, then we would expect Sata to try to undermine
pentecostal churches affiliated with the MMD, and to invest in new identity-based allies.
Indeed, five days after his election, Sata announced that he would run the government in
accordance with Catholic doctrine and the 10 biblical commandments (Times of Zambia).
He then sought to exclude evangelicals from his constitutional review committee, attempted
(but failed) to target the Catholic Church with religious favoritism, and attempted (but failed)
to deregister ICOZ and a number of other pentecostal churches, emphasizing that these
churches should not be “involved in politics.” Moreover, as the US Department of State,
2012 Report on International Religious Freedom reported in 2013:
On November 17, Sata appointed a 20-member committee of experts to draft
a revised national constitution. Contrary to the unofficial practice — in which
Catholics, mainline Protestants, and evangelicals are each allowed represen-
tation to such bodies — Sata deliberately excluded evangelicals and instead
assigned three positions for Catholic Bishops on the committee, who quietly
declined the invitation. Sata rejected persistent calls by opposition political
parties, civil society organizations, and the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia to
include evangelicals on the committee.
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Interestingly, Sata’s attempt to cement his government’s ties to the Catholic Church have
been viewed by many local civil servants, academics and voters as something quite different
from the clientelism associated with traditional ethnic politics and more recent pentecostal
propagation. Rather, by enlisting the significant human capital and social reach of the
Catholic Church — whose social services are available to all regardless of faith — Sata wanted
to signal to voters that he was serious about cleaning up corruption in local government that
the MMD had tolerated. Additionally, in an interview with one (Protestant) civil servant
charged with processing local government appointments under both the MMD and PF
governments described a stark and “intentional shift” by Sata to appoint priests and, to a
lesser degree, nuns or Protestant Reverends to local government committees. This strategic
move had two primary aims. The first was to “make use of their skills and knowledge of
the community and its problems,” and the second, was to signal to voters that “Sata would
not let them down by tolerating corruption . . . Because the priests are very, very difficult to
corrupt. This is widely known” (Author Interview with High-Level Bureaucrat in the Ministry
of Local Government and Housing, 2013). Therefore, in the view of this civil servant as well as
two long-serving officers of Zambia’s anti-corruption commission, Sata’s strategy was never
— and, in these views, could never have been — to “buy off” the Church. Rather, Sata’s
relationship to the Catholic Church sought to profit by association (alliance) with its moral
authority and manpower.
While it is impossible to evaluate Sata’s intentions, this understanding is consistent
with the fact that the Catholic Church certainly continued its vigorous grass-roots Justice
and Peace initiatives alongside of focussed, high-level public pressure for transparent
and democratic constitutional review processes throughout Sata’s tenure in office. For
instance, by July 2012, the Church’s relentless pursuit of transparent and pro-poor policy
actually led Sata to deport a Catholic priest to his native Rwanda on the grounds that
his sermon about government agricultural policies could incite anti-government uprisings.
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Predictably, pressure from the Church and its massive network of civil society allies forced
the government to revoke the deportation order within several months. But this example,
like most recent church-state relations in Zambia, is consistent with the relational theoretical
approach advocated here: Sata turned to the Catholics in an attempt to displace and
undermine the formerly privileged Pentecostals who were strongly affiliated with the prior-
ruling MMD party, as well as its corruption. From Sata’s vantage point, the Catholics were the
best group available to address the openly oppositional Pentecostals. Yet, evidence indicates
that Sata’s attempts to ally with the Catholic Church largely failed to achieve his objectives:
He has not effectively cultivated clientelist ties to Catholic leaders or parishioners, and the
Church continued its pro-democratic “watchdog” activism towards the government under
Sata.16
Conclusion
This chapter has provided a series of complementary analyses of church-state relations in
Zambia since 1991. My goal was to assess observable implications of my argument: Consid-
ering the allocation of government allocated business licenses, tax breaks, local government
appointments, and media licenses, we observe that Pentecostals were consistently favored,
and often in ways that demonstrate a political business cycle of Zambian pentecostal church
planting. This is consistent with my argument that the MMD government allocated state
benefits strategically in order to maximize political advantage.
16This reading dovetails with assertions in recent literature that the main identity-based thrust of Sata’s
campaign was one of “ethnopolulism”: a combination of appeal to class and economic grievance, sometimes
aligned with conditions of urban plight or mineworkers, and other times aligned with the resentment of ethnic
groups who had been excluded from prior clientelist regimes (Cheeseman and Larmer 2015). However, as
Gadjanova (2014) points out, this strategy ultimately emphasizes messages of common marginalization that
resonate across ethnic lines, even as it responds to the “landscape” of ethnic winners and losers left by the
prior regime.
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Moreover, the fact that Zambia’s government underwent a historic change in ruling
party in the 2011 elections that I studied enabled me to examine how the subsequent
ruling PF party, led by Catholic Michael Sata, responded to the landscape of loyalty and
opposition that it inherited from the MMD: most notably the politicization and propagation
of pentecostalism. I find that Sata’s regime sought to end disproportionate benefits to Pente-
costals, and even sought to deregister the most nakedly partisan pentecostal umbrella body.
Additionally, the PF removed blocks placed on Catholic requests for a television broadcast
station that the MMD had denied for nearly a decade. However, the new government did
not seek to subsidize Catholic media production (as the MMD had for Pentecostals), and
was rebuffed in some of its offerings to the Catholic Church, which the Church perceived
as exclusive. Evidence of Sata’s relations with the Catholic Church therefore implies not a
clientelistic relation, but a largely failed attempt to build a strategic alliance early in Sata’s
reign, motivated in part by the prominence of pentecostal politicization under the MMD.
As noted at the outset, data constraints limit my ability to draw causal inferences from
any one analysis presented above. By triangulating an abundance of different types of
fine-grained, original data, however, this chapter has demonstrated that we can reject the
null hypotheses that the establishment of new pentecostal churches under the MMD was
unrelated to partisan politics. Evidence that the MMD government allocated so many types
of privileges to Pentecostals preferentially and repeatedly around election time suggests that
the mechanisms my theory posits are at play. Further support for this argument is found
in the MMD’s withholding of those privileges when faced with unanticipated opposition
from older Evangelical churches (in 2001), and with respect to the oppositional Catholic
Church. The fact that Zambia’s winning opposition party did not establish functional
clientelistic ties through the Catholic Church but nevertheless enlisted the Church in an
effort to undermine the strength of Pentecostals undermines the relational nature of parties’
strategy in contemporary African politics.
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Chapter 4
Perceiving Politics and Religion: Qualitative Evidence from
Zambia
In previous chapters, I argued that the relationship between politics and religious change
in many contemporary sub-Saharan African states is endogenous. Further, I argued that
political actors played important but understudied roles in promoting (or constraining) the
growth of pentecostalism within their borders since third wave transitions to multiparty
politics. Chapters 2 and 3 triangulated cross- and subnational evidence that clearly refutes
the null hypothesis that the region’s changing religious demography has been unaffected
by political context variables, such as political competition and prior political mobilization
by established churches. When politicians have faced a combination of: (i) relatively
high electoral contestation; and (ii) established religious groups (e.g., the Catholic Church)
credibly threatening to mobilize opposition to elites’ favored policies or political survival,
they are more likely to engage in “politicized propagation” — the selective targeting of
state resources to promote the growth of new pentecostal church networks, through which
politicians aspire to cultivate a constituency.
This chapter complements prior chapters by presenting the results of several rounds of
qualitative fieldwork in Zambia. This research aims not simply to establish that politicized
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propagation has occurred — though it does offer further evidence in this regard — but
rather to illuminate the subjective meaning that Zambian political and religious leaders,
and everyday congregants assign to various religious institutions, political parties, and the
spectacular growth and prominence of Renewalist Christianity in the country since the
1990s.
Specifically, the chapter draws on a broader qualitative study to address the:
• Perceived social and political roles of different churches in Zambia since the 1980s
• Perceived partisan association between churches and political parties
• Motivation of pentecostal (or other) converts
• Perceived quality of governance and democracy in Zambia across denominations
To address these issues, I conducted a multi-method qualitative study titled, “The Church
and Society Study,” during the two months prior to Zambia’s historic 2011 elections. In 2013,
I conducted several follow-up interviews. The study combined three types of qualitative
research, including individual interviews with religious leader; participant observation at
more than twenty-six religious services and several political rallies; and systematic focus
group research conducted with randomly selected congregants at churches selected from
a stratified random sample in two purposefully selected urban compounds in Lusaka. To the
best of my knowledge this study is the first randomized qualitative study on the subject of
religion and politics in sub-Saharan Africa. This matters, because by relying on a stratified
random sample of churches, and a random sample of congregants, I can more confidently
draw inferences from strong patterns in the church-level data. For want of space, this chapter
limits my exploration of this data to the key points noted above.
Overall, the qualitative evidence affirms key premises of this study, and uncontroversially
supports the notion that the established churches have played central roles in Zambian
politics since the 1980s. The Catholic and mainline Protestant church leadership, in
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particular, are explicit about the central role that they accord to their political advocacy,
and its importance to their broader institutional identities. At the heart of these religious
bodies and coalitions, Zambian religious leaders explained to me, is a dual mission to pursue
the spiritual and material uplift of Zambian people, with a focus on alleviating poverty and
other degrading conditions (e.g., environmental or labor-related) among the extreme poor.
As the highly prominent leader of the mainline Protestant umbrella association, the Council
of Churches in Zambia put it, the question for the established churches is not “should the
church participate in politics? . . . The question is how?” (Author interview with Rev. Susan
Matale, 8/27/13).
By enabling diverse religious leaders to speak for themselves, this chapter therefore aims
to paint a more vivid portrait of the important and diverse roles that different Christian
churches have played in Zambian public life since the late 1980s. The remainder of the
chapter is dived roughly into two sections. The first section considers the positions that
Zambia’s main religious leaders staked out during extended interviews with me in 2011 and
2013. Among the most important interviews that I discuss below were those conducted
with leaders of Zambia’s three main religious “mother bodies” (umbrella associations). This
section devotes considerable space to leaders’ own words with the aim of enabling readers to
see how Zambian religious leaders (a) narrate the trajectory of their churches’ engagement
with government over time, and (b) distinguish pentecostal churches from established
churches.
The second section of this chapter focuses on several relevant themes that emerged
from focus groups held with parishioners in 2011. I supplement this section by drawing on
data collected during participant observation in religious services, and interviews conducted
with the founders and leaders of numerous, small Zambian churches. It is clear that these
parishioners, like their religious leaders associate a loose partisan connection between
the MMD party and Zambian Pentecostals. Likewise, parishioners describe pentecostal
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churches as significantly more likely to accept “bribes” from politicians to sing their praises.
Yet, it is equally clear that this is not, in parishioners’ estimation, a major motivator of
religious conversion or “church switching” in contemporary Zambia. Rather, numerous
focus group participants — especially young males — underscored the importance of diver-
gent organizational dynamics across churches as having motivated their conversion from
Catholicism to pentecostalism. Specifically, this subset of respondents described frustration
with the difficulty they faced in ascending to leadership positions within the Catholic church,
and emphasized their ambitions to be able to exercise leadership and gain new skills as
a leader within a smaller pentecostal church. This unanticipated but prominent theme
in the focus group discussions underscores the potential for either clashing or synergistic
objectives between pro-pentecostal politicians and ambitious pentecostal converts — a
theme I take up in more detail in Chapter 5.
4.1 In Leaders’ Own Words
There are three basic claims that I address in this section, which are fundamental to
my argument about the endogeneity of church-state relations over time, including the
propensity of some political actors to propagate pentecostal churches as a potential political
constituency. The first of these claims is that the established churches — by which I mean the
Catholic and mainline Protestant churches, in particular — played a major role in Zambia’s
transition to multiparty politics in 1991, and have subsequently threatened the ruling party,
either directly or indirectly, by adopting a pro-democracy “watch-dog” role. The second
claim that I address in this section concerns the degree to which the MMD has influenced the
size and strength of pentecostal communities within Zambia. Third, I will demonstrate that,
as expected, political and religious leaders alike emphasize various churches’ organizational
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dynamics (e.g., size, network structure, and hierarchy), access to outside resources, and
national political histories as determinants of the churches’ contemporary political roles.
Established churches as agents of change
As noted in previous chapters, the historical record indicates that the established churches
played pivotal roles in Zambia’s democratic transition. Newspapers and ongoing political
debates indicate that three churches continue to play an important role in national politics
by serving as “watch dogs” — a phrase commonly used by parishioners to describe the
older churches. In particular, the Catholic Church, the mainline Protestant churches
— through their mother body, the Council of Churches in Zambia (CCZ) — and, to a
slightly lesser extent, the older Evangelical churches — the founding members of the now
expanded Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ) — opposed anti-democratic reform (e.g.,
Chiluba’s bid for a third term), decry ongoing corruption (discussed below), and pressure
the government to adopt pro-poor policy (e.g., their influential campaigns for external debt
relief). But how do the leaders of these groups perceive and articulate their own roles in
politics? How do they describe the roles of other churches, including both their partners
(other established churches), as well as new pentecostal churches?
Secretary General of the mainline Protestant mother body, the Council of Churches in
Zambia (CCZ), Rev. Susan Matale, explained the churches’ motivation thusly in an interview
in 2011:
The Church needs to address the issues facing people in their every day lives.
Poverty is a big thing — people struggle in their everyday lives — we feel that
our politics make the living conditions of people worse, because they do not
prioritize on ensuring that people are helped to lead decent lives. So, I think the
next best thing in peoples’ lives is the church. And the church really occupies,
in my country here, a very important space, even at a political level, because we
are engaged very seriously in political issues.
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And that has been a struggle before — the question of the relation between
church and state — should the church participate in politics? For us the big
answer is yes. But the question is how. How do you participate, and with what
issues are you engaged? . . . Because they [politicians] have a huge responsibility
to create an environment that liberates people.1
Like the other leaders I interviewed, Matale also directly acknowledged the political
influence that the established churches have, noting:
Let me put it this way, I think we as an organization — the mother bodies,
Catholics, ourselves and EFZ — all governments are very aware of the influence
that we exert on the Zambian people. So they do tread with care, because we can
swing the issues. We do not do that deliberately but we just talk about issues.
In her attempt to describe why and how this influence came to be, she, like many oth-
ers I interviewed, emphasized the role that the established churches played in Zambia’s
democratic transition. These churches — especially the Catholic and mainline Protestant
churches — occupy a privileged place in the Zambian history because they brokered the
country’s peaceful transition to multipartyism in 1991, literally presiding over discussions
between the major competing political parties. The Executive Director of EFZ, Reverend
Pukuta Mwanza, echoed this point, and articulated it even more strongly. Below I quote
Rev. Mwanza at length in order to demonstrate how his personal narration of the role of
the Zambian churches in society progressed, unprompted. The following text comes from
the beginning of our interview, conducted at EFZ headquarters in Lusaka on 8/18/2013. I
had previously introduced my study as the Church and Society study, and emphasized that I
was interested in understanding all the roles that different churches have played over time in
Zambian life. Below, Rev. Mwanza is responding to the question, “How would you describe
the role of various major churches in Zambia over time?”
1All quotes from Rev. Matale in this chapter are from the author’s interview with her at CCZ headquarters in
Lusaka, 8/27/11.
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In the past, the role of the church was very much confined to the spiritual
activities. More of preparing people for celestial rewards in heaven, but very
little reference to the issues affecting people now — particularly among the
Evangelicals. Our perspective over social issues, democracy, human rights, and
livelihoods and so on — was very weak. At least in Zambia. . . .
Our friends the Catholics have traditionally been very consistent — particularly
with the social aspects. They have built schools clinics, hospitals and other
infrastructure such as hospices, orphanages, and so on. Although, some of the
historical background of the Evangelicals also was very deeply rooted in social
programs. I think over time that was lost. . . . So for us as Evangelicals, over the
years in Zambia, it was mainly spiritual — — preaching the gospel, prayer and
so on.
But as time went by, we saw that the church needed to broaden its understanding
of ministry, not just to focus on celestial rewards in heaven, but that the church
must be relevant in the now. And so we saw the church being actively involved,
both as EFZ as an entity, or collectively with other church mother bodies working
together to affect lots of issues affecting the country, particularly in the political
transformation.
Coming from the Second Republic, coming into the Third Republic, there were
a lot of issues that needed involvement of the church. And the church appeared
at that time as a key player in terms of harmonizing various political groups to
bring about positive political transformation that ushered in multipartism and
democracy. . . . [W]e were moving from a background of very strong one party
system. For 27 years, Zambia was under one party system.
A couple of efforts were made by the previous [one party] government to
introduce scientific socialism. It was the three church mother bodies that fought
the government not to introduce scientific socialism. That culminated into a
political revolution — that led to the introduction of multiparty democracy.
But prior to that, there was a problem of constitutionalism. Because there was
Article 4 of the constitution (at the time) that prevented multiparty politics. And
so in order to allow for multipartyism, the country needed to repeal Article 4 that
was dealing with the multiparty political structure. At the peak of seeking to do a
referendum, the President then, KK, decided to just repeal the Article 4 without
having to go through the referendum. That was because of enormous pressure
from the church, saying “You must read the atmosphere of the country.” The
general feeling by the Zambian people is that they want the introduction of
multiparty democracy. That yielded positive results. Scientific Socialism was
dropped with the church at the center of the revolution of 1991.
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There were other groups that supported [political transition]. I can talk of
the labor movement and the student movement, as well. That sort of large group
of pressure units helped to bring about that transformation. But the church was
the key player in the midst of that, because the political parties that were formed
at the time simply did not agree on the key issues, and the church was coming
in many times to bring mediation and to resolve conflicts between them. And I
think that from that time, strongly the priority for the development of the church
in issues of human [public] life was becoming stronger and stronger. And I think
that has continued until the recent elections in 2011, as well as just now, we are
dealing with the. . . formation of the new constitution. There are a couple of
issues now such as human rights issues, corruption issues, governance issues,
and the church is always knocking on the doors of government to make sure that
they can be aligned with what the people of Zambia want, and to what might be
perceived as ‘best practices’ for good governance.
In using the term “the church,” Rev. Mwanza referred specifically to the trifecta of church
mother bodies (including the Catholics, CCZ, and EFZ), which united and mobilized to
promote political transition. It is important to keep in mind, however, that in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, the membership of EFZ churches was significantly smaller than it has now,
and also significantly smaller than the two other mother bodies. The burgeoning of Zambian
pentecostal churches in the 1990s had not yet inspired significant growth in EFZ’s member
churches. I return to this point below.
In describing the influence of the established churches, Matale, officials at Caritas, and
Mwanza all emphasized the physical presence of churches around the country. The Catholic
Church is the single largest Christian denomination in the country, with roughly 31% of
Zambia’s population identifying as Catholic. However, the Protestant and older Evangelicals
also claim significant membership throughout the country, with Rev. Mwanza emphasizing
the way that EFZ’s membership had rapidly expanded to include thousands of churches,
i.e., “points of presence.” In a similar vein, Matale emphasized the contrast between church
capacity and government capacity: Between 30-40% of healthcare and education in Zambia
were provided by churches in 2013, according to Matale, with disproportionate impact in
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rural areas. “There are some places,” she added, where “the government is not even present,
but churches are there.”
From development to (enduring) political antagonism
A major commonality across interviews with Matale, Mwanza, Father Chiti, the Director of
the Catholic Jesuit Center for Theological Reflection, and Eugene Kabilika, leader at Caritas-
Zambia, was their emphasis on development — by which they meant primarily poverty
alleviation — as the primary of the motivation for their involvement with government. And
yet, it did not take long for Matale or Kabilika to connect the dots between their churches’
focus on pro-poor policy in Zambia, and a threat to the ruling elite. Matale summarized:
We [the church and state] have enjoyed what one might term a love — hate
relationship. It’s praise to the church, as you know, when we are helping
government. . . . But when we say we are concerned by the way the government
is running developmental issues, then . . . [trails off] And it’s been like that all the
time, I don’t think there has been a time, at least in my experience, that we have
been very satisfied with the way the government has performed. . . . Our theme is
very simple: Zambia is not a poor country. That’s why we participate in programs
about extractive industries. . . . [We are concerned about] environmental degra-
dation, displacement of people, the wanton destruction of natural resources for
the sake of mining activities. And also we are concerned that the huge proceeds
generated from mining are not benefitting the people. The people get poorer,
and yet the price of copper on the exchange is very high! . . . [And] at the same
time, we’ve seen that politicians and a very few people get richer every day. Their
lives improve every day. Yet, on the other side, the gaps are just widening. So I
don’t think there’s a time I can say where the church has been satisfied.
Since transition in 1991, established church leaders have routinely meet with govern-
ment officials. They made their “discomfort with the government” known through private
conversations, public statements, pastoral letters (read aloud to all church members), and
press releases. Yet, Catholic and mainline Protestant leaders, in particular, expressed
exasperation at the reversal of democratic progress after Chiluba came to power in 1991. And
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many religious leaders directly related this frustration to the other main factor in church-
state relations in Zambia: the role of new pentecostal churches.
Contrasts with pentecostal churches
Interestingly, before Frederick Chiluba was President, he belonged to the United Church of
Zambia (UCZ, the largest mainline Protestant denomination in Zambia), and practiced his
Born Again (charismatic) Christianity from within a subgroup of UCZ, and in interdenom-
inational fellowships, but not from pentecostal churches.2 Yet, soon after ascending to the
presidency, Chiluba left UCZ for newer Evangelical and pentecostal churches. When pressed
to explain the distinction between the established churches and these other churches,
Matale connected a number of important points raised earlier in this dissertation. I quote
this portion of my interview with her at length to maintain the broad narrative arch of
Matale’s understanding of the differences between established and pentecostal churches in
2013.
For me, I see a lot of praise and hero worshiping from those little pentecostal
churches, who see nothing wrong, because according to them suffering is
an individual choice. God can just give you a house and give you a car and
everything will be fine. The other big thing is that those pentecostal churches
belong to individuals. They belong to him [the pastor] and his wife, and his
family. But for us, we are institutional: It is not about me, it is about the
institution. When I go, the institution remains. . . . [With] these other churches,
it depends on the leadership. And the leader can be there forever, making money
and collecting tithes. . . .
For the traditional [established] churches, it’s not just about salvation and
the spiritual being, it’s the spiritual and the physical put together. Because, for
us, we believe very strongly in the social theology: How well are people? Do they
have food on their tables? We know that God provides, but we don’t think that
by praying the whole day and the whole night food will appear on the table. We
2UCZ was formed in 1965 when four previous Protestant missionary denominations came together at
independence, and combined their operations in different regions of the country.
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believe that we must pray for strength, and we must pray indeed God exists, but
we must also work hard. Yes. We must also be productive. We must also open
our eyes to the totality of the human being. We believe that you cannot preach
effectively to a hungry stomach.
That is why we get involved with poverty issues, because we don’t want to
go to church and talk about how good God is, when half the congregation has
not had a meal! That is why we get involved. And the government many times
will say, “go back to the pulpit and preach! You are sidestepping your roll! You
belong in the churches!” And we say “we will preach on the streets if we have to.
We will remind you, we will make your lives uncomfortable until you do the right
thing.”
So the differences are there, they are there like day and night. On the other side,
it’s very easy for them [new pentecostal church leaders] to praise politicians
because they want them [politicians] to come to their churches. . . . [But] we
[the older churches] know that the government, because it has our basket — our
cake — it has to be shared equitably among the people.
It is worth highlighting that in Chapter 1, I described low state capacity as a scope condition
for politicized propagation: Politicians are more likely to embrace this strategy where estab-
lished churches not only established credible and critical engagement with government, but
where state institutions are also relatively weak. It is the stark contrast between low-capacity
governments, on the one hand, and the wide reach and organizational strength of the major
churches, on the other, that makes them such a menacing set of “watch dog” institutions.
More broadly, Matale clearly identifies differences between the pentecostal churches and
the older established churches. These differences are, in her view, doctrinal, organizational,
and ultimately, political, and they are “like day and night.” In this instance, Matale
emphasized the established churches demand for more equal distribution of the national
“cake” as a major threat to ruling parties. In addition (as noted above) she and other religious
leaders also regularly emphasized their insistence on democratic constitution making as a
main area in which they have exerted power to the chagrin of elected politicians.
123
With respect to the Catholic Church, the power and perseverance of determined pro-
poor, pro-democracy activism manifested in numerous ways, including discussions with
priests, as well as leaders from Caritas and the Jesuit Center for Theological Reflection. In one
passing conversation with a program officer at Caritas, for instance, she explained frankly
that the Catholic Church “has in no way lessened its efforts to encourage the formation of
a critical, active, and organized citizenry.”3 Yet, perhaps the most richly illustrative example
of the kind of broad-based, grass-roots activism that the Catholic Church has organized in
Zambia concerns the Catholic Church’s Peace and Justice Commission’s ambitious effort to
establish Justice and Peace Teams (JPTs) in every parish throughout the country. In 2011,
Caritas was leading this effort. Eugene Kabalika, then-national Justice and Peace Division
Program Manager at Caritas, described the effort as follows:
The hope is that throughout the country we shall have Justice and Peace teams
who are able to respond — respond — to the needs of their communities. The
specific mandate that is given to us comes from the bishops, and let me say right
through from the Pope. The mission is the same throughout all of Africa, [and]
the mission is to promote and defend human rights, and to make people know
about human rights. So that is specific to the commission. The commission does
that in different ways of promoting, defending, and also making people aware
of their human rights. It could be issues around community justice, . . . issues
around political awareness and justice, . . . [or] issues of the environment — it
could be various issues.
My goal is that these small teams we have, dotted around the country,
would one day be able to respond to these challenges that we face. Because
each community at each locality has its own different challenges; they are not
all the same. Of course, they are influenced by international and national
engagement that the government sometimes puts [creates], itself. For example,
right now, [there is] a lot of collaboration with China. This comes with its
own challenges, like how China treats the workers, so that is another dynamic.
But that is now foreign influence into the community, so how do these Justice
and Peace members respond to that in their community? How do they hold
3Moreover, reflecting this fact, a leader of the Law Association of Zambia — a prominent progressive NGO —
described the Catholic Church in our interview as “Zambia’s second government.” (Author interview in Lusaka,
7/9/2011.)
124
government accountable if members of their communities are exploited, or any
other economic issues influence them? . . . It is hoped that they will be able to
take action, and some of them have been able to take action.
Working through Caritas, the Catholic Church had therefore called for grass-roots ac-
tivism to promote accountable governance. Moreover, the Church supplied personnel (e.g.,
Kabilika and others)4 and diverse resources (from information to modest programmatic
funding) throughout the country. Kabilika was in the midst of overseeing the dissemination
of these resources through the Church’s impressive infrastructure, from the Bishop’s Council
downward. And, in the spirit of democratic mobilization, Caritas’s training materials for JPTs
strongly encourages JPT members to include citizens from other religious groups in their
local organizing.
In effect, this means that Caritas was organizing citizens in localities that the state often
could not reach without working through local ethnic associations (i.e., chiefs and headmen)
or other religious leaders. According to Caritas, the goal of this effort was both to raise
awareness about and to establish groups capable of advancing rights that include the rights
to transparent and accountable governance, safe working environments, adequate social
services, and living wages (especially where foreign firms are concerned), among other
rights. Caritas aimed to establish JPTs in every parish within several years. The formation
of JPTs is therefore a prime example of the ways in which the Catholic Church can use its
well-trained personnel, extensive resources, and transnational infrastructure to promote
democratic accountability in the far reaches of the country.
4Caritas reportedly employs over 100 paid staff members and 50 volunteers in Lusaka, alone. http://www.
caritas.org/where-we-are/africa/zambia/
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Unique challenges within EFZ
By contrast, EFZ’s Executive Director, Rev. Pukuta Mwanza stressed the complexity, im-
portance, and historic challenge that the country’s Evangelical churches (and by extension,
newer pentecostal churches) have faced when it comes to addressing the social needs of
Zambian people, such as sustainable antipoverty programming, healthcare outposts or
schools. The Evangelicals historically did not provide many social services, which made
them “laggards” in comparison to the Catholic and Protestant churches in 1991. But
Rev. Mwanza also stressed his desire — and a desire among many (but not all) leaders
of EFZ member churches — to move towards providing more services. However, Mwanza
emphasized three handicaps that EFZ faces in this effort. First, he contrasted his churches
organizational structure with that of the other established churches:
Our friends the Catholics are very different from us, . . . because they are very
hierarchical and very, very systematic. They flow through a very definite line of
communication, which is very different from us. And even though they say “the
three church mother bodies,” the Evangelicals are the more complex because of
the diversity. We are dealing with thousands of different churches, and some of
them are just one congregation, maybe they’ve got 2000 people. . . . So when you
have thousands of these different churches, to mobilize them to rally behind
one objective is very difficult.
But the Catholic Church, they just have to respect the leadership, so even if
it’s top down, things will just work. But with us, we can’t do top down approach.
We need to do consultation to bring people together, to help them understand
why we’re doing this, and so on. So it’s been very difficult over the years.
Additionally, Mwanza stressed a second handicap that EFZ faced in terms of providing
more social services: a dearth of reliable international support. Somewhat to my surprise,
Mwanza spoke openly about how disappointed Zambian Evangelicals and Pentecostals
(united within EFZ) had been in terms of their international partners:
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The involvement of the international community among the Evangelicals could
have been better if they had taken a more proactive role. . . . International
churches could have played a more active role to ensure whether they could
have helped to strengthen the capacity of the Evangelical Churches in Zambia
because the Catholic Churches were already strong because of their background.
But I think we needed — there should have been some level of support.
Not necessarily money, but it could be even just prayer support or sharing
information and strategies — how do you go about this, and so on. Because
most of what we were doing was job-on training — learning as you go, learning
on the job. But I think we should have had better support than the way things
were.
. . . Whereas the African churches have drawn a lot of ‘spiritual remodeling’
from the US, there has not been a direct, deliberate interaction, where an
American pastor is mentoring a Zambian pastor to make sure they . . . are doing
things holistically, and so on. We [EFZ] have been working with our churches to
strengthen our pastors’ engagement with holistic approach to mission, . . . Don’t
just focus on spiritual issues, deal with issues that are affecting the person.
After this, I sought to clarify Mwanza’s position on the role of international actors in
Zambia’s Evangelical and pentecostal churches:
AUTHOR: Thank you. So, to recap and make sure I’m getting it: When you talk
about people who study pentecostalism globally or this kind of thing, some
of them very cynically say “Oh Evangelical churches in Africa — it’s all these
Americans going and planting their churches.” It seems that what you are saying
is quite contrary to that. That in fact, although there is some role-modeling and
diffusion of ideas, spiritual approaches, and intuition, but that in fact the direct
links (whether it’s monetary support or strategic planning), that in fact has been
disappointingly low in Zambia. Is that correct?
MWANZA: Precisely. I think that what you have said is what people perceive out
there. That perhaps American churches are pouring huge sums of dollars to run
churches in Africa. There are very few churches that emanate from the US, like
local branches of American parent churches. There could be very, very few —
extremely few — numbers to that extent.
What I think has been happening is that our Zambian pastors are looking to
America, Tulsa, Oklahoma, as the reservoir or source for spiritual inspiration. I
mean, you talk of Kennneth Copeland, T.D. Jakes — all these big guys — because
of their worldwide television ministries, books, CDs, and so on, our people still
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— on a remote level — still draw inspiration from there. But on a direct level,
there are very few churches of American origin. I know that Assemblies of God
has got two origins — one American and one Canadian — so maybe on that
level, yes. But they are just one denomination! There are thousands of other
denominations here [in Zambia], which, because of breaking away from parent
churches have become charismatic and formed their own churches, and so on.
In line with Mwanza’s assertion that most Zambian Evangelical and pentecostal churches
are not supported (or even directly engaged) with Western churches, he was also clear about
the important impact that Chiluba’s support for Pentecostals and Evangelicals had during
the 1990s. When asked how the 1991 transition impacted EFZ and its member churches, he
responded:
During the time of Frederick Chiluba, because he was an Evangelical Christian
— and he was very forthright about his testimony — I think everyone of the
Evangelicals was very excited to have a Born Again Christian President in State
House. And he talked about God very openly. That also helped to, for lack of a
better word, to “market” or “promote” the church. The church grew quite a lot
during that time because of the Evangelical President in State House.
Was there a link between this growth and state favoritism? How would we know?
Mwanza continued, noting that this period also ushered in a new relationship to state,
that differed markedly from the pre-multiparty era, and that benefited pentecostal and
Evangelical churches significantly. These churches, he explained,
. . . [D]id benefit significantly, including donations to some of them, including
donations to build churches from State House. The President at the time used
to operate what was called a slush fund. That was money that was being used to
give out when he was invited as a guest of honor at a church meeting, and so on.
And [it was being used] significantly because the President cannot go there [to a
church he is invited to speak at] with $10 or $100, so he would carry something
like $1000 or $10,000 that sort of thing (equivalent in Kwacha of course). So,
you would actually find that the [EFZ member] church[es] did benefit a lot.
. . . In urban communities, the [EFZ member] church[es] was receiving lots of
recognition, and support for land.
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Yet, as Mwanza highlighted, assistance from the government — both through its public,
outspoken advertisement of your faith, and through multiform material contributions — is
contingent on churches refraining from challenging the government, particularly when it
comes to political reform intended to prolong political survival. In other words, there are
“two sides to the coin” of government support. As we know from the end of Chapter 3,
EFZ was forced to make a very difficult decision by the end of Chiluba’s term: Would they
support his desire to amend the constitution, so that he could have a third term, or would
they side with the mainline Protestant and Catholic Churches, who opposed that reform as
vehemently as they had been opposing the government’s Christian Nation Declaration as an
insincere and anti-democratic ploy?
Many popular Zambian pentecostal leaders, including the leader of the Assemblies
of God and Bread of Life churches, openly supported Chiluba. Yet, leaders of the older
Evangelical churches within EFZ pushed back, and ultimately, EFZ refused to support
Chiluba’s bid for a third term. Seemingly as a result, we know that EFZ member churches
received exceptionally little support from the government in the lead up to the 2001
elections. Meanwhile, we know from interviews with pentecostal Bishop David Masupa,
that Chiluba personally summoned him to the office, funded him to start a competing
pentecostal church mother body, and funded a trip around the country wherein Masupa’s
objective was to explore support for the third term bid in far-flung churches (possibly also
distributing patronage and encouraging them to join Masupa’s new organization. Masupa
emerged as a celebrity that year, constantly speaking on state media about Chiluba’s
widespread support among Christians.
With this in mind, Mwanza’s contrasting the two “sides of the coin” of state support for
churches is important, as he speaks on the basis of his organization’s experience:
129
The church is well placed to influence society government international affairs.
Because the church has a Sunday service, and Saturday the church has youth
programs, women’s programs, men’s programs, and children’s ministry. So the
church is very loaded — very loaded [with opportunities for mobilization and
influence]. And we are well placed because of the level of meetings during the
week — bible studies and so on — that interaction can provide a channel of
communication for anything. . . .
But if churches are seen to be stronger to influence social transformation, they
can be seen to influence the community so much that some of the government
policies may be shot down. Take the constitution for instance. . . . To some
extent, the selfish motives of politicians in order to provide for elongated
stay in power, they would want to tamper with certain policies — including
components of the constitution. . . . And so if they perceive the church to be very
strong to be able to say “no to this [constitutional amendment], no to that,” who
would give money to an institution that will not support you for whatever you
[politicians] want to do? I think the natural thing is to avoid supporting those
churches, so that their strong advocacy role is not enhanced by government
contributions.
Just as politicians are deeply attracted to churches’ regular contact with large segments of
the population, and their influence over the communication and information that church
members receive, politicians will withhold state support from favored churches if and when
they speak out against government. EFZ learned this the hard way in 2001, and was careful
in balancing its role in national politics during Mwanawasa’s reign (2001-2003). Evidence
indicates that many EFZ member churches enjoyed a return to generous state support
(especially before elections) in following years, particularly as other pentecostal politicians
ascended within the MMD party after Chiluba.5
5For instance, pentecostal televangelist Nevers Mumba, served as Vice President under Levy Mwanawasa, and
Mwanawasa was replaced by Evangelical MMD member, Rupiah Banda, who served as President from 2008-
2011, when he narrowly lost to Michael Sata (a former MMD member turned “populist”).
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Elites only?
Excerpts presented in the previous section are in line with the arguments that I advance in
this dissertation. Yet, in a notoriously unequal country like Zambia, it is fair to ask whether
the views and perceptions of elites truly represent the views of Zambians at large. Do
parishioners from different churches, for instance, express different political opinions? To
what extent do they perceive the churches as occupying an important, and/or a valuable role
in politics? And how do they perceive possible changes over time in church-state relations?
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, how do randomly selected congregants explain why
some individuals convert to pentecostalism, while others do not?
To address these questions the next section of this chapter turns to results of focus groups
and interviews conducted in 2011 in and around Lusaka Zambia. Below, I detail the sampling
strategy that I used for both focus group participant selection as well as the stratified random
selection of church leaders that I interviewed during this period, as well. I then present
evidence from analysis of focus group transcripts that addresses the questions described
above.
4.2 Political Gospels, According to Parishioners and Pastors
Excerpts presented in the previous section are in line with the arguments that I advance in
this dissertation. Yet, in a notoriously unequal country like Zambia, it is fair to ask whether
the views and perceptions of elites truly represent the views of Zambians at large. Do
parishioners from different churches, for instance, express different political opinions? To
what extent do they perceive the churches as occupying an important, and/or a valuable role
in politics? And how do they perceive possible changes over time in church-state relations?
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Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, how do randomly selected congregants explain why
some individuals convert to pentecostalism, while others do not?
To address these questions, this section presents evidence and analysis of focus group
transcripts conducted with parishioners from different churches in Zambia in 2011. Below, I
detail the methodological approach and sampling strategy that I used to select a stratified
random sample of churches and church leaders (whom I interviewed) as well as the
randomly selected parishioners from within these churches.
4.2.1 Research strategy
Sampling strategy
Within Zambia, I focused my research on Lusaka and its surrounding, peri-urban areas.
Pentecostal churches are more prevalent in urban areas, where they appeal to rural-urban
migrants experiencing “social dislocation,” and can raise enough money from tithes to
sustain operation (Anderson 2013; Author interview, Rev. Joshua Banda, 8/2011). Focusing
on Lusaka also ensured access to higher quality administrative data, which I used to
construct the sampling frames. Some Zambian bureaucrats have suggested that smaller
churches or faith based businesses, which might otherwise prefer not to register, expect that
the government has relatively high capacity to monitor their operation in the capital city, and
are therefore more likely to register in Lusaka than in other parts of the country. Additionally,
as the capital city, Lusaka is more ethnically heterogeneous than regional capitals. Focusing
my qualitative research in the capital therefore helped mitigate concerns that strong regional
or tribal dynamics would drive discussions across churches in a given city or town (I return
to the question of tribal and regional dynamics below). A final advantage of focusing the
research in Lusaka is that the role of international evangelists is likely to be most pronounced
in the capital, which is significantly easier to reach than Zambia’s other large, sparsely
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populated and underdeveloped provinces. This enables me to better evaluate the alternative
explanation that international evangelists are perceived as more important forces in the rise
of Zambia’s pentecostal churches: than the country’s political actors.
Within Lusaka, I selected two peri-urban compounds (townships) to work within. These
compounds are similar to one another terms of their overall size, crime rate, and socioeco-
nomic status, and are viewed by many Zambians as “average” or representative of Zambian
life in Lusaka, more broadly. The two differed, however, in terms of the prominence of
the Catholic Church: The compound of Bauleni was established on lands formerly owned
by the Catholic Church, and Catholics have a long history of aiding community members
and supplying broad social services, even as a plethora of other churches established
prominence in the compound since the late 1980s. (More on this below).
By contrast, the compound of Chawama has no particular historical ties to the Catholic
Church. Like virtually all compounds in major Zambian cities, Chawama boasts a sizable
Catholic congregation, but Zambia’s most populous mainline Protestant church — the
United Church of Zambia (UCZ) — and several traditional evangelical churches (e.g., Baptist)
similarly sized crowds on Sundays. Both compounds have witnessed the profusion of
hundreds of new, largely pentecostal or Independent churches in recent decades.
Sampling frames
Within each compound, I required a list of all active churches, stratified along the denomina-
tional lines of primary relevance to the politics of Christianity in Zambia, including mainline
Protestant churches associated with the CCZ mother body; Catholic churches associated
with ZEC, and Evangelical and pentecostal churches associated either with EFZ or ICOZ.
Although no such sampling frames existed at the time, I was able to leverage information
from several sources to construct them.
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First, I called on existing data collected by the four main church umbrella organizations
(or “mother bodies”), including: The Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia, the Council of
Churches, the Zambian Episcopal Conference, and Independent Churches of Zambia. I
then amplified these lists using data obtained from the Registrar of Societies (recall, all
churches are required by law to register with this body). In order to ensure that the lists
were up to date and included churches that might be too small or new to have registered
yet, I approached several religious leaders, Ward counselors (local officials), and leaders
of local schools in each compound and asked them to review my sampling frame. School
administrators were particularly important, because very small or new churches are widely
known to rent school rooms out to hold worship services on Sundays. In each area, at least
three of these leaders reviewed and supplemented my lists with any churches believed to be
missing. These "experts" also confirmed that my stratification of churches across categories
(Catholic, mainline Protestant, Evangelical and pentecostal, and Independent).
Church and congregant selection
Enlisting these stratified sampling frames, I selected each compound’s Catholic Church
and United Church of Zambia (Zambia’s primary mainline Protestant church), and then
randomly selected three churches from within the category of Evangelical and pentecostal
churches (e.g., including older Baptist churches as well as the many new pentecostal
churches), and one African Independent (i.e., "Zion" or Mutima) church.
It is worth noting that I focused on congregants rather than the general public because
I wanted to explore variation in perceptions, attitudes and beliefs across individuals who
attended different churches. Sampling directly from church attendees allowed me to ensure
that all participants in the study were in fact congregants at the churches of interest. This
strategy was also less costly than a general household survey. By inviting congregants to
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join focus groups immediately following church service, I was also able to overcome the
challenge that members of a given church do not always live in the immediate geographic
area.
Additionally, in such a highly religious nation, a random sample of churchgoers in this
study is likely to be more similar to a general sample than would a sample of congregants
drawn from churches in the United States, for instance. As discussed in earlier chapters,
sources estimate that at least 80 percent of Zambian citizens identified as Christian in 2010
(WCD 2010; Pew 2011). A countrywide survey by the Pew Forum in 2009 found that upwards
of 90 percent of all Zambians identified religion as “very important” in their lives, and more
than 80 percent reported attending religious services at least once a week (Pew Forum, 2009).
Participation
With one exception, every church that was randomly selected agreed to participate in
the study.6 Participation involved (a) granting me an interview with the founder or head
Priest/Pastor of the church; and (b) granting the research team the opportunity to randomly
select and invite roughly 6-10 churchgoers to join a focus group after Sunday services. Focus
groups typically included 6-8 individuals and lasted two hours. Snacks and a small travel
voucher were provided to incentivize participation.
Trained Zambian research assistants conducted most focus groups in pairs of two,
which enabled me to be sure that at least 4 of the most popularly spoken local languages
were representedterms of a potential translatoreach group. In all but three focus groups,
participants requested that most groups be conducted in English — Lusaka’s lingua franca
— with occasional translations offered by research assistants. In several cases, participants
6In Bauleni, we were unable to locate one pentecostal church selected from our list. After several attempts, we
were unable to locate the leader or a single congregant associated with the church, and a local told us that the
man had left the compound nearly a year prior. We replaced that church with another randomly selected from
the list.
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requested that the group be facilitated in English, but preferred to relate their own thoughts
in Bemba or Nyanja. Facilitators translated the all transcripts into English for analysis.
Elite interviews: selection
In addition to the leaders of all churches participating in focus groups, I randomly selected
several additional religious leaders to interview in these compounds, along with leaders at
several high profile or megachurches closer to town. The latter included St. Ignatius Catholic
Church in Rhodes Park, Northmeade Assembly of God, (whose head Pastor has held several
high-ranking government positions, and leads all Assembly of God Churches in Zambia),
and the General Overseer of the Bread of Life Church International, (pentecostal) Bishop Joe
Imakondo.
Other elites interviewed in 2011 included local Ward Counselors, party strategists for all
major parties participating in the election, Michael Sata (the main opposition candidate who
eventually won the 2011 election) and other candidates standing for election, and leaders of
a number of major nonprofit organizations involved in democracy promotion, from Caritas
Zambia (a Catholic NGO), to Zambian staff at DanChurchAid, to prominent members of the
Law Association of Zambia. For lack of space, I focus on congregants’ views below.
Analysis
All focus groups were audiotaped and transcribed verbatim. I analyzed these transcripts
using open and axial coding (Boyatzis, 1998; Fereday et al., 2006; Guest et al., 2011) to identify
and analyze both emerging themes, and themes established a priori in focus group guides.
Two research assistants and I analyzed the data, with each coder reviewing the data and
coding themes independently. Themes and codes were then reviewed in research meetings
and any conflicting interpretations were resolved through discussion.
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4.2.2 Findings
Perceptions about the public roles of churches
At a very basic level, if my argument about politicized propagation was correct, then I
expected individuals from non-pentecostal churches to associate Pentecostals with the
ruling party, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), and to describe frustration
with stalled democratization in Zambia since Chiluba took office. To the extent that
Pentecostals were willing to speak about politics, I expected them to describe support for
the MMD, and to report greater satisfaction with the “democracy” in Zambia. I also expected
at least some respondents to describe the “watch dog” role of the major churches and the
mother bodies, especially the Catholic and mainline Protestants. By contrast, if no one
mentioned supportive relationships between Pentecostals and the MMD, or if Pentecostals
described supporting opposition politicians in 2011, my argument would be called into
question.
To evaluate these expectations, the outset of each interview and focus group asked
participants to make free associations with each of the main Christian groups in Zambia.
Specifically, focus group leaders prompted participants as follows: “When we talk about
churches in Zambia today, there are basically three types: Mainline (including Protestant and
Catholic Churches), pentecostal, and African Independent Churches. What comes to mind
when you think of these three types of churches? What are the similarities and differences?”
Several clear patterns emerged across responses to this question. First, the modal
response from members of the Catholic and mainline Protestant churches emphasized that
many pentecostal churches attracted poverty-impacted individuals with their prosperity
gospel. These respondents went further, however, linking the material wealth associated
with pentecostal pastors to “an unholy alliance” between MMD politicians and Pentecostals.
As one Catholic put it:
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Money is the root cause of mushrooming of churches. Another problem is when
there is a difference in a church, people don’t want to solve the problem. They
would rather leave and form their own church. Another thing is envy. People [in
pentecostal churches] would also want to get the money their pastor gets. And
to befriend their government leaders.
Similarly, an Anglican in Chawama stated:
These [pentecostal] churches are like businesses. People are more interested in
making money than serving God. When people see their pastors moving in good
vehicles, or convening at state house, they also want those things. That is why
in some churches they are not interested in small amounts to be put in offering
boxes, and you see them [pentecostal leaders] are more eager to sing the songs
of politicians.
Others suggested that newer churches are founded — and often attended — by indi-
viduals seeking handouts from the government; by contrast, for politicians, the smaller
churches may be more vulnerable and therefore more easily bribed. Among Catholics and
most mainline Protestants, there was consensus that, as one Protestant put it, “it is mainly
the small churches that take bribes.” A Catholic participant in a different group similarly
concluded that, “mostly it is small churches that have no capacity to grow that need help
from politicians.”
Moreover, many Pentecostals acknowledged that “some” of their brethren had engaged
in corrupt,quid pro quo relations with the MMD at various points in Zambia’s history,
although no participants directly acknowledged participating in this type of behavior.
When prompted to consider the motivations of pentecostal church founders and converts,
members of pentecostal churches repeatedly described a perceived division within their
ranks, wherein some church founders “are called,” but others launched new churches out
of “selfishness,” and a desire for material wealth and socio-political status (i.e., “becoming
important or famous”).
138
How does this compare to the perceived roles of mainline Protestant and Catholic
churches in relation and the public sphere? Interestingly, there were very few comments that
referred directly to the role of mainline Protestant churches in society without lumping them
together with Catholics. As expected, a majority of comments about the public roles of the
Catholic and mainline Protestant churches underscored their pro-democracy leanings, and
the degree to which the MMD government interpreted their advocacy as “anti-government,”
and a political challenge for the MMD. One Protestant congregant, for example, emphasized
the importance of religious institutions in educating and mobilizing voters, specifically:
The Church has a role to play in politics in Zambia. When we talk about church,
we talk about the people of Zambia. Seventy-five percent of people in Zambia go
to church, and they are also the ones who vote. So the church has a major role to
play by educating membership of their rights and role in politics.
A member of this group followed the last comment by articulating support for Father Bwalya,
a particularly outspoken, progressive Catholic Priest in Zambia:
There is an important role for the Church in politics, but there is a problem. For
example, we have Father Bwalya of Roman Catholic Church. When he talks, the
government says he is just a clergyman and he should not involve himself in
politics. I think this is not fair because he wants to be a voice for the people, but
he is hindered by the government powers that be.
Together, these quotes illustrate the broader dynamic in which mainline Protestant and
Catholic leaders are generally seen as speaking with one voice when it comes to pro-
democratic statements or activism. And, while the Catholics appear to be more vocal
in the public sphere, Protestants repeatedly endorsed and reinforced their common, pro-
democracy views in focus groups, just as the mother bodies have united in public state-
ments. For instance, the second speaker quoted above was a Protestant advocating for the
right of a Catholic priest to “be a voice for the people.”
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Relatedly, members of several groups emphasized the importance of the hierarchy
within the Catholic Church, and underscored that Catholic and mainline church leaders
are significantly better educated than most pentecostal or AIC leaders. As one Catholic
summarized it:
Catholics believe in obedience to the leadership. Priests go for training for many
years. In Catholic, obedience to authority is of utmost importance. Catholic
priests are more learned than leaders of other churches. This helps them resist
temptations of worldly power.
A pentecostal woman expressed a similar sentiment by suggesting that, although Catholic
priests are highly educated and “move together” (i.e., operate in a unified, hierarchical
system), their education and organizational unity do not, alone, amount to a real connection
with God. She therefore rejected the concept of confession in the Catholic Church (her prior
affiliation), in favor of a church where “it is not about the years of learning or a connection
to Rome, it is about your individual connection to God and his salvation.”
Conversion and charismaticism
Numerous focus group participants also articulated the perception that pentecostal converts
commonly come from the Catholic Church. Several members of pentecostal churches
also cited their upbringings in the Catholic Church. According to several Catholics, these
conversions were typically motivated by individuals’ pursuit of more powerful positions
within the church. For these churchgoers (often youth), their desire to play a more powerful
role in the church was stymied by the many years of training required to become a priest
(and perhaps also the requirement that priests be unmarried men). Yet, this same appetite
for power or leadership, Catholics agreed, leads many of the new pentecostal churches to
splinter as members compete with one another. As one Catholic put it,
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Most Pentecostals come from the Catholic Church. Their problem is that, even among
themselves, they do not stick together for a long time. They always have breakaways.
Catholics also clarified the role of charismatic groups within their faith. These remarks
were pervaded by an emphasis on keeping charismatics within the Catholic Church, even
while letting them pray “like Pentecostals.” For instance, one Catholic seemed to defend the
idea that the charismatic Catholic movement was legitimate, noting that:
There are different organizations within the Catholic Church. People are free
to choose to join any group they feel comfortable in. Those who want to pray
in a pentecostal way are free to join the Charismatic group. Catholics can
accommodate everybody.
A Catholic participant in another group similarly remarked that “[w]hat is important is
to know that it is an organization within the church. Everyone is to follow the doctrine
of the Catholic Church.” Another non-Charismatic member of the group jumped in to
affirm this statement, adding that “even the Charismatics have something also to teach
about spirituality. The only problem is when people misunderstand their role in the
church.” Clearly these Catholics were well aware of the diverse groups of Catholics,
including Charismatics who “pray like Pentecostals,” and were willing to accept these
spiritual innovations and adopted worship practices as long as the Catholic Church structure
(roles) and doctrine (including social doctrine) were upheld, and the church remained
unified.
From the perspective of pentecostal converts, a young, former-Catholic member of a
small pentecostal church suggested that people like her switch churches for widely varying
reasons, but that they often have to continue church switching because the religious market
is so rife with variation across churches. She noted:
Nowadays, it is common to move from one church to another because they are
following so many things. Some of them want deliverance and others want to
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be blessed with money and other things. . . . And others want help — they want
that when they die they can be buried and others want deliverance, others want
salvation. Because of different churches when they see that there is no salvation
in the church, they should go where they think there is salvation.
This member reported joining the church because she had heard that if a member of her
family died, the church would help pay or loan money for the funeral. The diverse goals and
motivations of converts that she described may also be read as a reflection of the fact that
Pentecostals rarely describe or defend Pentecostals as a coherent group. Instead, members of
pentecostal churches are as quick as members of established churches to emphasize internal
division and the presence of “bad apples,” who prioritize bribes, tithes and offerings over
spiritual salvation.
As noted at the outset of the chapter, another theme that emerged from the responses
of pentecostal converts — particularly among young men — emphasized their attraction to
pentecostal churches where they could “exercise leadership.” In contrast to the hierarchical
Catholic Church, from which all but one of them came, these youth perceived pentecostal
churches as places where newcomers were encouraged to participate in the preaching if they
possessed a gift or “calling.” One male participant in a focus group that was drawn from one
of the smaller and more prosperity gospel-oriented churches that I observed, described his
motivation like this:
Me, I came from Catholic because I was born into it and that was what I know.
But two years ago, I received a calling from God and the Holy Spirit, and I knew I
must share my calling. I must . . . preach for the Lord. But what are we [youth] to
do? Wait around to be an altar boy for ten years? No. I cannot wait! I must share
my calling and be true to my calling to the Lord! So I am here, and I am happy [to
be] beginning to learn how to preach with the elders. . . . By next year I will be a
pastor, I hope.
Four other young men in different focus groups expressed related sentiments, with one
noting that he had “tired of waiting for long lines of authorities in order to show love to the
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Lord,” and noted that, in his new pentecostal church, he was “able to love the Lord with all
my heart, and share in the worship leading.” In another group, a participant echoed the
sentiment that becoming a leader of the Catholic Church was not in the cards for him, but
emphasized the strict lifestyle requirements:
-pacing . . . But why would God require that to rejoice in — to worship him —
I must not have a family? That is not what God wants! That is confusion. And
all the other churches know this. He [God] wants it, He is a father! And I want
to lead true worship, so I can also have a good family. That is why I came here,
where the family leads the church.
More broadly speaking, young or new members of many pentecostal churches tended
to emphasize their belief that participating in the pentecostal church would bring new
opportunities for professional advancement, or the honing of new skills, such as preaching.
Perceptions of democracy
With respect to perceived quality of democracy in Zambia, Catholics and Protestants
were significantly more likely to voice dismay in the country’s political trajectory than
pentecostal church members. These groups also spent more time discussing this question
than pentecostal focus groups, where the question occasionally fell flat. One representative
response from a mainline Protestant to this question was, “[T]here is no democracy. We
once had it in the 1990s, but it has slipped through our hands.” This comment reflects the
sense that Zambia has experienced backsliding since its transition to multipartyism in 1991.
Another member of this group noted that, although Zambia is more democratic than some
of its neighbors (e.g., Angola and the Congo), it is still “far from 100 percent democratic.”
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Similarly, Catholic groups achieved consensus that, although the former one party
state had given way to multiple political parties Zambia, the country was inadequately
democratic, largely because the MMD government had claimed excessive authority:
We have to decide what we want and not the government deciding on our
behalf. That’s why we say it’s not 100 percent [democratic]. For example,
the constitution making process: The views of the people were not taken into
account. The bill failed to go through in parliament.
In fact, Catholics overwhelmingly agreed that the upcoming 2011 elections would be rigged
in favor of the MMD. One group member specified that, “since parliament was dissolved,
we see the government abusing public resources. The public media is abused by the
current ruling government. All programs are advertising the ruling party.” Another Catholic
commented that “When results are announced, it becomes evident that PF can win, but
later it goes to MMD.” If the elections were fair, Catholics and mainline Protestants generally
believed that the PF would win, but based on the last twenty years of Zambia’s political
history, few believed that the MMD would actually relinquish power.
An additional remark concerning churches and voting came from a Catholic, who
suggested that Catholics often vote as a block, and are often influenced by their leaders:
“Certain people move as a family. For example, us Catholics will move together and influence
each other at the time of voting. Sometimes [religious] leaders influence us.” This may
help clarify why Catholic leaders’ vocal opposition to anti-democratic reform and corruption




In this chapter, I have built on quantitative findings presented in Chapters 2 and 3 by
presenting results from a series of qualitative interviews conducted within a single case over
time. Specifically, findings reported in this chapter are drawn from qualitative field work
conducted in Zambia immediately preceding the country’s historic 2011 national elections,
with follow-up interviews conducted in 2013. By investigating the subjective meanings that
various Zambians attribute to different religious and political actors, and by probing elite
opinion on issues and implications related to the argument advanced in this dissertation,
evidence presented in this chapter should build our confidence that the empirical trends I
have described are real, and that the subjective interpretation of relationships among key
actors described in prior chapters is in line with perceptions shared by many Zambian elites,
as well as parishioners.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion: Politicized Propagation in Other Contexts
“It is because the religious field is a locus of social change that it
is simultaneously a field of potential political recomposition.”
— Jean Francois Bayart, 1993, p.302
This dissertation began with the observation that a a significant literature in political
science examines the influence of religion on politics, but treats religion as an independent
(right hand side) variable. I have argued, however, that in many developing countries,
politics and religion are endogenous: We cannot understand one without reference to
the other. Approaching religion and politics this way not only creates opportunities for
new empirical predictions, but allows us to posit new research questions. The preceding
chapters have taken up two of these interrelated new questions, asking, Under what political
conditions are new religious movements most likely to thrive, and to emerge as politically
salient identities in developing countries today? To what extent do contemporary political
actors facilitate (or constrain) the rise of new conversionary religious movements?
I argued that political elites in developing countries sometimes face incentives to invest
public resources in the propagation of conversionary religious movements. The condi-
tions under which this is likely are both political and religious: In states where political
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competition is relatively high, and where established religious institutions credibly threaten
to mobilize opposition to elites’ favored policies, politicians are more likely to engage
in politicized propagation of new religious movements in an attempt to cultivate new
constituencies, and to lay claim to new forms of religious-cum-political authority.
How do political elites promote the growth of new religious movements? We have
seen that politicians can use a number of tools to propagate new movements, some of
which include: elevating the movement’s status in national discourse (possibly through elite
conversion and testimony), appointing members of the movement to public offices, and
targeting material resources to affiliated individuals and religious institutions. In addition,
we observed that new or small religious movements are often particularly hungry for these
symbolic and material resources, as they must compete with established religions that have
access to transnational support and decades of investment in local religious ‘infrastructure.’
Such relatively high levels of need among new movements raises the effective value of
politicians’ resources. By contrast, the same amount of symbolic or material capital allocated
to relatively well-off, established religious groups would presumably “buy” politicians less
influence, if it succeeded in buying them any at all.
How does this strategic behavior — which I termed politicized propagation — differ from
older concepts of religious favoritism? Elites engaged in politicized propagation do not
simply privilege one major faith group over another, but target resources to help establish
and propagate new religious networks, which seek converts from established religious
communities. Politicians also tend to be more covert about politicized propagation than
older forms of religious favoritism. Contemporary political parties may actively support
and “market” a new religious movement, for instance, but they do not establish official
ties with formal representatives or organizations of the movement. This differs significantly
from historic cases of favoritism in which state officials sought to exert formal control over
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hierarchical religious bodies, often treating established church agencies as extensions of the
state.
Contemporary Renewalist movements in Africa
To evaluate this argument empirically, I focused on the rise of pentecostal Christianity in
sub-Saharan Africa, which has grown extremely rapidly since the late 1980s in many (but not
all) countries. In this context, I hypothesized that the interaction of two contextual variables
— namely, the intensity of political competition and the presence of recent political mo-
bilization by religious institutions — incentivized politicians to invest in the “propagation”
of pentecostal church networks. Chapter 2 established the plausibility of this argument
using a mix of qualitative and quantitative cross-national analyses. In particular, Chapter
2 revealed a strong positive correlation between a country’s pentecostal population share
(in 2010) and the interaction between average levels of electoral contestation in the decades
following third wave transitions, and prior political mobilization by established religions.
Chapter 2 showed that there is no evidence that these political context variables correlated
with charismatic Christian population share. Given that charismatics and Pentecostals share
extremely similar doctrinal beliefs and worship styles, this strong empirical finding indicated
that doctrinal appeal and individual demand for Renewalist worship cannot explain cross-
national variation pentecostal prevalence.
Why might political context variables play a unique role in shaping opportunities for the
growth of pentecostal populations, but not charismatics? I highlighted the ways in which
different churches’ organizational dynamics and political legacies influence politicians’
incentives to intervene in the supply of pentecostal churches. Pentecostals’ relatively new
and decentralized religious institutions lack significant transnational oversight, support,
leadership training, and agenda setting. This contrasts with established churches, especially
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the Catholic and, to a lesser extent, mainline Protestant churches, which have hierarchical
authority structures, formal leadership training, enforceable expectations about leaders’
behavior, and a proven record of coordinating communication and collective action across
clergy, parishes, and churches.
Another important contrast between newer Pentecostal and older, established churches
in many African countries concerns their history of church-state relations, or what we might
think of as a church’s political legacy or affiliations. Whereas the established churches
mobilized opposition to single-party rule in many African states, and demonstrated their
capability and willingness to fight for pro-poor, pro-democratic policy, newer pentecostal
churches lacked “a dog in the pro-democratic fight, ” as one pentecostal church founder
put it in an interview. Moreover, the particular political legacies affixed to established
churches meant that, in many African countries where politicians faced increasing electoral
competition after transition to multipartyism in the 1990s, politicians also faced established
churches mobilized to play a “watch dog” role with respect to government, and to defend
the rights of the marginalized against elites. While the phenomenon of religious leadership
during third wave transitions was by no means limited to sub-Saharan African countries
(Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011), the degree to which established churches’ institutional
capacity and geographic reach has trumped many political parties in the region is arguably
more extreme in sub-Saharan African than any other world region (Herbst 2000; van de Walle
2001).
Causal process mechanisms
To assess whether the causal process mechanisms of politicized propagation were at play,
I combined brief case comparisons (Chapter 2) with extended analysis of subnational
variation within a single case over time (Chapter 3 and 4). Case comparisons alleviated
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concerns that colonial heritage or politicians’ personal religious positions might explain
cross-national variation in the size of pentecostal populations in the region.
Chapters 3 and 4 presented a variety of fine-grained, original data from Zambia including
quantitative analysis of evidence from state records, as well as participant observation at
numerous religious serves and political rallies, extensive qualitative interviews, and wide-
ranging review of primary source documents from relevant churches and government
agencies. Specifically, I found that in the two decades following Zambia’s 1991 transition
to multiparty politics, the ruling MMD party systematically targeted government appoint-
ments, media access, and other excludable resources to pentecostal churches, and often
allocated these resources according to a political business cycle. Simultaneously, this ruling
party regulated and, when possible, constrained access to similar resources for religious
groups that the party perceived as oppositional (namely, the Catholic Church).
In Chapter 4, I showed that significant qualitative evidence collected in Zambia is
consistent with this interpretation of analyses presented in Chapter 3. The qualitative data
revealed widespread recognition of political strategy adopted by MMD politicians (and some
pentecostal leaders) from the 1990s, onward. This evidence also underscored, however, that
the reasons individuals convert to pentecostal churches are not directly related to politicized
propagation. The latter finding points towards a need for further research on the long-
run impact of politicized propagation: Does it work? To what extent can the reportedly
divergent motivations of church founders and converts ultimately thwart politicians’ efforts
to cultivate constituencies tolerant of anti-democratic reform? This research is beyond
the scope of the dissertation, and can build usefully on empirical relationships that the
dissertation established.
Importantly, no single analysis in any of the preceding chapters presents a “smoking gun”
for the theory of politicized propagation. Yet, by triangulating a wide range of distinct types
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of evidence from distinct cases, I have demonstrated that political and religious change have
been intertwined in the recent history of many African states. Findings from Chapter 2 also
provided evidence against the null hypothesis that political context variables are unrelated
to variation in pentecostal population share. Evidence presented in Chapters 3 and 4, in
particular, make a compelling suggestive case for the argument that politicized propagation
is one of the means by which politics and religion have endogenously influenced one another
in sub-Saharan Africa.
The remainder of this chapter addresses three outstanding questions. First, how well do
the core arguments advanced in this dissertation travel to other contexts? The following
section engages the question of external validity by briefly discussing the rise of pente-
costalism in Latin American countries, and then relates my argument to both historical
and contemporary cases in which political actors in Africa engaged in the propagation
of conversionary Islamic movements. In both cases that I discuss, evidence suggests
that political actors were motivated by self-interest and perceived political threat and/or
competition, which is broadly consistent with the theory of politicized propagation put
forward in this dissertation. Specifically, I consider the case of colonial-era propagation of
the Mouride Brotherhood in French West Africa, and government of Niger’s interventionist
relationship with both Sufi and Salafi Muslim orders over the last several decades.
The following sections of this chapter turn to two other outstanding questions: How
does the argument about politicized propagation relate to theories of nationalism? In other
words, should we consider pentecostal propagation to be a type of nationalist politics? And,
secondly, what are the broader implications of my argument and findings? I conclude with a




How does the account of identity and politics — and specifically, of the spread of pente-
costalism — developed in this dissertation relate to other instances in which pentecostalism
has grown rapidly? Interdisciplinary religious studies scholars have repeatedly claimed that
today’s religious transformation across the global south — in combination with the shrinking
of traditional Christian populations in Europe and parts of North America — represents an
“epochal” transformation of global Christianity: “The era of Western Christianity has passed
within our lifetimes, and the day of Southern Christianity is dawning. The fact of change
itself is undeniable: it has happened, and will continue to happen” (Jenkins 2011: 8). Today,
pentecostal and charismatic Christianity represent the fastest growing religious groups in
both Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa.
Yet, there are important differences in the trajectory of pentecostal growth and involve-
ment in politics across regions. Religious demographers suggest that pentecostal growth is
associated with different segments of the population in Latin American and sub-Saharan
contexts, as well as different political objectives (Freston 2004). This cross-regional variation
resonates with the broader theory of politicized propagation advanced in this dissertation:
The political orientation and public role of Pentecostals differs in Latin America due, in
part, to Latin American countries’ very different political contexts and lack of successful,
church-led movements for democratization in many states. Virtually all scholarly accounts
of pentecostalism in Latin American and African contexts emphasize, for instance, that while
“the new Christianity defines itself against” an extremely diverse and dynamic cultural and
religious landscape in sub-Saharan Africa, the Latin American context has been dominated
152
by the (formerly) monopolist Catholic Church — “a matrix that is thoroughly Christian”
(2011: 8).
This cross-national variation also underscores the relevance of the scope conditions for a
theory of politicized propagation. We are most likely to observe politicized propagation, I ar-
gued, in democratizing, and weakly institutionalized states characterized where established
religious groups credibly threaten to mobilize opposition. These conditions distinguish
most sub-Saharan states from their Latin American counterparts on the basis of institutional
strength, the timing of democratization, and the role of established religions in political
struggles.
5.1.2 Islamic movements in Sub-Saharan Africa
This section considers two different questions concerning external validity: To what extent
can the two-tiered argument advanced in this dissertation help explain the rise of non-
Christian religious movements in sub-Saharan states? To what extent is this theory bound
to the present time period, or can it be applied to earlier eras? To clarify, the two tiers of the
argument to which I refer include the propositions that: (i) the relationship between religion
and politics is endogenous in at least some developing countries; and (ii) the concept of
“politicized propagation” (political leaders investing in the propagation of conversionary
religious movements) represents one mechanism through which this endogenous relation-
ship has transpired. To briefly illustrate the portability of these conceptual arguments, this
section considers the historic propagation of the Mouride Brotherhood in West African Sufi




The Mouride Brotherhood — a large order within Sufi Islam — is widely recognized to
have influenced the political trajectories of several West African countries, but most notably
Senegal and Gambia. Founded in 1883 by Senegalese mystic, Amadou Bamba, adherents of
the Brotherhood (termed Mourides) are distinguished by their emphasis on manual labor
and hard work, as well as devotion to local spiritual guides called Marabouts. Mouride
disciples undergo rituals of allegiance to their Marabouts, and provide their spiritual guides
with significant material tributes. In turn, Marabouts typically provide social services
(including loans) and exert significant influence over their followers’ political and economic
attitudes and behaviors (Coulon 1981; Villalon 1995; Cruise-O’Brien 1971). Worldwide,
Mourides are “famous for their entrepreneurship as much as for their moderate, essentially
African vision of Islam” (Onishi 2002).
Today, roughly 32% of all Senegalese citizens identify as Mouride.1 But this was not
always the case. Soon after Bamba — a renowned poet and prayer leader — founded the
order in 1883, he led a peaceful resistance to French colonialism. As a result, the French
exiled him to Gabon (1895 — 1902) and then Mauritania (1903 — 1907). By 1910, however,
the French had established a cooperative relationship with Bamba. At the same time,
the colonial government faced mounting demands from their extant social intermediaries
in Senegal. During World War I, France also faced heightened international political
competition and demand for African labor, which increased their interest in working with
the Mouride Brotherhood to pursue their interests and solidify support in Senegal.
1This is based on data from Senegal’s 2002 Census (ANSD 2002), which Fall et al. (2010) report as the most
recent available data. Publicly available data from Senegal’s 2013 Census does not cover religious demography.
Overall, the country is between 95-96% Muslim, with individuals adhering to one of the four main Sufi
brotherhoods, approximately 4% Christian (overwhelmingly Roman Catholic), and less than 0.5% animist (Fall
et al., 2010).
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Under these conditions of heightened political competition and increasing political
mobilization by non-Mouride African elites, the French allowed Bamba to return to present-
day Senegal, and actively invested in the promotion of his pacifistic, labor-oriented Mouride
Brotherhood. As Catherine Boone summarized in Merchant Capital and the Roots of State
Power in Senegal, “the French supported the marabouts, underwriting the rise of their
economic and political power in the rural areas of central Senegal” (2006: 40). In Political
Topographies of the African State, Boone — an expert on West African politics — went further:
By the time of World War II, the French authorities and the leaders of the
Sufi brotherhoods were locked in partnership. Sufi leaders collaborated closely
with colonial governors and instructed their disciples to accept colonial rule,
pay taxes, cultivate groundnuts, and submit to forced labor and military con-
scription. Colonial administrators in turn supported the Islamic brotherhoods
economically with agricultural loans, land concessions, roads and wells in zones
of Mouride settlement, and cash grants (Boone 2003: 55).
The French colonial government therefore appears to have engaged in politicized prop-
agation of the Sufi Brotherhood, and to have done so under conditions that broadly
conform to the expectations of the theory advanced in this dissertation. Moreover, this
episode of politicized propagation has had long-term impact: Throughout much of the
twentieth century, Mouride leaders influenced the trajectory of Senegalese state formation
and post-colonial politics (Ibid; Cruise-O’Brien 1972). Their political influence followed
a path dependent trajectory, with roots in the colonial propagation of what was, at the
time, a relatively new, conversionary Sufi order. Therefore, the historical example of
self-interested, “state-sponsored” growth of a new, conversionary Islamic movement to
advance less than democratic political control offers further evidence in support of the two,
interrelated arguments at the heart of the dissertation: Political dynamics and religious
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demographic change were clearly interrelated, and the French governments’ self-interested,
anti-democratic policy facilitated major religious demographic change.2
Niger’s regulation of Sufi and Salafi Islam
The case of Niger offers another example of a government intervening in the religious sphere
to effectively shape religious demography within its borders. Like most states in the region,
the government’s constitution “prohibits religious discrimination and provides for freedom
of religion and worship consistent with public order and national unity” (US Government
International Religious Freedom Report for Niger, 2005). Yet, dating back to the military
coup of Seyni Kountché in 1974, the Nigerien state has consistently sought to regulate Islam
within its borders (Elischer 2015a, b).
Originally, Kountché’s regime was motivated by increasing political instability and reli-
gious competition emanating from Libya, among other neighbor states. During the 1970s,
the government responded to its simultaneous concerns about political and religious change
by creating the Association Islamique du Niger (AIN). The AIN had a twofold purpose: On the
one hand, it was tasked with preventing the emergence or spread of Salafism from entering
the country (Elischer 2015a). In this sense, it operated as regulatory and ultimately repressive
organ of the state. For instance, the AIN required all Muslim leaders to pass a series of state-
sponsored tests in order to acquire a prayer license before they were legally allowed to lead
worship. The AIN was further empowered to revoke this license — and to ban any cleric from
the state’s mosques — if the cleric breeched the “state-sanctioned version of Islam” (Elischer
2015a: 18).
2Interestingly, Donal Cruise-O’Brien’s (1971) pathbreaking research on Senegalese Islam suggested that, to
the extent that Mourides later retained political influence, it was underwritten by the post-Independence
Senegalese state, which saw Mourides as an important antidote to mounting urban radicalism, and therefore
invested in sustaining — and perhaps also propagating and influencing — their ranks (also see Klein 1973: 169).
Further research is warranted to investigate this interpretation.
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Yet, the twin goal of the AIN was to actively invest in and promote a version of Islam that
supported the ruling party and posed no threat to the solvency of the state. As one of the
few scholars who have written about this case in English notes, in the 1970s, “the Nigerien
state began propagating a national version of Islam” (Elischer 2015a: 18, emphasis added).
This “national” or “Nigerien Islam” derived from local, Sufi interpretations of the Koran, but
was also marked by its explicit commitment to refrain from partisan or violent activity. The
AIN was therefore characterized as “a state-led organization dedicated to the promotion of
Sufi Islam across Niger’s territory” (Ibid). During the 1970s-80s, the Nigerien state used both
sticks and carrots in an effort to shape the country’s religious beliefs and demography. This
entailed propagating a relatively new, conversionary form of Islam that was perceived as
non-threatening in contrast with other movements active in the region.
Following third wave political liberalization in the 1990s, the Nigerien state continued
to invest in promoting its preferred form of Islam. US Government International Religious
Freedom Reports, for example, note that Niger’s Islamic Association, “which acts as an
official advisory committee on religious matters to the Government, conducted biweekly
broadcasts on the government-controlled television station” in the 2000s.3 The government
has reportedly restricted the ability of foreign evangelists to construct mosques, including
applicants from Pakistan, Iran, and Egypt.
As Elischer (Ibid), Kane (2007), and others have noted, we lack detailed information on
many Islamic movements and their state-relations in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in
Francophone countries like Niger. Yet, available evidence indicates that Nigerien “church”-
state relations have been characterized by successive governments’ attempt to promote and
sustain a certain Nigerien strain of (Sufi) Islam, which is explicitly nonthreatening to the
government. They do so partly in reaction to perceived threats to their rule, which are
3See, for instance, US Government International Religious Freedom Reports for Niger, 2005 at http://www.
state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2005/51488.htm.
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both political and religious in nature, but also transnational. In contrast to the Zambian
case, for instance, Niger’s government operates is a context of simultaneous external and
internal religio-political threats, including explicitly anti-secular Salafi movements that
operate throughout the Sahel with funding from the Middle East. It appears that this
dissertation’s core arguments concerning the endogeneity between religious and political
conditions applies in this case. Moreover, a conceptual framework that enables analysts to
appreciate incumbents’ incentives to propagate conversionary religious movements (even
within one nationally-dominant world religion, such as Islam) is required to make sense of
recent Nigerien political and religious history.
5.2 Broader Implications
Advancing understanding about the endogenous relationship between religious and po-
litical change has scholarly and policy-level implications. First and foremost, evidence
presented in this dissertation suggests that the media is wrong to depict the spread of
pentecostalism in sub-Saharan Africa as a one way street, in which American and other
Western evangelists transplant “morality politics” by creating materially dependent com-
munities in developing countries. As we have seen, the spread of pentecostalism has been
predominantly led by and for Africans, making use of international resources when possible,
but charting its own doctrinal and social trajectories (Marshall 2009; Ranger 2008).
The argument advanced here also has implications for development policy. Donors
have in many cases been disillusioned with the performance of governments in states
characterized by stalled or reversed democratic transitions. It is particularly in these states
that many donors, including USAID and several bureaus of the UN, have turned increasingly
to local NGOs, including faith-based NGOs.
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This dissertation suggests that donors should proceed with extreme caution in this
regard. On the one hand, it is true that local faith-based organizations (FBOs) often have
considerable access to local populations, policy makers, and the moral authority required
to launch and complete successful, community-based development projects. Yet, the
argument I advance here suggests that injecting funds into any identity-based organization,
including FBOs, can have significant unintended consequences. For instance, the extent
to which foreign development agencies and charities already direct resources through
established churches in developing countries arguably helps to create the incentives for
politicians to invest in religious institutions that might counter-balance the pro-democracy
activities of these older churches. This may occur as a result of strengthening pro-democratic
established churches, such as the Catholic and traditional Protestant churches in many
states, or newer and less progressive organizations, (e.g., pentecostal churches).
In terms of the long-run consequences of politicized propagation and democratization,
much remains to be seen. From the perspective of the established churches, we have seen
that individuals’ motivation to join smaller churches often springs from a desire to play more
active leadership roles in religious services, and in the religious community at large. Many
individuals feel restricted in terms of the degree to which they can ascend to meaningful
leadership roles within the established churches, especially the hierarchical Catholic Church
(Chapter 4). Therefore, as long as individuals hunger for opportunities for to engage in
greater leadership roles, and to engage in the kind of communication skills development
that pentecostal churches are perceived to offer, it will presumably be difficult to cap this
type of enthusiasm for experimentation with new church networks.
From the perspective of anti-democratic politicians in developing countries, the impli-
cations of this research may be troubling. I find strong evidence of established churches’
willingness to promote pro-poor, pro-democratic policy, at least in countries like Zambia
where they played leading roles in third wave transitions. Yet, there is little evidence that
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politicized propagation is a viable strategy in the long-run. In Zambia and Benin, for
instance, leaders who expressed interest in pursuing third term bids ultimately lacked the
support to do so, and competition among Pentecostals within ruling parties has often cost
individual politicians their desired outcome. Moreover, as Rev. Mwanza of the Evangelical
Fellowship of Zambia reported, it is difficult to mobilize meaningful support from across so
many decentralized religious institutions. Further research is needed to assess the degree
to which Pentecostals may or may not effectively reallocate support from a former ruling
party to a new ruling party after event of a transfer of power. While this did not occur during
the years following Sata’s surprise victory in Zambia in 2011, it is necessary to observe for a
longer time period before drawing conclusions.
5.3 Conceptual Connections: Relating Politicized Propaga-
tion to Theories of Nationalism
The final question that this chapter considers is the conceptual relationship between
politicized propagation and what scholars of nationalist politics refer to as nationalist
myth-making. A robust literature on nationalism has documented the ways in which
transitions to multiparty electoral politics (political liberalization) can incentivize ruling elite
to invest in new modes of identification, with the goal of legitimizing elites’ anti-democratic
reform. Rustow (1970), Snyder (2000), and Snyder and Mansfield (2005) document how
the expansion of mass politics before the establishment of key democratic institutions —
particularly a free press — enables elites to develop and “sell” nationalist myths to a newly
enfranchised public. Key to the success of these elites is retaining control over the “arena
of public discourse,” namely mass media, through which nationalist ideas could otherwise
face competition and lose credibility. Additionally, elites have historically combined the
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imposition of nationalist myths with diversionary conflict, which enhances the willingness
of the public to accept anti-democratic behavior.
To what extent does the trajectory of politicized pentecostalism in sub-Saharan Africa
mirror that of nationalist myth-making and elite persuasion throughout history? Aside
from the obvious similarities, there are several important differences. First, particularly
in traditional societies where spirituality and religion were deeply engrained in political
intuition and belief (Ter Haar and Ellis 2004), elite interventions and the actual evolution
of new religious movements are, ironically, subject to greater instability than top-down
nationalist movements facilitated by strong parties of the past. This is attributable in part to
identity-based outsourcing, by which I mean the degree to which politicians in the contexts
I study have often outsourced the construction and maintenance of party-voter linkages
through identity-based networks outside of the formal party structure.
In the Zambian case, for instance, it is notable that the long-ruling MMD party never
had formal control over the actions of its primary clientelist brokers — pentecostal leaders.
This degree of remove made the eventual rift between Pentecostals and Evangelicals over
the third term debate particularly damaging to the party. Similarly, the partial outsourcing
of party-voter ties to identity-based institutions in the form of pentecostal churches in the
early 1990s can be related to the profusion of competitive Christian parties that sprung up
to challenge the MMD in the mid- to late-1990s. It was likely the MMD’s use of overt political
repression and electoral manipulation that helped the MMD survive these splinter parties.
Therefore, although ethnic outbidding has long been an important feature of nationalist
politics, many of the MMD’s political setbacks have arisen as a result of the party’s lack of
direct, organizational control over the agents that do its bidding. In this sense, politicized
propagation appears to be a shakier, and perhaps less costly mode of building national
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constituencies and networks willing to undercut the Zambian regime’s most unflappable,
and capable watch dogs: the Catholic Church.
Further testament to the contingent and unstable nature of politicized pentecostalism is
the fact that, as literature on the political economy of religion reminds us, each pentecostal
church faces incentives to compete with other pentecostal churches. While this may increase
party control over dependent churches, to whom it relates in a hub-and-spokes network
structure (with the MMD at the center, and individual pentecostal leaders and their churches
at the end of each spoke), it also makes the party vulnerable to the possibility that social
entrepreneurs will hijack their religio-political discourse by building ties between the various
pentecostal (and other) churches. Such a revolution in the religious network structure of
pentecostalism would, in theory, resemble the changes that religious networks underwent
during the Protestant Reformation in early modern Europe (Nexon 2009).
Another important difference between nationalist myth-making and the kind of religious
discourse propounded through politicized propagation concerns the degree to which myths
and doctrine, respectively, are subject to public debate. Snyder (2000) defines modern
nationalist myths as assertions vulnerable to the loss of credibility if exposed to “rigorous,
disinterested public evaluation” (2000: 55). Religious doctrines, by contrast, make more
universal claims, which cannot be subjected to worldly “testing.” To the extent that
religious doctrine derives authority from alleged spiritual rather than scientific or rational
means, the conviction that follows from religious belief is always-already-believed-to-be-
proven. Importantly, it is this quality that enables religious leaders to proffer beliefs in post-
humous rewards (e.g., martyrdom), which can motivate particularly persistent and deadly
confrontation. It is difficult to think of examples where similar motivations led rank and
file nationalists to take similarly risky behavior. Instead, it was often the power of party and
state organizations that created the social pressure that drove men to fight in nationalist
“crusades.”
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A final area of difference between nationalism and elite investment in politicized prop-
agation concerns the mechanisms through which beliefs and attendant social networks
are developed, transmitted, and contested in each case. Many sub-Saharan countries are
characterized by low information environments, significant linguistic heterogeneity, and
sparsely populated, rural terrain. In such contexts, the importance of people-driven social
network expansion and idea promotion — typified by religious evangelism — has consti-
tuted the primary means for diffusion of sociopolitical and spiritual ideas and practices.4
This resonates with McAdam’s (2010) argument about the central role of religious institutions
in facilitating the US civil rights movement among oppressed minorities who lacked literacy
and the ability to contribute actively to popular media, for example.
As discussed in Chapter 1, the earliest gains made by grassroots pentecostal movements
in sub-Saharan Africa occurred primarily through face-to-face events, such as student
unions, campus (or other) crusades, and professional-religious associations. The self-
propagating and decentralized network structure of pentecostal Christianity has been cen-
tral to its ability to establish and grow new organizations throughout the African states where
it has gained a foothold. Therefore, although media also matters in cases of politicized
propagation, the ultimate means of movement-building have been face-to-face encounters,
wherein evangelists meet people “where they are at.”5 This differs significantly from the top-
down and complex party, media, and state organizations associated with most nationalist
movements.
Therefore, while there are many similarities between politicized propagation and mod-
ern nationalist movements, there are also important differences. These differences, in
particular, are fruitful terrain for future research, which could help to shed light on both
4See, for instance, Peel (1986) on the history of West African religious and political change during precolonial
times; or Wellbourn (1961, 1965) on East African Revival movements preceding decolonization.
5On the role of media in pentecostal movement growth in the region, see Marshall 1998; Hackett and Soares
2014.
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the intended and unintended consequences of politicized propagation in contemporary
developing states.
5.4 Closing Thoughts
Throughout the dissertation I have relied on the language of political economy to distinguish
the main goal of this study from research that seeks to explain individual-level demand
for Renewalist doctrine or worship practices. The main empirical contribution of this
dissertation has been to demonstrate the interrelated nature of religion and politics in the
region, and to provide compelling suggestive evidence that politicized propagation is one
determinant of variation in the supply of pentecostal churches across countries. Indeed,
evidence consistently indicated that local political actors have played important roles in
facilitating — or, in some cases, constraining — religious change within their borders. And
there is no question that in a number of cases, these political actors faced strong incentives
to do so.
While this dissertation has focused on explaining variation in the “supply” of new
religious movements, however, this should not be taken as a suggestion that political elites
can effectively control the vitality or the ultimate political impact of religious innovation
on public life. Wide-ranging and rich studies of religion and politics have concluded that,
at its heart, the relation between religion and politics is ambiguous: Religious principles,
resources, and mobilizing frames can be used to promote the agency, interests, and long-
run well-being of exploited groups (c.f., McAdam 1982; Trejo 2009; Smilde 2007). At the same
time, religious principles, resources, and mobilizing frames can be used, as Marx prophesied,
to distract, persuade, or control the masses (c.f., Grossman 2015). Many studies of religion
and politics have grappled with this fundamental “political ambivalence of religion” in
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a variety of contexts and religious traditions (Philpott 2007; McClendon and Riedl 2015;
Wadsworth 2014; Harris 1999).
With respect to the study of African pentecostalism, no one has addressed this ambiva-
lence more eloquently than Ruth Marshall, who invoked Hannah Arendt’s theory of human
action in her analysis. Focusing on the metaphor of rebirth in born again Christianity,
Marshall wrote:
The figure of the new birth reiterates the miracle of natality, the ontological
basis for the miraculous capacity of human action, of beginning something new.
. . . Even if Born-Again practice fails to enact the full experience of this capacity,
and if it reinserts this gift into an economy of exchange, . . . the urgency of the
promise of justice remains. . . . The urgency of this promise creates the force of
faith. This promise, perverted by the Born-Again attempt to monopolize and
control it, nonetheless reveals the general and universal hope for what is unseen,
a justice to come whose horizon is unlimited and entails the resurrection of
the dead and the new creation: beyond the particular figure of the Christian
messiah, a general messianic yearning for the ‘other’ who will come and bestow
the gift of life and justice, a hope against hope, as in Romans 8:24: “For we are
saved by hope: but hope that is seen is not hope: for what a man seeth, why doth
he yet hope for?” (Marshall 2009: 244).
Precisely because our instinctual quest for deeper meaning, new beginnings, and better
futures is so valuable, politicians and social entrepreneurs face strong incentives to manipu-
late it. It is important for scholars of ethnic and party politics, as well as religious studies, to
understand this. But just because elites seek to manipulate religious communities does not
mean that they will, ultimately, succeed. I hope that future studies build upon the concepts
and evidence presented in this dissertation to ask not whether politicized propagation exists,
nor what its short term consequences may be, but rather: Under what conditions are religious
participants able to tip the scales back towards the universal search for justice, even in the
face of elite manipulation and gross inequity? Only by engaging questions of both supply
and demand will we be able to more fully understand ongoing shifts in the endogenous
relationship between religion and politics, even within new conversionary movements.
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